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Abstract
This thesis delves into the nature and effects of financial and monetary policy design. It
comprises three chapters, each of which studies this topic from a different perspective and
with a focus on different frictions.
The first chapter derives theoretically the optimal monetary policy for a small open economy
characterized by the incompleteness of the domestic financial market. In the model, a
tight relationship between the consumption of different agents and the aggregate debt-
to-GDP ratio emerges in equilibrium. Optimal monetary policy is the result of a tradeoff
between the stabilization of this ratio (risk-sharing) and the traditional policy objectives of
price and output gap stabilization. Quantitative simulations suggest that price and output
stabilization dominate debt-to-GDP stabilization in the optimal policy rule. Unlike the case
of a closed economy, the policy objective of improving on risk-sharing is excessively costly
from the point of view of the policymaker when the economy is open.
The second chapter studies theoretical issues related to the unsecured consumer credit
market, normally characterized by incompleteness and poor protection of property rights.
The chapter describes a theoretical mechanism by which the interest rate to a given borrower
is affected by the default choices of other agents. Individual agents ignore the effect of their
own default choices on aggregate credit conditions, and thus the volume of unsecured credit
in a decentralized market will be generally inefficient. The chapter employs simulations
of the model to conclude that recently observed credit booms in Latin America may be
inefficient.
The third chapter analyzes empirically the relationship between information sharing and
credit outcomes in the unsecured consumer credit market, focusing on the potential ex-
post disciplinary effect and the ex-ante informational hold-up of long-lived negative infor-
mation about borrowers. The chapter exploits a natural experiment in Colombia created by
Law 1266/2008, whereby detailed information about past defaults that were exogenously
“sufficiently old” was erased from Private Credit Bureaus (in what follows, PCB). Using a
Differences-in-Differences (DD) specification, it is found that after old negative information
is erased, there is a significant increase in the size and maturity of new loans, no significant
changes in interest rates, and an increase in subsequent default rates for the treatment
group, relative to the control group. Overall, these results are consistent with both ex-post
disciplinary effects, and ex-ante information hold-up from long-lived negative information
in PCB. Specifically, consistent with the hold-up theories, the chapter finds that most of
the increase in the value of loans comes from outside banks. In addition, consistent with
the disciplinary role of information sharing, the chapter finds evidence of a relative increase
in the frequency of default for new loans after negative information is erased.
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1. Foreign Currency Debt and
Optimal Monetary Policy: Is There
a Role for the Exchange Rate in
Completing Markets?
This chapter aims to characterize the optimal monetary and exchange rate policies that a
small open economy should follow when there is an incomplete domestic financial market
in which financial instruments (assets and liabilities) are denominated in foreign currency.
The importance of the issues raised by the pervasiveness of foreign currency financial instru-
ments in an economy with market incompleteness is illustrated by the recent experience of
household debt in several Eastern European economies such as Serbia and, most especially,
Hungary (see Szpunar and Glogowski[76, 2012]). Since the beginning of the past decade,
and perhaps due to lower interest rates and to the expectations created by a tight channel
for the nominal exchange rate, Hungarian households started a process of rapid accumula-
tion of both assets and liabilities denominated in currencies other than the Hungarian Forint
(HUF), principally Swiss Francs (CHF).
The ratio of foreign currency household debt to GDP in Hungary increased from virtually
zero in 1999 to slightly above 29% at the beginning of 2009. According to Balás and Nagy[4,
2010], close to 90% of this debt was denominated in CHF, and only 7% was denominated in
Euros. Since then, borrowing in foreign currency has ground to a halt and the outstanding
balances have unravelled quickly in a context of financial turbulence for households, nominal
depreciation and extreme measures taken by Hungarian authorities with the aim of limiting
issuance of this type of liabilities (see Balogh et al[3, 2013]). At the beginning of 2013,
payments on about 20% of mortgages denominated in foreign currency in Hungary were
overdue (see WESP[80, 2013]); the government was publicly discussing with the financial
system the possibility to introduce differentiated exchange rates for households making
prepayments of debt in foreign currency.
The struggle of Hungarian households and of the Hungarian government is indicative of the
importance of monetary and exchange rate strategies in a context where financial contracts
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in foreign currency are pervasive, in particular taking into account (among others) the effect
of inflation and the nominal exchange rate on the financial health of domestic agents.
This chapter characterizes optimal monetary and exchange rate policies for an open econ-
omy where financial claims are denominated in foreign currency. The first section of the
chapter builds a New Keynesian model of the small open economy which is standard in
the literature except for the following two key features. The first consists of abandoning
the representative agent framework in the domestic economy with the aim of introducing
a domestic financial market. This market is incomplete in the sense that domestic house-
holds will only be able to lend and borrow to each other in a nominal, non-contingent debt
instrument1. This form of incompleteness will necessarily require some form of incomplete-
ness in the international financial market as well (that is, in the market where households
of different countries will exchange financial claims)2. The second key non-standard fea-
ture of the model is that the financial instrument traded by households of the domestic
economy is denominated in foreign currency. As was the case for Hungary in recent years,
the denomination of financial instruments will imply that the nominal exchange rate plays
a crucial role in the degree to which the households of the domestic economy share risk.
Importantly, the only driving force of the model is shocks to the productivity of labour.
Naturally, part of the strategy of monetary policy may include the decision to allow domestic
agents to take positions among themselves in foreign currency in the first place. In other
words, it is clear that the issues raised by the pervasiveness of foreign currency debt would
disappear had the policymaker forbidden households to take this positions. This chapter will
not consider the decision of the policymaker with regard to regulating ex-ante the ability
of households to trade financial instruments in foreign currency, but will rather focus on
optimal policy once financial contracts denominated in foreign currency have become a
dominant feature in the financial system of the economy3.
Beyond the effect of the nominal exchange rate on risk-sharing across domestic agents,
monetary policy is affected by the introduction of these new elements in several ways. In a
1In particular, the model assumes an overlapping generations (OLG) structure with different generations of
households that will borrow and lend from each other as a consequence of the fact that individual income
is characterized by a standard life-cycle pattern. The incompleteness of the domestic financial markets
will have the well-known implication that risk-sharing across generations is potentially suboptimal (from
the point of view of a benevolent policymaker). The potential effects of monetary and exchange rate
policies on risk-sharing across the generations of the model will be a key part of the story told by the
model.
2As will be seen, the model presented below will assume the most extreme form of international market
incompleteness, financial autarky. This implies that domestic households will not be able to share risk
with foreign households. In such a way, the model ’stacks the cards’ against risk sharing by domestic
households. This assumption, however, goes against the results of the model as eliminating it would
only weaken the incentive of optimal monetary policy to be proactive in the promotion of risk-sharing
across households if this had already been achieved by other means.
3For an account of a risk-sharing argument to explain the high pervasiveness of foreign currency financial
contracts in economies that recently achieved price stability, see Rappoport[67, 2009].
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closed economy setting, for example, Sheedy[74, 2013] has demonstrated that the introduc-
tion of market incompleteness in an economy with heterogeneous agents may potentially
render the strategy of inflation targeting suboptimal when compared to a Nominal GDP
targeting rule. The intuition for this result is straightforward and, given its importance to
understand the results of this chapter, it merits a brief consideration.
The basic model by Sheedy[74, 2013] considers an endowment economy with flexible prices,
where the only existing friction is the financial market incompleteness, where households
can trade only a nominal, non-contingent bond. This incompleteness implies that ex-post,
aggregate risk is potentially unevenly shared across households. For instance, when inflation
is constant (say, because of the Central Bank following an Inflation Targeting rule), creditors
are relatively isolated from any productivity shock (they hold a non-contingent bond in real
terms) whereas debtors are overly exposed to risk (their capacity to fulfil financial promises is
affected by changes in income). From the point of view of ex-ante efficiency and given that
households are risk-averse, a benevolent policymaker would like to devise a mechanism to
transfer wealth from creditors to debtors after a particularly bad shock4. That mechanism is
inflation, which changes the real burden of debt for debtors. The wealth transfers induced by
inflation (which are not arbitrary but specifically engineered as part of an optimal monetary
policy strategy) improve on risk-sharing and increase welfare from an ex-ante perspective.
The combination of market incompleteness with debt instruments denominated in foreign
currency introduces additional considerations for a policymaker concerned about ex-ante
risk-sharing, price stability and output gap stability. First, on the risk-sharing front, nominal
depreciation emerges as an additional mechanism to transfer wealth across households.
However, the ability of monetary policy to steer the nominal exchange rate and inflation
in potentially different directions is related to its ability to control the real exchange rate,
the terms of trade and output. In principle, a negative productivity shock should trigger
nominal appreciations (and vice versa) in order to reduce the value of outstanding debt
liabilities, and thus transfer wealth from creditors to debtors. However, the desire of the
policymaker to improve on risk-sharing this way clashes with its objective to stabilize output
and prices. In this sense, there is a trade-off for monetary policy between risk-sharing and
the standard macroeconomic objectives, which is essentially a quantitative matter.
Optimal monetary and exchange rate policies are characterized analytically in the second
section of this chapter by means of the Linear-Quadratic method. This is common to a
great portion of the literature on optimal policy in New Keynesian models. From this char-
acterization, the model provides a natural extension to the parametric condition studied
by Cole and Obstfeld[28, 1991]. In particular, it is found that the same condition studied
4In general, from an ex-ante perspective the policymaker would like to transfer wealth from low marginal
utility-households to high marginal utility-households after any aggregate shock. A negative (positive)
productivity shock will imply a relatively low (high) consumption -high (low) marginal utility- for debtors.
12
by those authors (namely, unitary elasticity of substitution across goods produced in dif-
ferent countries) is a sufficient condition for full risk-sharing across domestic households
independently of monetary policy.
The third section of the chapter studies the response of key variables of the model to a
negative productivity shock under the optimal policy rule compared to a set of alternative
policy regimes5: Producer Price Index (PPI) Inflation Targeting, Consumer Price Index
(CPI) Inflation Targeting and an Exchange Rate Peg. For the calibration considered, the
optimal monetary policy rule ascribes most of the weight in the abovementioned trade-off to
the standard macroeconomic objectives of price and output stabilization. To this purpose,
the policymaker will therefore mostly sacrifice risk-sharing considerations, which indicates
that the objective of improving on risk-sharing is excessively costly from the point of view of
the policymaker. In addition, some risk sharing takes place automatically if the calibration
is close to the parametric condition of Cole and Obstfeld[28, 1991], which reduces the
incentive of the policymaker to sacrifice the stability of inflation and output in favour of
risk-sharing. As a consequence, the optimal policy rule is found to be closest to PPI Inflation
Targeting than to Consumer Price Index Inflation Targeting or an Exchange Rate Peg, due
to the ability of the former to replicate the flexible price equilibrium allocation.
Despite optimal policy mostly sacrificing risk-sharing considerations, the nominal exchange
rate will still play an important role in creating ex-post redistributions of wealth. The fourth
section of the chapter calculates the relative welfare losses imposed on households by an
Exchange Rate Peg. It is found that a Peg can be significantly more harmful in terms of
welfare in the overlapping generations model of Section 1.1 than in standard, representative
agent models of the open economy, the reason being the need for the exchange rate to
respond actively to productivity shock in a context where risk is unevenly shared across the
small open economy.
The model of this chapter combines distinct elements from two separate areas of the
literature. The first strand focuses on the study of optimal policy in New Keynesian models
of the small open economy. The review by Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc[29, 2011] summarizes
the issues at hand in characterizing optimal monetary policy in this setting6. A seminal work
that inspires the spirit of this chapter is Galí and Monacelli[38, 2005], who derive optimal
policy for a small open economy under internationally complete markets. Di Paoli[62,
2009] abandons this last assumption to study optimal policy under different international
financial market structures, whereas Benigno and Benigno[5, 2006] abandon the small open
economy setting to explore the international coordination aspects of monetary policy. All
these papers assume that, at the national (domestic) level, either the economy is populated
5Following Galí and Monacelli[38, 2005].
6Key papers among this literature include Obstfeld and Rogoff[57, 1995], McCallum and Nelson[53, 2001],
Clarida, Galí and Gertler[27, 2001], Corsetti and Pesenti[30, 2001] and De Fiore and Liu[36, 2005].
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by a representative agent or by a continuum of identical households with perfect risk-
sharing across its members. This chapter abandons this assumption to postulate instead
the existence of a domestic financial market and imperfect risk-sharing at the national level.
The second strand of the literature is relatively younger, its main feature being the aban-
donment of the representative agent assumption to study optimal monetary policy under
incomplete markets in a closed economy, New Keynesian setting. Besides the work by
Sheedy[74, 2013] mentioned above, Pescatori[64, 2007] studies optimal policy as it relates
to ex-post wealth redistribution across rich and poor individuals. Finally, Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe[72, 2004] introduce nominal rigidities into the otherwise classical framework of
incomplete markets and optimal fiscal policy of Chari and Kehoe[24, 1999]. They discover
that optimal monetary policy will not perform a great deal of ex-post wealth redistribution
between the government and households as this would imply extremely volatile inflation.
The results of this chapter are similar to theirs in the sense of monetary policy being rela-
tively passive to risk-sharing considerations in order to avoid inflation variability, but in this
chapter tax smoothing plays no role, redistribution is made across households and the key
to the desirability of risk-sharing is risk aversion on the side of the latter.
This chapter therefore bridges the gap between these two strands of the literature by bor-
rowing the open economy insights of the former and combining them with the domestic
incomplete markets of the latter. The resulting framework is expanded to include foreign
currency denominated financial claims and in such way to most closely resemble the envi-
ronment of those group of economies (discussed above) most affected by the penetration
of foreign currency debt in incomplete markets.
1.1. The Model
The model follows closely the open economy structure of Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc[29,
2011] and the incomplete markets framework of Sheedy[74, 2013]. The model postulates a
world economy populated by a continuum of households of measure 1. A fraction n of these
individuals reside in country H (Home), and the remaining fraction 1− n reside in country
F (Foreign). There is an international bond market in which the only financial instrument
available is a nominal, one period, non-contingent bond denominated in the currency of
country F. While the Home economy will be characterized by a generational structure
that gives rise to a domestic financial market, the Foreign economy will be modeled as a
standard, representative agent economy.
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1.1.1. Households
1.1.1.1. Home Households
The Home economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure n. Each of
these households lives for three periods. In the first period, the household is young, and
his choice variables are indexed by y. In the second period, the household is middle-aged
(m), and in the third period the household is old (o). At a given time, three generations
(or cohorts) exist, each of which has a measure n3 . It is thus assumed that, at each period,
a new cohort of young households is born in a measure that exactly replaces the measure
of old households that die, in such a way that the demographic structure of the population
stays invariant over time. The problem faced by every new generation of young households
is given by:
max
{Ci,t,Hi,t}
Ut ≡
lnCy,t − α−ηy H
1+η
y,t
1+ η
+ βEt
lnCm,t+1 − α−ηm H
1+η
m,t+1
1+ η
 (1.1.1)
+ β2Et
{
lnCo,t+2 − α−ηo
H1+ηo,t+2
1+ η
}
where Ci,t represents the consumption at time t of a basket of Home and Foreign goods
by a household at period i of his life, Hi,t his individual supply of labour, and η > 0. The
set of parameters αi is related to the disutility of work for generation i. These parameters
are specified in such a way that, in equilibrium, the profile of total income over the lifetime
of an individual resembles a traditional life cycle pattern (i.e., relatively low income when
young and old, and relatively high income when middle-aged). The consumption basket is
defined by the following CES-type aggregator:
Ci,t =
[
a
1
φ
H
(
CHi,t
) φ−1
φ
+ (1− aH)
1
φ
(
CFi,t
) φ−1
φ
] φ
φ−1
(1.1.2)
with Cji,t denoting the consumption of goods produced in country j (in what follows, “j
goods”) at time t by a household in period i of his life. The parameter aH captures the
degree of “home bias” in consumption, and it can also be interpreted as a measure of the
“openness” of the economy. The parameter φ represents the elasticity of substitution across
H and F goods. The consumption of H and F goods is itself a CES-type aggregate of
infinite varieties produced in the respective country with a common elasticity of substitution
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e, as follows:
CHi,t =
 nˆ
0
(
1
n
) 1
e
CHi,t (j)
e−1
e dj
 ee−1 (1.1.3)
CFi,t =
 1ˆ
n
(
1
1− n
) 1
e
CFi,t (j)
e−1
e dj

e
e−1
where Cxi,t (j) denotes consumption of variety j produced in country x, and e > φ is
assumed7. The price of the consumption basket, or equivalently, the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) of the Home economy, is given, following standard results from CES-type aggregators,
by:
Pt =
[
aH
(
PHt
)1−φ
+ (1− aH)
(
PFt
)1−φ] 11−φ
(1.1.4)
where Pjt represents the nominal price of a good produced in country j at time t measured
in currency units of the Home economy, and Pxt is the price of a composite good produced
in country x, defined by:
PHt =
( 1
n
) nˆ
0
PHt (j)
1−e dj
 11−e (1.1.5)
PFt =
( 1
1− n
) 1ˆ
n
PFt (j)
1−e dj

1
1−e
PHt and PFt will be referred to in what follows as the Producer Price Indices (PPI) of the
Home and Foreign economies, respectively, as they measure the price level of those goods
produced within a given country. Finally, the allocation of the composite good produced in
7This assumption implies that varieties produced within a country are more similar (more substitutable)
than goods produced in different countries. See Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc[29, 2011].
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each country among each variety j is:
CHi,t (j) = aH
(
1
n
) [
PHt
PHt (j)
]e ( Pt
PHt
)φ
Ci,t (1.1.6)
CFi,t (j) = (1− aH)
(
1
1− n
) [
PFt
PFt (j)
]e ( Pt
PFt
)φ
Ci,t (1.1.7)
The budget constraints faced by a household at each of the three stages of his life, expressed
in units of the Home currency, are given by:
PtCy,t +QtBy,tet +
My,t
1+ it
≤ Wy,tHy,t + αyPt Jt − PtTy,t (1.1.8)
PtCm,t +QtBm,tet +
Mm,t
1+ it
≤ Wm,tHm,t + αmPt Jt − PtTm,t + By,t−1et (1.1.9)
+My,t−1
PtCo,t ≤ Wo,tHo,t + αoPt Jt − PtTo,t + Bm,t−1et (1.1.10)
+Mm,t−1
Qt is the price of a nominal, one period, non-contingent bond at time t. As this price
is measured in currency units of country F currency, the nominal exchange rate et is also
part of the budget constraint. One unit of this bond purchased at t promises the bearer
the payment of one unit of foreign currency at t + 1. The quantity of bonds purchased
by a household is denoted by B. Note that the nominal exchange rate et is an important
determinant of the burden of debt to be paid (or collected) by the middle-aged and old
generations at the beginning of each period. There is a Home Central Bank that produces
money, M. Households can deposit their holdings of money at the Central Bank at the
riskless nominal interest rate i. Individuals are ex-ante homogeneous in the sense of having
the same preferences, the same life cycle evolution of their endowment, and the same
(zero) initial wealth. Wi,t is the nominal wage and αi also represents the proportion of total
profits received by individuals of generation i8. Finally, Jt is the aggregate profits of firms in
country H and Ti,t represents lump-sum levied charged on generation i by the government
(in units of the composite good C). For future reference, let CHt and CFt denote aggregate
8These parameters αi coincide with the parameters of the disutility of labour in (1.1.1). It will be shown
this structure implies constancy of the shares of aggregate income received by each generation.
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home economy consumption of home and foreign goods respectively, defined as:
nCHt =
n
3
CHy,t +
n
3
CHm,t +
n
3
CHo,t (1.1.11)
nCFt =
n
3
CFy,t +
n
3
CFm,t +
n
3
CFo,t (1.1.12)
and aggregate consumption as:
nCt =
n
3
Cy,t +
n
3
Cm,t +
n
3
Co,t (1.1.13)
Optimality Conditions The necessary first order conditions of the optimization problem
(1.1.1) subject to (1.1.8)-(1.1.10) are reduced to the following set of Euler and intratemporal
equations:
β
Qt
Et
[
et+1
et
Pt
Pt+1
(
Cy,t
Cm,t+1
)]
= 1 (1.1.14)
β
Qt
Et
[
et+1
et
Pt
Pt+1
(
Cm,t
Co,t+1
)]
= 1 (1.1.15)
βEt
[
Pt
Pt+1
(
Cy,t
Cm,t+1
)]
=
1
1+ it
(1.1.16)
Ci,t
(
αi
Hi,t
)−η
= wi,t (1.1.17)
where wi,t = Wi,t/Pt denotes the real wage (expressed in units of the composite good).
1.1.1.2. Foreign Households
The Foreign economy is populated by a continuum of identical, infinitely-lived households
of measure 1− n. The problem of the representative household of this economy is given
by:
max
{C∗t ,H∗t }
U∗t = Et
∞
∑
τ=0
βτ
[
lnC∗t+τ −
(
H∗t+τ
)1+η
1+ η
]
(1.1.18)
where ’∗’ will refer in what follows to variables of the foreign economy. C∗t is a basket
of goods produced in the Home and the Foreign country analogous to (1.1.2) with a bias
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parameter a∗H. This parameter indicates the preference of the foreign households for H
goods and represents a measure of the “foreign bias” of the Foreign economy. The expres-
sions for the consumption aggregators, CPI, PPI and optimal consumption allocation of
the Foreign economy are analogous to (1.1.4)-(1.1.7) replacing respective terms with CH∗t ,
CF∗t , CH∗t (j), CF∗t (j), P∗t , PH∗t , PF∗t , PH∗t (j), PF∗t (j), where price levels are denominated
in units of the foreign currency.
The budget constraint of the representative household of the foreign economy (in units of
the foreign currency) is given by:
P∗t C∗t +QtB∗t +
M∗t
1+ i∗t
= W∗t H∗t + P∗t J∗t − P∗t T∗t +M∗t−1 + B∗t−1 (1.1.19)
where the nominal exchange rate is not included as long as the prices and quantities of
bonds/securities are denominated in the currency of the foreign country. There is also
a Foreign Central Bank who produces money M∗ and riskless deposits for money at the
nominal interest rate i∗. The remaining variables have the analogous interpretation as in
the Home economy.
Optimality Conditions The necessary first order conditions of the optimization problem
of the foreign household (1.1.18) subject to the sequence of constraints (1.1.19) are given
by:
βEt
[
P∗t
P∗t+1
(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)]
= Qt (1.1.20)
βEt
[
P∗t
P∗t+1
(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)]
=
1
1+ i∗t
(1.1.21)
C∗t (H∗t )
η = w∗t (1.1.22)
where w∗t = W∗t/P∗t is the real wage of the foreign economy.
1.1.1.3. Interest Rate Parity
From the optimality conditions of households across the world it is possible to derive a
version of the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity Condition (UIP). From (1.1.20) and (1.1.21),
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it is the case that:
Qt =
1
1+ i∗t
(1.1.23)
From (1.1.14) and (1.1.16), using (1.1.23), the UIP condition is:
(1+ i∗t ) Et
[
et+1
et
Pt
Pt+1
(
Cy,t
Cm,t+1
)]
= Et
[
Pt
Pt+1
(
Cy,t
Cm,t+1
)]
(1+ it) (1.1.24)
1.1.2. Terms of Trade, Real Exchange Rate and Demand
Functions
Let St denote the terms of trade of the Home economy, defined as the relative price of
foreign goods in terms of home goods:
St ≡ P
F
t
PHt
(1.1.25)
Let Ωt denote the real exchange rate of the home economy, defined as the ratio between
the CPI of the foreign and the home economies, expressed in the same currency:
Ωt ≡ etP
∗
t
Pt
(1.1.26)
In what follows, a law of one price for individual varieties produced in both countries is
assumed9. For goods produced in country x:
Pxt (j) = etP
x∗
t (j) (1.1.27)
It is straightforward to demonstrate that (1.1.27) implies:
etPH∗t = PHt etPF∗t = PFt (1.1.28)
The real exchange rate is therefore rewritten as:
Ωt ≡
[
a∗H
(
PHt
)1−φ
+ (1− a∗H)
(
PFt
)1−φ
aH
(
PHt
)1−φ
+ (1− aH)
(
PFt
)1−φ
] 1
1−φ
(1.1.29)
9This result can also be endogenously derived assuming producer-currency pricing on the side of firms,
given the common elasticity of substitution e across varieties in local aggregators.
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The real exchange rate collapses to 1 if aH = a∗H. As will be seen, the ability of monetary
policy to alter real outcomes in the Home economy is tightly linked to its ability to control
the real exchange rate. Therefore, for the rest of the chapter it is assumed that aH 6= a∗H10.
1.1.2.1. Demand Functions
For the specification of the problems of firms, it will be useful to calculate the aggregate
demand for a given variety produced in a given country. For varieties produced at Home
and in the Foreign economy respectively, these will be given by:
YH,dt (j) = nC
H
t (j) + (1− n)CH∗t (j)
YF,dt (j) = nC
F
t (j) + (1− n)CF∗t (j)
Using (1.1.6), (1.1.7) and (1.1.11)-(1.1.13), these can be rewritten as:
YH,dt (j) =
(
Pt
PHt
)φ [ PHt
PHt (j)
]e
Ydt (1.1.30)
YF,dt (j) =
(
Pt
PFt
)φ [ PFt
PFt (j)
]e
Y∗dt (1.1.31)
where Ydt = aHCt +
(
1−n
n
)
a∗HΩ
φ
t C
∗
t is the total demand faced by the Home economy
and Y∗dt =
( n
1−n
)
(1− aH)Ct + (1− a∗H)C∗tΩφt is the total demand faced by the Foreign
economy.
1.1.3. Firms
1.1.3.1. Home Firms
A typical firm in the Home economy operates in a monopolistically competitive environment,
producing a differentiated good (j) with the following linear technology in labour:
YHt (j) = AtNt (j) (1.1.32)
10Notice this assumption need not imply the existence of home bias, which is observed when aH > 1/2.
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At represents the total productivity of labour and constitutes the only exogenous stochastic
process of the economy. Following the literature on wage stickiness in New Keynesian mod-
els (in particular Erceg et al[34, 2000]), the demand for labour from different generations
is aggregated using a Cobb-Douglas specification11:
Nt (j) = ANy,t (j)
αy
3 Nm,t (j)
αm
3 No,t (j)
αo
3 (1.1.33)
with A =
[(
αy
3
) αy
3 ( αm
3
) αm
3
(
αo
3
) αo
3
]−1
, and where Ni,t (j) is the employment of hours of
labour by individuals of generation i. Firms receive a proportional wage bill subsidy τ on
labour costs. The firm solves a problem of allocating labour from different generations
analogous to the one faced by the households when allocating components of a composite
consumption basket. The cost-minimizing generational labour demand functions are given
by:
αi
3
wt
wi,t
Nt (j) = Ni,t (j) i = y,m, o. (1.1.34)
where wt = w
αy
3
y,tw
αm
3
m,tw
αo
3
o,t is the real wage index of the Home economy. The problem of the
home firm is to maximise the present value of lifetime instantaneous profits in real terms:
JHt (j) =
PHt (j)Y
H
t (j)
Pt
− (1− τ)× (1.1.35)[
wy,tNy,t (j) + wm,tNm,t (j) + wo,tNo,t (j)
]
The absence of intertermporal elements makes the cost minimization problem essentially
static. Using (1.1.32), (1.1.34) and (1.1.30), the problem of firms can be redefined as:
max
PHt (j)
JHt (j) =
{
PHt (j)
Pt
(
Pt
PHt
)φ [ PHt
PHt (j)
]e
− (1.1.36)
(1− τ) xt
(
Pt
PHt
)φ [ PHt
PHt (j)
]e}
Ydt (1.1.37)
where xt = wtAt is the aggregate marginal cost and Pt, xt, P
H
t and Ydt are taken as given.
The solution of this problem depends on the price formation mechanisms of the economy.
11Erceg et al[34, 2000] employ a general CES aggregator for heterogeneous labour; the specification used
in this chapter borrows the idea of using consumption-style aggregators.
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Price Stickiness: Different Information Sets It is assumed that all firms set prices
in the currency of the producer country (referred to in the literature as Producer Currency
Pricing, PCP). This chapter considers a form of price rigidity in which different firms have
random access to a different set of information. In particular, a fraction 1− κ of firms in
the Home economy sets an optimal price with information up-to-date at the moment of
making choices (that is, Pt, xt, PHt and Ydt are observed at the moment of solving problem
(1.1.36)). The remaining fraction κ sets an optimal price at t with the information set of
period t− 1, and must therefore rely on forecasts of the relevant variables Pt, xt, PHt and
Ydt . Notice that all firms are allowed to change prices between time periods.
The first order condition of problem (1.1.36) is common for all firms operating under full
information. The optimal price will be therefore common among this group and equal to:
PˆHt = xtµ (1− τ) Pt (1.1.38)
where µ = ee−1 , with µ (1− τ) being the “gross effective markup” (net of the wage
subsidy) charged by firms over marginal cost in nominal terms.
All firms with lagged information, on the other hand, solve the following problem:
max
PHt (j)
Et−1 JHt (j) (1.1.39)
where PHt (j) = Et−1
[
PHt (j)
]
. The first order condition of this problem is:
Et−1
{(
PˇHt
PHt
)−e ( Pt
PHt
)φ
Ydt
[
PˇHt
Pt
− µ (1− τ) xt
]}
= 0 (1.1.40)
where PˇHt is the common price chosen by these firms. From the definition of the PPI
(1.1.5):
(
PHt
)1−e
=
(
1
n
) nˆ
0
PHt (j)
1−e dj = (1− κ)
(
PˆHt
)1−e
+ κ
(
PˇHt
)1−e
(1.1.41)
Letting p̂Ht =
PˆHt
PHt
and pˇHt =
PˇHt
PHt
, we can relate the prices set by firms belonging to different
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groups as follows:
1 = (1− κ)
(
pˆHt
)1−e
+ κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e
pˆHt =
[
1
1− κ −
κ
1− κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e] 11−e
(1.1.42)
These results allow the pricing equations to be rewritten as follows for the relative prices
under full information:
pˆHt = xtµ (1− τ)
Pt
PHt
(1.1.43)
and for the relative prices under outdated information:
Et−1
{(
pˇHt
)−e ( Pt
PHt
)φ−1
Ydt
(
pˇHt −
[
1
1− κ −
κ
1− κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e] 11−e)}
(1.1.44)
= 0
Importantly, (1.1.43) and (1.1.44) depend on the ratio between the CPI and the PPI at
Home, which is related (as will be shown) to the terms of trade, St. This observation will
result in the Phillips curve of the Home economy depending on its terms of trade.
1.1.3.2. Foreign Firms
A typical firm in the Foreign economy operates in a monopolistically competitive environ-
ment, but (for simplicity) it is assumed that it is not subject to any form of price stickiness.
The production function of a Foreign firm is given by:
YF∗t (j) = N∗t (j) (1.1.45)
where the total productivity of labour has been set to 1. Foreign firms use only one type
of labour, supplied by the representative household of the foreign economy. Following an
analogous procedure as in the previous section, the relative price set by all firms in the
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Foreign economy is given by:
pˆF∗t = x∗t µ (1− τ)
P∗t
PF∗t
= 1 (1.1.46)
where x∗t = w∗t , pˆF∗t =
PˆF∗t
PF∗t
and the remaining variables have an analogous interpretation
to those in the Home economy.
1.1.4. Governments
The only role of the governments in both the Home and Foreign economies is to transfer
lump-sum taxes levied on households to firms as wage subsidies with the sole purpose
of eliminating market power inefficiencies from the side of firms that are not perfectly
competitive. This means that the wage bill subsidy rate τ will be engineered in such a
way that the gross effective markup is one: τ = e−1. The budget constraint of the Home
government is given by:
nTt =
n
3
Ty,t+
n
3
Tm,t+
n
3
To,t = e−1
nˆ
0
[
wy,tNy,t (j) + wm,tNm,t (j) + wo,tNo,t (j)
]
dj
(1.1.47)
Assume that the proportion of aggregate government revenue coming from each generation
is equal to the disutility parameter αi: Ti,t = αiTt. For the Foreign government,
(1− n) Tt = e−1
1ˆ
n
w∗t N∗t (j) dj (1.1.48)
1.1.5. Aggregate Equilibrium Conditions
The components described so far allow the construction of a simple condition that relates
aggregate demand to aggregate supply in each of the two economies of the model. For
the case of the Home economy, condition (1.1.30) implies that an individual variety market
clearing condition can be written as:
YHt (j) =
(
Pt
PHt
)φ [ PHt
PHt (j)
]e
Ydt (1.1.49)
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for all j. In what follows, let nYt =
´ n
0
PHt (j)Y
H
t (j)
Pt dj denote the real GDP in the Home
country in terms of the composite good. Then, by (1.1.49), the aggregate equilibrium
condition of the Home economy is:
Yt = Ydt
(
Pt
PHt
)φ−1
(1.1.50)
where we have used (1.1.5). The left hand side of expression (1.1.50) corresponds to the
total supply of the economy. This can be transformed into an aggregate production function
of the Home economy using the equilibrium conditions of the labour markets:
nˆ
0
Ni,t (j) dj =
n
3
Hi,t (1.1.51)
Letting nNt =
´ n
0 Nt (j) dj denote the aggregate demand for labour of the Home economy,
and using (1.1.32) and (1.1.50) in (1.1.49), the aggregate production function of the
economy is obtained:
Yt = AtNt
(
Pt
PHt
)−1
Ft (1.1.52)
where Ft =
{
(1− κ)
[
1
1−κ − κ1−κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e] −e1−e
+ κ
(
pˇHt
)−e}−1 captures the distorsions
created by price dispersion in the Home economy.
Finally, for the Foreign economy, letting (1− n)Y∗t =
´ 1
n
PF∗t (j)YF∗t (j)
P∗t
dj denote the foreign
real GDP, the equilibrium conditions imply:
Y∗t = Y∗dt Ω
−φ
t
(
P∗t
PF∗t
)φ−1
(1.1.53)
and the aggregate production function is obtained following a similar procedure as above
(the foreign labour market equilibrium condition being
´ 1
n N
F∗
t (j) dj = (1− n)H∗t ):
Y∗t = H∗t
(
P∗t
PF∗t
)−1
(1.1.54)
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1.1.5.1. Non-Financial Household Income
The structure of the model described so far implies that the equilibrium non-financial income
of a given generation at Home is a constant share of aggregate nominal GDP. Using (1.1.34),
(1.1.51), and the definition of aggregate profits at Home nJHt =
´ n
0 J
H
t (j) dj :
Wi,tHi,t + αiPt Jt − PtTi,t = αiPtYt (1.1.55)
Following a similar case, the total nominal non-financial income of the foreign household
is equal to P∗t Y∗t . As discussed above, the parameters αy, αm, and αo are set such that
the profile of total non-financial income over the lifetime of an individual resembles a
traditional life cycle pattern. Following Sheedy[74, 2013], this pattern is reduced to a
structural parameter γ that relates the set of αi as follows:
αy = 1− βγ αm = 1+ (1+ β) γ αo = 1− γ (1.1.56)
with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 representing the slope of the life-cycle income pattern. Total non-financial
income will be therefore maximum while middle-aged and minimum while old. The structure
of the Home economy can be reduced to a simple representative economy framework by
setting γ = 0. In that case, all generations are exactly the same ex-ante and ex-post,
and there will be no trade in the domestic financial market. The domestic financial market
will emerge as a result of different generations having different incomes (γ > 0), different
propensities to save and/or borrow and a desire to smooth consumption across their lifetime.
1.1.6. Marginal Cost and the Phillips Curve
The Phillips curve of the Home economy can be derived from the first order conditions of
households and from the pricing equations. From (1.1.17):
C
1
1+η
i,t (wtNt)
η
1+η = wi,t (1.1.57)
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Using the definition of the real wage and the aggregate production function (1.1.52), the
real marginal cost can be rewritten as:
xt =
C
αy
3
y,tC
αm
3
m,tC
αo
3
o,t
(At)
1+η
[
Yt
Ft
(
Pt
PHt
)]−η (1.1.58)
Using (1.1.42), (1.1.58) and µ (1− τ) = 1, the pricing equation (1.1.43) can be reex-
pressed as:
[
1
1− κ −
κ
1− κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e] 11−e
=
C
αy
3
y,tC
αm
3
m,tC
αo
3
o,t
(At)
1+η
[
Yt
Ft
(
Pt
PHt
)]−η PtPHt (1.1.59)
Equation (1.1.59) represents the non-linear Phillips curve of the Home economy. The left
hand side of this expression includes elements related to the degree of price stickiness and
to inflation, whereas the right hand side relates to the real side of the economy (recall the
ratio between Pt and PHt is related to the terms of trade, a real variable). For the foreign
economy, the analogous expression is:
1 =
C∗σt[
YF∗t
(
P∗t
PF∗t
)]−η P∗tPF∗t (1.1.60)
1.1.7. The Equilibrium of a Small Open Home Economy under
Financial Autarky
The system that characterizes the world equilibrium is composed of equations (1.1.8)-
(1.1.10), (1.1.14)-(1.1.16), (1.1.19), (1.1.21), (1.1.44), (1.1.50), (1.1.53), (1.1.59), (1.1.60),
and a market clearing condition for the international bond market:
n
3
(
By,t + Bm,t
)
+ (1− n) B∗t = 0 (1.1.61)
using (1.1.23) to replace Qt everywhere. Following di Paoli[62, 2009], the Home economy
can be reduced to a small open economy by taking the limit of the system of equations
when n→ 0 and a∗H → 0. For simplicity and to preserve international trade, the additional
assumption of
(
1−n
n
)
a∗H → 1− aH is imposed.
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It is also assumed that the Foreign economy is in a steady state with zero inflation and zero
initial wealth, which in equilibrium implies B∗ = 0 for all t. The latter implies the following
financial autarky condition:
By,t = −Bm,t = Bt (1.1.62)
which indicates that any resources borrowed by the young generation must be lent by the
middle-aged generation. It is in this sense that the financial market is domestic, under
the assumption of financial autarky in international markets. The latter implies that the
only possibility for domestic (that is, Home economy) households to share risk is through a
domestic financial market. International risk sharing is not allowed in the model12. Adding
up the set of budget constraints of the Home economy (1.1.8)-(1.1.10), using (1.1.55) and
(1.1.56), the following simple trade balance condition is derived.
Ct = Yt (1.1.63)
A similar condition for the Foreign economy (C∗ = Y∗) is derived directly from (1.1.53)
using a∗H → 0 and P∗ = PF∗.
The condition a∗H → 0 also implies the following relationships between the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate and the ratio between the CPI and the PPI in the Home economy:
Ωt =
[
aHS
φ−1
t + (1− aH)
] 1
φ−1 (1.1.64)
Pt
PHt
=
[
aH + (1− aH) S1−φt
] 1
1−φ (1.1.65)
Equation (1.1.63) can be combined with (1.1.50), (1.1.64), (1.1.65) and the trade balance
condition in the Foreign economy to obtain:
[
aHS
φ−1
t + (1− aH)
] φ
φ−1 ∆t = S
1−φ
t (1.1.66)
where ∆t = Y
∗
Yt is a measure of relative incomes across countries. Equation (1.1.66)
12In a world without financial autarky, domestic households could potentially trade financial instruments
and share risk with households in other countries. Thus, as mentioned before, the assumption of
financial autarky “stacks the cards” against the ability of Home households to share risk and insure
against productivity shocks. As will be seen in Section 1.2, the policymaker does not have a strong
incentive to improve on risk-sharing relative to the decentralized equilibrium. Therefore, if anything,
the assumption of financial autarky goes against the results of the chapter, insofar as eliminating it
would reduce further the incentive of the policymaker to take action to improve risk-sharing across
households of the Home economy, as households would be able to share risk by other means (with the
reset of the world). As a consequence, introducing some possibility of international risk sharing would
only strengthen the conclusions of the simulations of optimal monetary policy presented below.
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determines the terms of trade of the Home economy.
These observations permit the reduction of the system that characterizes the equilibrium
of the Home economy to the following equations (lower-case variables have been scaled by
Yt ):
βEt
[
Rt+1
Gt+1
(
cy,t
cm,t+1
)]
= 1 (1.1.67)
βEt
[
Rt+1
Gt+1
(
cm,t
co,t+1
)]
= 1 (1.1.68)
βEt
[
It
Πt+1Gt+1
(
cy,t
cm,t+1
)]
= 1 (1.1.69)
cy,t + lt = 1− βγ (1.1.70)
cm,t − lt = 1+ (1+ β) γ+ dt (1.1.71)
co,t = 1− γ− dt (1.1.72)[
aHS
φ−1
t + (1− aH)
] φ
φ−1 ∆t = S
1−φ
t (1.1.73)
Et−1
{(
pˇHt
)−e
YHt
(
pˇHt −
[
1
1− κ −
κ
1− κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e] 11−e)}
= 0 (1.1.74)
F−ηt (At)
−η−1 Y(1+η)t c
αy
3
y,tc
αm
3
m,tc
αo
3
o,t × (1.1.75)[
aH + (1− aH) S1−φt
] 1+η
1−φ
=
[
1
1− κ −
κ
1− κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e] 11−e
{
(1− κ)
[
1
1− κ −
κ
1− κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e] −e1−e
+ κ
(
pˇHt
)−e}−1
= Ft (1.1.76)
Rt =
I¯∗ξt
Πt
(1.1.77)
where cy,t ≡ Cy,tYt , cm,t ≡
Cm,t
Yt , co,t ≡
Co,t
Yt , Gt =
Yt
Yt−1 , ξt =
et
et−1 , Πt =
Pt
Pt−1 , lt =
QtBtet
PtYt ,
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dt =
Bt−1et
PtYt , It = 1 + it and I¯
∗ is the gross steady state nominal interest rate of the
Foreign economy. In this setting, lt denotes the end-of-period debt-to-GDP ratio, whereas
dt denotes the ratio between debt maturing at the beginning of time t and GDP. This
beginning-of-period debt-to-GDP ratio will be the focus of the analysis of optimal monetary
policy undertaken below, for it is intuitively the variable through which redistributions of
wealth ex-post across borrowers and lenders operate. Equation (1.1.77) describes the ex-
post real interest rate of the nominal, non-contingent bond traded within the domestic
financial market of the Home economy13. As mentioned above, changes in this ex-post real
interest rate (caused by changes in inflation or nominal depreciation) will create ex-post
redistributions of wealth across lenders and borrowers, and therefore will be potentially
important in the degree of risk-sharing across generations within the Home economy.
The system has the following endogenous variables: cy,t , cm,t , co,t , dt , lt, ξt , Πt, It,
Rt, Ft, pˇHt , St and Yt. To this system of equations it is necessary to append the definition
dt = lt−1 RtGt and the policy rule. Following the optimal monetary policy literature, the
policy rule will be provided by the solution to the optimal monetary policy problem in the
form of a targeting rule for a set of key variables.
1.1.7.1. The Equilibrium of the Loglinearized System
Following standard practice, the non-linear system of equations (1.1.67)-(1.1.77) will be
solved after being reexpressed in the form of logarithmic deviations from a deterministic
steady state. In what follows, let x˜t = ln (xt/x¯) denote the logarithmic deviation of variable
x from its deterministic steady state value x¯. The following proposition characterizes the
deterministic steady state of the Home economy.
Proposition 1. Assuming A¯ = 1 and ∆¯ = 1, there exists a symmetric steady state where
c¯y = 1, c¯m = 1, c¯o = 1, l¯ = −βγ, d¯ = −γ, β (1+ r¯) = 1, S¯ = 1, Y¯ = 1, ¯ˇpH = F¯ = 1
and ξ¯ = Π¯. Proof: See Appendix A.1.
13It is important to distinguish between the ex-post real interest rate of the economy, R, and the ex-ante
real interest rate, which is related to the expectation of R and is crucial in the intertemporal allocation
of consumption as indicated in equations (1.1.67)-(1.1.68).
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The loglinearized system can be written as follows:
EtR˜t+1 + c˜y,t − EtG˜t+1 − Et c˜m,t+1 = 0 (1.1.78)
EtR˜t+1 + c˜m,t − EtG˜t+1 − Et c˜o,t+1 = 0 (1.1.79)
I˜t = Etξ˜t+1 (1.1.80)
c˜y,t = βγl˜t (1.1.81)
c˜m,t + βγl˜t = −γl˜t−1 − γ
(
R˜t − G˜t
)
(1.1.82)
c˜o,t = γl˜t−1 + γ
(
R˜t − G˜t
)
(1.1.83)
d˜t = l˜t−1 + R˜t − G˜t (1.1.84)
S˜t = −ψY˜t (1.1.85)
− κ
1− κ
(
Et−1Π˜Ht − Π˜Ht
)
= (1− η) (Y˜t − A˜t) (1.1.86)
+
(αy
3
c˜y,t +
αm
3
c˜m,t +
αo
3
c˜o,t
)
+ (1− η) (1− aH) S˜t
F˜t = 0 (1.1.87)
R˜t = −aHψ
(
Y˜t − Y˜t−1
)
(1.1.88)
with ψ = [1− φ (1+ aH)]−1. The following set of observations are in order.
First, equation (1.1.85) pins down the log-deviation of the terms of trade from its steady
state only from the log-deviation of GDP. This relationship comes directly from equation
(1.1.73).
Second, equation (1.1.88) reveals that the evolution of GDP also determines the log-
deviation of the real interest rate. This equation is derived from the definition of the real
interest rate (which in log-deviation corresponds to R˜t = Ξ˜t− Π˜t), using equation (1.1.85)
and the definitions of the log-deviations of St and Πt:
S˜t − S˜t−1 ≡ ξ˜t − Π˜Ht Π˜t = aHΠ˜Ht + (1− aH) ξ˜t
with ΠHt = PHt /PHt−1 being the PPI inflation rate of the Home economy. In other words,
when expressed in loglinear deviations from the deterministic steady state, changes in real
GDP are related to changes in the terms of trade that in turn create changes in the real
interest rate through changes in the nominal depreciation and PPI inflation of the Home
economy.
Third, equation (1.1.86) corresponds to the Phillips curve of the Home economy, and is
derived as a loglinear approximation of the pricing equation (1.1.59) around the deterministic
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steady state, using the fact that ˜ˇpHt = Et−1Π˜Ht − Π˜Ht .
Finally, equation (1.1.80) is the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity Condition in log-deviation
form.
1.1.7.2. The Natural Allocation and Risk-Sharing
The system of equations (1.1.78)-(1.1.88) is easily solved taking into account that the
subsystem composed by equations (1.1.78)-(1.1.83) coincides exactly with the system of
equations of a closed economy described in Sheedy[74, 2013]. The solution of this subsys-
tem is therefore established immediately from the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The solution of the system of equations (1.1.78)-(1.1.88) is given by:
Etd˜t+1 = λd˜t (1.1.89)
R˜t = d˜t +
d˜t−1
θ
+ G˜t (1.1.90)
c˜y,t = −γβ
θ
d˜t c˜m,t = −γ
(
1− β
θ
)
d˜t c˜o,t = γd˜t (1.1.91)
with θ and λ denoting combinations of structural parameters of the economy described in
Appendix A.2.
Proof: Sheedy[74, 2013].
A particular type of equilibrium allocation that will be useful is given by studying a hy-
pothetical small open Home economy where markets are complete (that is, where there
is full risk sharing) and prices are flexible (κ = 0). This allocation will be referred to as
the “natural” allocation of the small open economy, and is characterized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. The natural allocation of the small open economy subsystem of equations
(1.1.78)-(1.1.88) is given by:
d˜nt = 0
R˜nt = G˜
n
t
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c˜ny,t = c˜
n
m,t = c˜
n
o,t = 0
where “n” denotes the “natural” allocation.
Proof: Sheedy[74, 2013].
Equation (1.1.91) indicates that the fluctuations of consumption across the different gen-
erations of the Home economy are tightly linked in equilibrium to the fluctuations of the
debt-to-GDP ratio, d˜t. Proposition 3 indicates that, under complete markets at Home, d˜t
is fully stabilized at zero. Therefore, the degree of risk-sharing across generations (that is,
the degree in which the decentralized equilibrium replicates the complete markets alloca-
tion) depends crucially on the degree in which the debt-to-GDP ratio is stabilized. From
equation (1.1.90), the stabilization of d˜t is related in equilibrium to the degree to which
the real interest rate responds (in the same direction) to changes in the growth rate of
the economy. That is, a recessionary shock should trigger a fall in the real interest rate,
and vice versa. From equation (1.1.85), this latter response is related to the endogenous
reaction of output fluctuations to shocks to labour productivity, A˜t.
Considering only the objective of replicating the complete markets allocation and improving
on risk-sharing across generations, the required response of the real interest rate to produc-
tivity shocks also highlights the role of the nominal exchange rate in completing markets.
Given PPI inflation, equation (1.1.77) indicates that the fall in the real interest rate required
after a recessionary shock in order to help replicate the complete markets allocation can
be brought about only through a nominal appreciation, which in turn implies an increase
in St. This observation lends a key role to the nominal exchange rate in risk-sharing in a
world where financial transactions are denominated in foreign currency: given PPI inflation,
nominal appreciation reduces the real burden of debt and redistributes wealth from the
creditor generation to the debtor generation. The quantitative relevance of this role will be
explored in detail below.
The model thus implies a trade-off for monetary policy in the face of technological shocks:
the desire by the policymaker to steer the economy towards a more stable debt-to-GDP
ratio for more risk-sharing across generations potentially requires a more volatile output and
(due to the Phillips curve) more volatile inflation, which generally will also be part of the
objective of the policymaker. This trade-off will depend on the specific set of parameter
values chosen and is therefore a quantitative matter.
Using the results from Propositions 2 and 3, defining the output gap of the Home economy
as Yˆt ≡ Y˜t − Y˜nt = Y˜t − A˜t1−(1−aH)ψ and the terms of trade gap as Sˆt = S˜t − S˜nt =
S˜t+
ψ
1−(1−aH)ψ A˜t, the system of equations that characterizes the equilibrium of the Home
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economy can be reduced to:
Etd˜t+1 = λd˜t (1.1.92)
(1+ aHψ)
(
Yˆt − Yˆt−1
)
= −d˜t − d˜t−1
θ
− 1+ aHψ
1− (1− aH)ψ × (1.1.93)(
A˜t − A˜t−1
)
− κ
1− κ
(
Et−1Π˜Ht − Π˜Ht
)
= (1+ η) Yˆt−ζ
θ
d˜t+ (1+ η) (1− aH) Sˆt (1.1.94)
Sˆt = −ψYˆt (1.1.95)
where ζ =
[
1−βγ
3 βγ+ γ (θ − β) 1+γ(1+β)3 − γθ 1−γ3
]
. Given the policy rule and a stochas-
tic process for A˜t, this system of equations provides the solution for the endogenous variables
d˜t, Yˆt, Sˆt and Π˜Ht . This system of equations will constitute the set of constraints on a
policymaker seeking to establish and implement an optimal monetary policy strategy. The
following section is devoted to the analysis of the problem of the policymaker.
1.2. Optimal Monetary Policy
The Optimal Monetary Policy strategy will result from a benevolent policymaker/Central
Bank who attempts to maximize the following welfare function, which comprises the weighted
sum of utilities of every generation living in the Home economy at all times:
Wo = E0
[
1
3
∞
∑
t=−2
βtUt
]
(1.2.1)
subject to the system of equations (1.1.92)-(1.1.95)14. This optimization problem will be
solved using the common approach in the New Keynesian literature developed by Rotem-
berg and Woodford[69, 1998] and Benigno and Woodford[7, 2004], which consists in con-
structing a second order approximation of the welfare function using the original system
of non-linear equilibrium conditions. Appendix A.3 demonstrates that the problem of the
14The weight attached by the policymaker to each generation is 1/3. With logaritmic utility, these set
of weights support the complete markets equilibrium as the solution to the optimization problem of
a hypothetical social planner that has access to a full set of state-contingent fiscal instruments that
allows state-contingent transfers across generations (see Sheedy[74, 2013]).
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policymaker is approximately equivalent to the minimization of the following loss function:
L0 = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
1
2
χ
θ2
d˜2t +
(1+ η)
2
Yˆ2t +
e
2
(
κ
1− κ
)(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)2
(1.2.2)
+ (1− aH) Sˆt + (1+ η) (1− aH) YˆtSˆt
+
1
2
(1− aH) [(φ+ η) (1− aH) + (1− φ)] Sˆ2t
−ψ (1− aH) aH (1− φ)
1− (1− aH)ψ Sˆt A˜t
}
where χ is a combination of structural parameters of the economy (see Appendix A.2).
The policymaker picks optimal sequences for d˜t, Yˆt, Sˆt and Π˜Ht subject to the system of
linear constraints (1.1.92)-(1.1.95) given by the first order approximation to the system of
non-linear equilibrium conditions. Appendix A.4 shows that the solution to this optimization
problem is reduced to the following system of linear equations:
Θpi
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)
= −Θd
θ
(
d˜t − Et−1d˜t
)− ΘAψ
1− (1− aH)ψ × (1.2.3)(
A˜t − Et−1A˜t
)
κ
1− κ
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)
= (1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
(
Yˆt − Et−1Yˆt
)
(1.2.4)
−ζ
θ
(
d˜t − Et−1d˜t
)
(1+ aHψ)
(
Yˆt − Et−1Yˆt
)
= − (d˜t − Et−1d˜t)− 1+ aHψ1− (1− aH)ψ × (1.2.5)(
A˜t − Et−1A˜t
)
where Θpi, Θd and ΘA are combinations of structural parameters of the economy (see
Appendix A.2). Equation (1.2.3) corresponds to the first order condition of the optimization
problem. This condition encapsulates the intuition on optimal policy and risk-sharing that
has been discussed throughout the chapter. For the calibration employed below, Θpi, Θd
and ΘA are all positive, and ψ < 0. Thus, given PPI inflation, the optimal response to
a negative productivity shock is to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. This is precisely the
risk-sharing objective pursued by the policymaker. The linear system of equations provides
an analytical solution for the unanticipated responses of the output gap (Yˆt − Et−1Yˆt),
the debt-to-GDP ratio (d˜t − Et−1d˜t) and PPI inflation (Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht ) as a function of
the only driving process of the model, the unanticipated innovation in labour productivity
(A˜t − Et−1A˜t). It is also possible to calculate the response of the terms of trade, the real
return and the nominal exchange rate. The unanticipated response of the terms of trade
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follows directly from (1.1.95):
Sˆt − Et−1Sˆt = −ψ
(
Yˆt − Et−1Yˆt
)
(1.2.6)
For the real return, recall the definitions of the real return in (1.1.88) and the output gap
Y˜t = Yˆt + A˜t1−(1−aH)ψ :
R˜t = −aHψ
(
Yˆt − Yˆt−1
)− aHψ
1− (1− aH)ψ
(
A˜t − A˜t−1
)
(1.2.7)
The unanticipated response of the nominal exchange rate, key in determining the degree
of risk-sharing ex-post across generations, is calculated as the residual expression resulting
from the combination of the terms of trade response and the Home inflation response:
ξ˜t− Et−1ξ˜t =
(
Sˆt − Et−1Sˆt
)
+
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)
− ψ
1− (1− aH)ψ
(
A˜t − Et−1A˜t
)
(1.2.8)
1.2.1. Cole and Obstfeld[28, 1991] extended
Before proceeding to the calculation of the set of unanticipated responses, the model admits
an extension of a parametric condition first discussed in Cole and Obstfeld[28, 1991], by
which the Home and Foreign economies fully share risk despite being unable to trade
financial claims in a world under financial autarky. This result was derived in the context of
a model with two economies that feature a representative agent and operate under financial
autarky.
The following proposition generalizes the result by showing that the same parametric con-
dition guarantees full risk sharing both across countries and across generations within the
Home economy.
Proposition 4. If the parametric condition φ = 1 is imposed (and countries are assumed
to have initial zero net foreign assets), the following are true:
The optimal monetary policy problem rule achieves:
Yˆt − Et−1Yˆt = d˜t − Et−1d˜t = Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht = 0 (1.2.9)
There is full risk-sharing across countries:
Ωt
Ωt+1
C∗t
C∗t+1
=
Ct
Ct+1
(1.2.10)
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There is full risk-sharing across generations:
c˜y,t − c˜m,t+1 = c˜m,t − c˜o,t+1 (1.2.11)
Proof:
If φ = 1, ψ = −a−1H and ΘA = 0 (see Appendix A.2). Thus, equation (1.2.5) implies
d˜t − Et−1d˜t = 0 (irrespective of monetary policy, the unanticipated response of the debt-
to-GDP ratio is zero) and the first order condition (1.2.3) implies that the policymaker
chooses Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht = 0. The Phillips curve (1.2.4) implies Yˆt − Et−1Yˆt = 0 .
Under the assumption of zero initial net assets and given that the Foreign economy is
assumed to be in steady state, Equation (1.2.10) implies: C˜t = Ω˜t = aH S˜t = −aHψY˜t
, where the second equality comes from the loglinear first-order approximation to (1.1.64)
and the third from (1.1.85). If φ = 1, ψ = −a−1H and the international risk sharing
condition collapses to C˜t = Y˜t, which is equation (1.1.63) and holds in the equilibrium of
the model .
From the first part of this proposition, d˜t = Et−1d˜t = λdt−1, where the last equality comes
from the equilibrium condition (1.1.92). Given |λ| < 1, d˜t = 0. The proposition follows
from the equilibrium allocation of consumption given in (1.1.91) .
Intuitively, the condition φ = 1 guarantees full risk-sharing across generations because it
guarantees that the output gap (and therefore the real interest rate) will react to productivity
innovations in a way that is consistent with the full stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio
in equation (1.1.90). Proposition 4 shows that the condition φ = 1 has generally stronger
implications than considered in standard, representative agent models of the open economy,
by providing full risk-sharing and allowing the policymaker to achieve full macroeconomic
stabilization, defined in this context as a situation in which no inflation, output gap or debt
fluctuations occur.
1.3. Alternative Policy Regimes
This section calculates the set of unanticipated responses that solve the system of equations
(1.2.3)-(1.2.5) for a particular baseline calibration in order to explore the effect of some key
parameters and to compare the optimal policy rule with alternative policy regimes. The set
of alternative policy regimes that will be studied in this chapter follows the seminal work
by Galí and Monacelli[38, 2005]:
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1. Producer Price Index Inflation Targeting (PPI-IT): A regime of PPI-IT would seek to
have:
Π˜Ht = 0
for all t. A commitment to follow this policy would imply that the surprise component
of domestic inflation is set to zero:
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht = 0 (1.3.1)
The responses of variables can be obtained by solving the equilibrium system given
by (1.2.4), (1.2.5) and (1.3.1).
2. Consumer Price Index Inflation Targeting (CPI-IT): A regime of CPI-IT would seek
to have:
Π˜t = 0
From the definition of CPI inflation, Π˜t = aHΠ˜Ht + (1− aH) ξ˜t. Thus, the policy
prescribes:
ξ˜t = −
(
aH
1− aH
)
Π˜Ht
From this equation, it is apparent that a policy regime of CPI-IT postulates a particular
relationship between the nominal exchange rate and PPI inflation. This observation
will be relevant when discussing the intuition for the suboptimality of CPI-IT below.
From (1.2.8):
Π˜Ht −Et−1Π˜Ht = − (1− aH)
(
Sˆt − Et−1Sˆt
)
+(1− aH) ψ1− (1− aH)ψ
(
A˜t − Et−1A˜t
)
and substituting this into (1.2.6):
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht = (1− aH)ψ
(
Yˆt − Et−1Yˆt
)
+(1− aH) ψ1− (1− aH)ψ
(
A˜t − Et−1A˜t
)
(1.3.2)
The responses of variables are now obtained by solving the equilibrium system given
by (1.2.4), (1.2.5) and (1.3.2).
3. Exchange Rate Peg: A fixed exchange rate regime would seek to have:
ξ˜t = 0
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Therefore, from (1.2.8):
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht = −
(
Sˆt − Et−1Sˆt
)
+
ψ
1− (1− aH)ψ
(
A˜t − Et−1A˜t
)
and from (1.2.6):
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht = ψ
(
YˆHt − Et−1YˆHt
)
+
ψ
1− (1− aH)ψ
(
A˜t − Et−1A˜t
)
(1.3.3)
The responses of variables are now obtained by solving the equilibrium system given
by (1.2.4), (1.2.5) and (1.3.3).
The set of baseline parameters employed in this exercise is described below.
1.3.1. Calibration
Table 1.1 presents the set of baseline structural parameters employed in the calculations
of section 1.3.2. The baseline values of a subset of the parameters have been borrowed
from different papers on open economy models under complete markets and representative
agents. This subset includes the parameters e, φ and aH. The baseline value for parameter
η has been chosen so that the Frisch elasticity of labour supply is 0.4, in line with recent
estimations for the US economy (Reichling and Wahleng[68, 2005]).
The parameters β and γ have been calibrated, to follow the factual motivation described in
the introduction, to target some key moments of the Hungarian economy. To perform this
calibration, one period of the model is taken to represent 10 years in the data, to make it
consistent with the generational interpretation of the physical environment of the model. In
particular, β has been chosen to mach a steady state real interest rate of 7%, which is the
average real interest rate of mortgage loans denominated in Swiss Francs (CHF) in Hungary
during the period 2005-2010. The slope of the life-cycle income γ has been calibrated to
match the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio. Given the model’s focus on consumption and
private debt, γ is chosen to target a ratio of total household debt denominated in foreign
currency to private comsumption of 58%, observed at the peak of the penetration of foreign
currency debt in Hungary in the first quarter of 2009.
The parameter κ (the fraction of firms that update prices with outdated information) is
also subject to the time convention of 10 years in the data corresponding to one period in
the model. The inverse of 1− κ relates to the average duration of a spell of time without a
given firm updating the information it uses to set prices (see Sheedy[74, 2013]). This spell
is taken to be two years and a half for the baseline calibration. Finally, it is assumed in
what follows that the stochastic process A˜t is white noise, which implies that Et−1A˜t = 0.
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Table 1.1.: Baseline parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value Target/Source
η
Inverse Frisch
elasticity 2.5 Frisch elasticity = 0.4(Reichling and
Wahleng[68, 2005])
e
Elasticity of
substitution
across varieties
10 Benigno and
Woodford[8, 2005]
β Discount factor 0.59 Real Rate on CHF
Loans =7% (Hungary)
γ
Slope of
life-cycle income 0.29 FC Debt/Consumption
= 58% (Hungary)
φ
Elasticity of
substitution
across H and F
1.5 di Paoli[62, 2009]
aH Home Bias 0.7 di Paoli[62, 2009]
κ
Fraction of firms
that update
prices with
outdated
information
0.2 Information update
every 2.5 years
1.3.2. Calculation of Responses
Figures 1 and 2 show the responses of the endogenous unanticipated components of macroe-
conomic variables (Yˆt− Et−1Yˆt, d˜t− Et−1d˜t, Sˆt− Et−1Sˆt Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht , ξ˜t− Et−1ξ˜t and
R˜t− Et−1R˜t) to a negative one percent shock to labour productivity for different values of
φ and κ. These results are discussed in turn.
1.3.2.1. The effect of φ
Figure 1 shows the unanticipated response of the set of variables to a negative one percent
shock to labour productivity as a function of the elasticity of substitution φ, where φ is set
in the range from 1 to e. The qualitative responses are robust to changes in φ (for both
the optimal monetary policy rule and the alternative policy regimes).
A negative shock to productivity triggers a fall in the real interest rate in an attempt by
the policymaker to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio and redistribute wealth from creditors
to debtors with the goal of improving ex-ante risk-sharing. This fall in the real interest
rate is brought about by a nominal appreciation. The reaction of the nominal exchange
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rate lies at the heart of the effort of improving on risk-sharing. In doing so, however, the
policymaker does not achieve a significant improvement in risk-sharing across generations,
as is evident from the fact that the debt-to-GDP ratio is not significantly more stable than
in alternative regimes.
The fall in the real interest rate brought about by an increase in the output gap (see equation
(1.1.88)) necessarily implies a (relatively small) positive reaction of inflation through the
Phillips curve. The volatility of both the output gap and inflation is significantly smaller un-
der the optimal policy rule than under alternative regimes. It is in this sense that the results
indicate the policymaker prefers to concentrate on the stabilization of standard macroeco-
nomic variables (the output gap and inflation) at the expense of not being active enough
in boosting risk-sharing. The policymaker faces a trade-off between standard macroeco-
nomic objectives and risk-sharing, and the latter proves to be very costly to undertake under
the baseline calibration. In other words, the objective of stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio
would require a significant surprise in terms output and inflation, which the policymaker
finds suboptimal.
For this reason, the optimal policy rule is closest to PPI-IT than to any other alternative
regime: the stabilization of PPI inflation is approximately equivalent to the implementation
of the flexible-price equilibrium in a context where only technology shocks drive economic
fluctuations. The stabilization of PPI inflation gives priority to standard macroeconomic
objectives (output gap and inflation volatility) over risk-sharing considerations.
The suboptimality of CPI-IT and of an exchange rate peg is precisely related to the fact that
these regimes create excessive volatility in output and inflation. Under the exchange rate
peg, the fall in the real interest rate requires a very strong positive response of inflation,
which is related to a strong positive response of output. CPI-IT allows some nominal
appreciation and therefore reduces the response of inflation, but the dynamic behavior
imposed by CPI-IT on the nominal exchange rate interferes with the role of the latter in
contributing to risk-sharing and creates higher volatility of inflation and output.
The effect of the elasticity of substitution φ on these responses can be understood from
the results described in Proposition 4 and equation (1.1.95). When φ → 1, Proposition
4 indicates that the optimal policy rule achieves full stabilization of output, inflation and
the debt-to-GDP ratio. The stabilization of the latter implies that the real return reacts
negatively by the exact amount needed to neutralize the effect of shocks to productivity.
This negative response is related to a strong nominal appreciation. On the other hand,
taking the limit of the economy when φ → ∞, equations (1.1.88) and (1.1.95) imply
Sˆt → 0 and R˜t → 0. When Home and Foreign goods are perfect substitutes (φ → ∞),
the policymaker does not have any “traction” over the terms of trade or the real interest
rate of the economy. Therefore, as φ increases, the reaction of the output gap and inflation
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Figure 1.3.1.: The effect of φ
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Output Gap Alternative Policies
 
 
Optimal Policy PPI−IT CPI−IT Peg
2 4 6 8 10
−0.5
0
0.5
1
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.5
1
Debt Alternative Policies
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Terms of Trade Gap Alternative Policies
2 4 6 8 10
−1
−0.5
0
Nominal Exchange Rate Alternative Policies
2 4 6 8 10
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Real Return Alternative Policies
under the optimal policy rule has to be stronger to generate a smaller fall in the real interest
rate, as long as monetary policy is less “powerful”. Interestingly, for φ > 1, a fall in the
elasticity of substitution φ has two effects: it increases the power of monetary policy on key
variables (the terms of trade and the real return in particular) but reduces the incentive of
the policymaker to take action thanks to the results of Proposition 4. On the other hand,
an increase in φ reduces the power of monetary policy in a context where a more decisive
action from it is required.
1.3.2.2. The effect of κ
Figure 2 calculates the unanticipated response of the set of variables to a negative one
percent shock to labour productivity as a function of the “information updating” parameter
κ, where κ ∈ (0, 1). To highlight the differences between the optimal policy rule and
PPI-IT (not perceived at the scale of Figure 1), Figure 2 focuses only on these two policy
regimes. Similar to the previous case, the qualitative responses are robust to changes in κ
for both the optimal monetary policy rule and all the alternative policy regimes.
The intuitive interpretation of the responses in Figure 2 is the same as that described for
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Figure 1.3.2.: The effect of κ
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the case of φ in Figure 1, that is, the optimal policy engineers a fall in the real interest
rate and a nominal appreciation in order to limit the response of the debt-to-GDP ratio,
and to achieve this, a positive reaction of the output gap and PPI inflation are required.
The latter two are almost negligible from a quantitative point of view, and indicate that
regardless of the value of κ, the optimal policy rule achieves a high degree of stability of
both variables.
Given φ, an increase in κ (which makes the economy more rigid and the Phillips curve
flatter) reduces the inflationary cost of a given output gap response. However, the cost
of improving on risk-sharing becomes larger as the rigidity of the economy increases. As
κ increases, the policymaker finds it less desirable to stabilize the real interest rate and
the debt-to-GDP ratio compared to the objective of output gap stabilization, which gains
prominence naturally as the greater rigidity of the economy impairs its natural ability to
stabilize itself after a negative productivity shock.
The following section focuses again on the remaining alternative regimes and offers a quan-
titative assessment of the degree of suboptimality created by CPI-IT and an Exchange Rate
Peg (which are furthest away from the optimal policy rule).
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1.4. Welfare Losses
The welfare losses attached to each alternative policy regime can be calculated as the
unconditional expectation of the loss function, E (L). To calculate the components of the
loss function, it is useful to write:
d˜t = λd˜t−1 +
(
d˜t − Et−1d˜t
)
Using the the standard result for the mean and variance of a stationary AR(1) process:
E
(
d˜t
)
= 0 E
(
d˜2t
)
=
V
(
d˜t − Et−1d˜t
)
1− λ2
For the variance of output, we can follow a similar strategy to equation (1.1.94).
As Et−1Yˆt = − ζ(1+η)(1−ψ+ψaH)λd˜t−1, by definition:
Yˆt = − ζλ
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) d˜t−1 +
(
Yˆt − Et−1Yˆt
)
E
(
Yˆt
)2
=
[
ζλ
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
]2 V (d˜t − Et−1d˜t)
1− λ2 +V
(
Yˆt − Et−1Yˆt
)
As E
(
d˜t
)
= 0, E
(
Yˆt
)
= 0 and thus:
E
(
A˜tYˆt
)
= cov
(
A˜t, Yˆt
)
= cov
(
A˜t − Et−1A˜t, Yˆt − Et−1Yˆt
)
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The welfare criterion is thus:
E (L) =
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
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where xst = xt − Et−1xt for a given variable x. Evaluating the expected loss requires a
particular value of V
(
A˜t
)
to be specified. But given the interest of this chapter in relative
welfare losses (compared to alternative policy regimes and other models), no value for this
parameter is provided and, instead, expression (1.4.1) is scaled over V
(
A˜t
)
, in which form
it can be calculated directly from the structural parameters of the economy.
Table 1.2 compares the welfare losses (relative to the variance of the shock V
(
A˜t
)
) of the
regimes of CPI-IT and the Exchange Rate Peg for different values of κ, φ and two different
sets of models derived from different parametric conditions: firstly, the “OLG” columns
correspond to the baseline calibration shown above for the overlapping generations structure
presented. Secondly, the “Representative Agent” columns correspond to a calculation of
the welfare criterion under the condition γ = 0. As discussed above, this condition reduces
the model to a standard, representative agent open economy by eliminating the life-cycle
pattern of income and therefore the need for domestic financial markets.
The entries in the table are interpreted as permanent reductions in consumption under a
given regime relative to steady state scaled by V
(
A˜t
)
. The tables suggest that the exchange
rate peg is generally more costly than the regime of CPI-IT. Besides, as φ increases from
1.5 (table 1.2a) to 6 (table 1.2b), the losses from both regimes become much larger than
in a representative agent model. This allows to conclude that, given the role of the nominal
exchange rate in completing markets in the overlapping generations model, the losses of a
Peg and of a regime of CPI-IT are much larger compared to the ones calculated previously for
models of the small open economy based on the representative agent assumption (see Galí
and Monacelli[38, 2005]). Therefore, despite the relatively limited involvement of optimal
monetary policy in risk-sharing (compared to standard macroeconomic objectives), the
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Table 1.2.: Welfare Losses
(a) φ = 1.5
OLG Representative Agent
CPI-IT Peg CPI-IT Peg
κ = 0.2 3.41 5.15 3.41 5.16
κ = 0.66 9.79 13.74 9.83 13.82
(b) φ = 6
φ = 6 OLG Representative Agent
CPI-IT Peg CPI-IT Peg
κ = 0.2 7.50 10.20 3.80 5.89
κ = 0.66 17.60 25.33 14.25 21.58
nominal exchange rate plays a role in ex-post redistributions of wealth that are quantitatively
important from the point of view of the welfare losses of households in the Home economy.
1.5. Concluding Comments
This chapter has characterized optimal monetary and exchange rate policies for a small open
economy under incomplete markets at the local level and financial instruments denominated
in foreign currency. Several conclusions arise from this effort.
The main finding of the chapter is that the risk-sharing considerations which arise from
market incompleteness introduce a new trade-off for monetary policy under financial au-
tarky. After any productivity shock, the variations in the real exchange rate and the real
return required to replicate the complete markets allocation imply excessive volatility in
the traditional macroeconomic objectives of output and inflation. Under the calibration
considered, optimal policy resolves this trade-off in favour of the traditional objectives.
Consequently, the optimal policy is closest to Producer Price Index (PPI) Inflation Target-
ing than to the more standard Consumer Price Index (CPI) Inflation Targeting or the more
extreme Exchange Rate Peg, as it is closest to the flexible price allocation (the traditional
aim of a broad range of New Keynesian optimal policy models). The cost of this strategy
is an excessively volatile debt-to-GDP ratio and therefore imperfect risk-sharing across the
different generations of the economy.
This result does not imply, however, total passivity of the optimal rule to risk-sharing/financial
considerations. In particular, the optimal policy rule prescribes that the nominal exchange
rate should appreciate after a negative productivity shock (and vice versa) so that the real
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burden of outstanding liabilities in foreign currency fall after a bad shock and wealth is
transferred from the creditor generation to the debtor generation. Indeed, although the
optimal policy is relatively passive when it comes to risk-sharing, being excessively passive
(as implied by an Exchange Rate Peg) creates significant welfare losses on households, that
significantly exceed those calculated by the literature under representative agent frame-
works. The ability of the nominal exchange rate to react to shocks in a specific fashion is
therefore crucial, as far as household welfare is concerned.
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2. Flows of Information and
Inefficiency in the Unsecured
Consumer Credit Market: A Simple
Framework
During the last decade, several Latin American economies have experienced a dramatic
surge in the amount of consumer credit taken by households1. This trend is summarized in
Figure 2.0.1 with quarterly data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
For all these countries, the ratio of consumer credit to GDP (shown in the left panel of the
figure) rose rapidly since 2002, in some instances reaching the 10% mark towards the end
of the decade. An equivalent way to present this phenomenon (right panel) is to calculate
indices and setting the starting value of the ratio for each country to 1. In this case, by the
end of the decade most countries were above or around the mark of 2, which effectively
means that their penetration of consumer credit doubled during these years2.
A quick glance at available similar data for other groups of countries suggests that the
growth of consumer credit experienced in Latin America is very rapid and, to a large extent,
uncommon. For example, the amount of consumer credit in Brazil or Colombia grew from
4% to 9% of GDP in the space of less than 6 years, whereas in the United States the
same increase took about 15 years3. A similar conclusion can be reached by studying data
of other developed countries, such as the United Kingdom4. With regard to countries of
1Consumer Credit combines all forms of borrowing by households excluding housing or mortgage-related
credit. These forms include (but are not limited to) credit card lines, car loans, overdrafts and personal
loans.
2The only exception to this rule is Argentina. However, taking into account that the recession in Argentina
ended around the end of 2002 and thus setting 2003:I as the base quarter (first quarter with positive
GDP growth after the recession), the country ends up with an index of 3.73 in 2011:III, an almost
fourfold increase in the ratio in just 8 years.
3Datasource: Federal Reserve. The sum of “Commercial Loans by All Banks” (Table H.8) and “Gross
Consumer Accounts Receivable (excluding Pools of Securitized Consumer Assets) by Finance Compa-
nies” (G.20) divided by Nominal GDP grew from 4.09% in 1949 to 9.05% at the end of 1964.
4Datasource: Bank of England. The “Total Outstanding Amount of Sterling Net Unsecured Lending to
Individuals” (series code LPQAVHH) hit 4.07% of GDP in June 1982 and reached 9.29% only in 2000.
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a similar level of development than Latin America, BIS[16, 2009] (and references therein)
largely confirms the rarity of such dramatic increases in penetration of consumer credit
across countries5.
Figure 2.0.1.: Consumer Credit in Latin America, 2001:I-2011:III
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The speed and exceptionality of this trend raises at least two questions. First, why has
borrowing expanded so quickly in Latin America? Potential explanations already put for-
ward include financial innovations (see Livshits et al.[50, 2011]) and changes in the legal
protection of creditors along the lines of Djankov et al.[32, 2007]. This chapter focuses on
a second, closely related, question: is the growth of consumer credit in Latin America ex-
cessive from a social perspective? In other words, does it lead to a form of misallocation or
constrained inefficiency that should be corrected by means of changes to the credit policy?
A search for an answer to the latter question may start with the recent literature on the
efficiency of credit booms (see, among others, Benigno et al.[6, 2010], Bianchi[15, 2011],
Lorenzoni[51, 2008] and Uribe[77, 2006]). These papers use the interaction between price
indices and collateral constraints to shed light on the role of pecuniary externalities. How-
ever, their insights are of limited use to study the abovementioned trends. The reason for
this is that consumer credit in less developed financial systems is mostly unsecured in na-
ture, non-collateralized, and not subject to any formal procedure for individuals’ bankruptcy
filing6. By and large, creditors do not have the legal power to seize any asset or income in
5A recent exception is the case of the Republic of Korea, see Park[63, 2009]
6Reliable estimates of recovery rates for unsecured consumer loans in Latin America are nonexistent.
A weak upper bound to these recovery rates might be given by some other forms of secured credit,
like housing loans. In the latter case, recovery rates are generally estimated to be very low (see
Obermann[56, 2006]). It is reasonable to deduce from this data that the recovery rates of unsecured
consumer credit are close to zero.
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the event of default, thus rendering collateral constraints inappropriate for understanding
unsecured consumer credit.
Unsecured consumer credit is perhaps better captured by the existing tools of the theory
of sovereign debt, in which default triggers non-pecuniary penalties on borrowers, such
as exclusion of capital markets (Eaton and Gersovitz[33, 1981]) or the transmission of
bad signals to other agents (Sandleris[70, 2008]). Recent examples to model unsecured
consumer credit following this thread include Chatterjee et al.[26, 2007] and Livshits et
al.[50, 2011]. However, so far there has not been any attempt to study the question of
constrained inefficiency in the consumer credit market using theoretical frameworks akin to
those of sovereign borrowing outside the toolkit of collateral constraints.
This chapter tackles precisely that gap in the literature. Within a simple framework similar
to Livshits[50, 2011], it proposes a theoretical mechanism through which the individual
conditions of access to unsecured consumer credit for one agent (in particular, the interest
rate) are affected by the default choices of other agents in similar markets. The key behind
this mechanism is the role played by aggregate variables, in particular by the aggregate
default rate, in the problem of a lender facing the choice of whether to extend unsecured
credit to a potential borrower and, if so, at which interest rate. Lenders give a crucial
importance to the aggregate default rate in their decision process because the income
prospects are imperfectly observable and, crucially, correlated across borrowers78.
Given this observation, the model presented below seeks to capture the theoretical effect
that the default choice of one consumer might have on the conditions of access (interest
rate) of other consumers in the economy. An atomistic consumer who defaults will naturally
take into account the consequences of his choice on his own payoffs (including a reputational
cost, for example) but will ignore its effect on the borrowing possibilities of other agents.
This form of externality through the flow of information across financial transactions will
have welfare implications: the volume of unsecured credit in a decentralized financial market
7There is survey evidence that indicates the weight given to aggregate variables by bank loan officers
in their decision process. See, for example, the results of surveys conducted on bank loan offi-
cers by the Federal Reserve (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/), the Euro-
pean Central Bank (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html), the
Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/dl/loan/loos/index.htm/ ), the Bank of Eng-
land (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/monetary/creditconditions.htm), the Cen-
tral Bank of Chile (http://www.bcentral.cl/estadisticas-economicas/credito-bancario/index.htm ) and
the Central Bank of Colombia (http://www.banrep.gov.co/informes-economicos/ine_enc_sit-cred-
col_cp.html). Only in the case of Chile the aggregate default rate is included explicitly among the
set of possible answers. The discussion by Park[63, 2009] about the abovementioned case of the Re-
public of Korea is also indicative of the role of a low starting default rate as a main driver of a rapid
growth of credit at the beginning of a credit boom.
8Income can be correlated across borrowers for a number of reasons. If individual income is the com-
bination of an idiosyncratic component and an aggregate component, then this correlation follows
naturally.
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will be generally inefficient, and a benevolent policymaker would choose optimally a different
level of borrowing ex-ante to control the probability of this externality to materialize9.
Interestingly, the direction of the inefficiency that arises in the model is not as clear-cut
as might be deduced from this discussion. The set of forces described so far leads to the
conclusion that the decentralized equilibrium would feature overborrowing, as a policymaker
would desire to have less borrowing in order to cap from above the probability of default.
However, the policymaker might also wish to have more borrowing because, given a default
(or repayment) choice, a positive reputational signal can be transferred from one consumer
to the next when borrowing is higher. The tension between these two forces will create an
ambiguity regarding the optimality of decentralized unsecured consumer borrowing.
Notice that these externalities require only a flow of information across different financial
transactions. Thus, besides the literature on unsecured consumer credit, sovereign debt
and efficiency of credit booms that has already been cited, this chapter is also related to
the research agenda on the link between information flows and constrained inefficiency. In
particular, it draws economic intuition from old ideas about the effect of information reve-
lation on the insurance possibilities of risk-averse agents in uncertain environments. Classic
references are Hirshleifer[44, 1971] and the seminal paper on the efficiency of Rational
Expectations Equilibria by Laffont[48, 1985]. More recently, Lepetyuk and Stoltenberg[49,
2012] have exploited this insight for the case of revelations of changes in policy targets.
Albeit different in nature, the work by Morris and Shin[55, 2002] is also an example of how,
under some conditions, more public information of a certain nature can be detrimental for
welfare.
The rest of the chapter is organized in three sections as follows. Section 2.1 is devoted
to presenting the basic, symmetric-information version of the model, together with the
inefficiency result and its economic intuition. Section 2.2 presents simulations of the basic
model under specific parameters and functional forms, in order to explore the effect of
changes in the economic environment on the size and direction of inefficiency. This extension
of the model reinforces the conclusions obtained with the basic version, while at the same
time shedding light on the gap between first- and second-best allocations. Some reflections
as concluding comments are presented in Section 2.3.
9Up to this point, it is apparent that this inefficiency mechanism has the potential to apply to more
general situations than simply the unsecured consumer credit market. However, this is not necessarily
the case as long as, if collateralization is permitted, borrowers might “buy themselves out” of the effects
of the externality by simply posting more, or better, collateral. Thus, for the mechanism to work it is
necessary to keep the focus in an unsecured credit market where the posting of collateral after default
of other agents is not allowed.
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2.1. The Basic Model
This section is devoted to describe the simplest possible framework that could capture the
effect of information flows across financial transactions on the optimality of decentralized
borrowing. After presenting the basic asumptions and ingredients of the model, the section
describes the problem of each group of economic agents and the decentralized equilibrium.
This decentralized ’benchmark’ is then compared to the solution of a benevolent policy-
maker that faces the same informational constraints of the decentralized economy. Some
simulations of the model are presented in the next section as a means to shed light on
the effect of some parameters on the gap between the decentralized and the policymaker
solutions.
2.1.1. Structure, Timing, Assumptions, Information
There are two separate financial markets. In what follows, these markets will be respectively
labeled Market A and Market B. Each of these two markets is composed of a risk-averse
Borrower and a risk-neutral Bank, different across markets. There are thus four agents,
and Borrowers and Banks will be labeled according to the market in which they participate:
Borrower A and Bank A in Market A; Borrower B and Bank B in Market B. It is assumed
that agents from one market cannot participate in the other market. In this way, there will
be no flow of real resources across markets. As will be specified below, only information
will flow between Markets A and B.
Each Market has two periods. In the first period, the respective Borrower (who has no
endowment) borrows from the Bank in order to consume. This borrowing takes the form
of the sale of an unsecured discount bond. The absence of a full set of state-contingent
assets makes both markets incomplete by construction10. In the second and final period,
the Borrower receives an income which is random from the point of view of period 1, and
having observed income, decides whether to repay or default. Importantly, it is assumed
that Market B opens after the closure of Market A. In other words, the first period of
Market B occurs immediately after the second period of Market A. In a sense, the model
uses time as a device to explore the information flows across financial markets, which are
the main focus of this chapter.
The following key assumptions are made:
A1: There is free entry in the banking industry of each of the two financial markets.
10This form of incompleteness is imposed without considering the problem of optimal contracting in the
context of the model.
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A2: Banks are assumed to finance loans to (more precisely, purchases of bonds from)
Borrowers by taking “deposits” from an exogenous, perfectly elastic wholesale supply
of funds at an interest rate of zero11.
Assumptions A1 and A2 will greatly help to facilitate the description and solution of the
model via the simplification of the problem of Banks.
A3: The income of either of the two Borrowers is neither directly observable nor verifiable
by either Bank or by the other Borrower. Naturally, each Borrower will observe his own
income once it realizes in the second period of his respective Market (and will decide
to repay or default accordingly), but this information will not be directly revealed to
anyone else12.
A4: The income of Borrower A is correlated with the income of Borrower B. As suggested
before, this assumption can be justified along the lines of aggregate shocks affecting
both Borrowers at the same time in a specific way.
A5: No partial default is allowed. The repayment of debts will entail the full payment of
obligations, and default will entail no payment from the Borrower to the Bank.
Finally, the information structure of the model is relatively simple, but crucial nonetheless.
Given that there is not any history before the first period of Market A, the only information
that Bank A and Borrower A have is the unconditional probability distribution function
(PDF) of future income of the latter. Thus, there is no information asymmetry between
Borrower and Bank ex-ante. The agents in Market B, however, have an informational
advantage over agents in Market A. In addition to knowing unconditional distributions,
they observe all decisions taken in Market A (i.e.: borrowing and default/repayment by
Borrower A). This information is promptly used to update the probability of default of
Borrower B, given the correlation of income across the two borrowers.
2.1.2. The Problem of the Borrowers
Borrower i ∈ {A, B} faces the following standard, time-separable, optimization problem:
Vi ≡ max
ci1,c
i
2
Ui ≡ u
(
ci1
)
+ βE
[
u
(
ci2
)
| =i
]
(2.1.1)
11Assuming a strictly positive cost of funds would complicate the mathematics of the model without
adding significant intuition. However, one of the strategies that the policymaker might use to steer
the decentralized equilibrium might be the control of this exogenous cost of funds, as will be explored
below.
12In a similar spirit, the time structure of the model implies that Borrowers (who live in separate periods
of time) cannot collude to reveal the realization of income to one another.
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where superscripts denote the particular Borrower and subscripts denote life periods. Fol-
lowing usual notation, c denotes consumption, β < 1 is the discount factor and u is a
instantaneous utility function that satisfies the Inada conditions together with standard
conditions on concavity, continuity and differentiability. Notice that the expectation opera-
tor E is taken conditional on the common information set of Borrower i and the respective
Bank i, which is denoted by =i. Consumption in each period is given by:
ci1 = q
i`i (2.1.2)
ci2 =
yi − `i if Repayment
(
di = 0
)
yi − γyi if Default (di = 1) (2.1.3)
Given that Borrower i does not have any endowment in his first period, ci1 will correspond
to the proceeds of the sale of an unsecured discount bond with face value `i at price qi.
This form of debt contract is contingent only to the extent that full (and only full) default
is permitted in the second period after the realization of income yi. This choice is captured
by the indicator variable di: in case of repayment (di = 0), Borrower i consumes his income
net of the payment of the face value of the bond; in case of default (di = 1), Borrower i
will have to give up a consumption cost (penalty) given by a fraction γ ∈ (0, 1) of income.
The cost of default can be interpreted as a simplified, reduced-form version of the set of
losses that a borrower faces after default in a more complicated, multiple-period setting:
e.g. temporary exclusion from financial markets, negative flags in credit history records13.
Importantly, as credit is unsecured, the penalty γyi is not transferred to Bank i in the event
of default. Borrower i decides to default in the second period only if this choice delivers a
higher consumption than repayment. Clearly:
di =
0 (Repayment) if yi ≥ `
i/γ
1 (Default) if yi < `i/γ
(2.1.4)
The information sets of the Borrowers are given by =A = {∅} and =B = {∅, `A, dA},
where the empty set ∅ includes information about the unconditional distribution of income,
as specified next. The only flow between Market A and Market B is precisely the flow of
information on `A and dA.
13See Chaterjee et al.[26, 2007][25, 2009]. Chapter 3 of this thesis explores empirically the effects of
negative flags in credit history on the credit outcomes of individual borrowers.
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2.1.2.1. Income Distribution
Assumption A4 can be crystallised by postulating that the random variables yA and yB are
distributed according to a joint density function f
(
yA, yB
)
. This joint density is known by
all agents in advance. Let F
(
yA, yB
)
denote the cumulative distribution function associated
to the joint distribution f . Both yAand yB are also assumed to lie between a minimum
income yL and a maximum income yH, with yH > yL. In other words, the support of the
joint cumulative distribution function F
(
yA, yB
)
is given by the space [yL, yH]× [yL, yH].
The functions given by g
(
yA
)
=
´ yH
yL
f
(
yA, yB
)
dyB and G
(
yA
)
= F
(
yA, yH
)
will denote
respectively the marginal density and cumulative distribution function of yA. Similarly,
h
(
yB
)
=
´ yH
yL
f
(
yA, yB
)
dyA and H
(
yB
)
= F
(
yH, yB
)
will represent respectively the
marginal density and cumulative distribution function of yB. The set of functions F, G,
and H are assumed to be continuously differentiable within the support [yL, yH]× [yL, yH].
2.1.3. The Problem of the Banks
During its first period, Bank i sets an interest rate (or equivalently, a price on the bond qi)
that guarantees zero expected profit on the particular financial transaction with Borrower
i. This is a direct implication of both assumptions A1 (free entry) and risk-neutrality on
the side of Banks. Thus, denoting with pii the probability of repayment of Borrower i
and recalling A2 (zero cost of wholesale funds), the following zero-profit condition will
characterize the equilibrium behavior of Banks:
pii`i +
[
1− pii
]
0 = qi`i
pii = qi (2.1.5)
With probability pii Bank i will be repaid the face value of the discount bond on hold,
whereas with probability
(
1− pii)it will receive nothing. This second period-expected in-
come must coincide, in equilibrium, with the amount of wholesale funds taken to finance
the purchase of the bond in period 1, as the interest rate on these funds is assumed to be
zero. This condition collapses to (2.1.5), that equates the equilibrium price of the bond
issued by Borrower i to his own probability of repayment pii.
The probability of repayment of Borrower i, pii, is calculated by Bank i using rationally
all available information. This information will not include in any case the realization of
income, but does include the structure of the Borrowers’ problem together with =i. Using
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(2.1.4), pii will therefore be a function of `i and =i as follows:
pii = Pr
(
yi ≥ `
i
γ
| =i
)
(2.1.6)
2.1.4. Decentralized Equilibrium
Using (2.1.5) and (2.1.6), and opening up the expectations term in (2.1.1) taking into
account the default choice in (2.1.4), the problem of Borrower i can be rewritten as follows:
Vi ≡ max
`i
u
(
Pr
(
yi ≥ `
i
γ
| =i
)
`i
)
+β
{
Pr
(
yi ≥ `
i
γ
| =i
)
E
[
u
(
yi − `i
)
| yi ≥ `
i
γ
;=i
]}
+β
{
Pr
(
yi <
`i
γ
| =i
)
E
[
u
(
yi − γyi
)
| yi < `
i
γ
;=i
]}
(2.1.7)
Notice that in equilibrium `i ≤ γyH must hold. Given that yi ≤ yH, no rational lender
will buy a bond with a face value higher than γyH, as this would trigger default with
probability one (the only rational interest rate on this loan would be infinite). On the other
hand, notice that if `i lies in the interval [0,γyL], the loan is effectively riskless and its
interest rate is zero because of the free entry condition. As u is assumed to be concave,
β < 1 implies that Borrower i prefers `i = γyL among this range of riskless contracts.
Thanks to the sequential nature of the model, and to the absence of financial markets
after the closure of Market B, the decentralized equilibrium of the model can be found in a
straightforward manner using a backward induction argument. Recall that the information
set of agents in Market B is given by =B = {∅, `A, dA}. At the start of his life, Borrower B
might observe one of two possible scenarios: either Borrower A has repaid in full `A(dA =
0) or he has defaulted on his obligations (dA = 1). The different conditions that these two
situations imply for Borrower B’s insurance possibilities lie at the heart of the inefficiency
mechanism that is proposed in this chapter.
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2.1.4.1. Borrower B after dA = 0
Using (2.1.7), the problem of Borrower B under full repayment of `A by Borrower A can
be written as:
VB
(
`A, 0
)
≡ max
`B≤γyH
u
(
Pr
(
yB ≥ `
B
γ
| yA ≥ `
A
γ
)
`B
)
+β
{
Pr
(
yB ≥ `
B
γ
| yA ≥ `
A
γ
)
E
[
u
(
yB − `B
)
| yB ≥ `
B
γ
; yA ≥ `
A
γ
]}
+β
{
Pr
(
yB <
`B
γ
| yA ≥ `
A
γ
)
E
[
u
(
yB − γyB
)
| yB < `
B
γ
; yA ≥ `
A
γ
]}
= max
`B≤γyH
u
1− F
(
`A
γ , yH
)
− F
(
yH, `
B
γ
)
+ F
(
`A
γ ,
`B
γ
)
1− G
(
`A
γ
)
 `B

+
β
1− G
(
`A
γ
)

yHˆ
`B
γ
yHˆ
`A
γ
u
(
yB − `B
)
f
(
yA, yB
)
dyAdyB+
`B
γˆ
yL
yHˆ
`A
γ
u
(
yB − γyB
)
f
(
yA, yB
)
dyAdyB
 (2.1.8)
where the set of state variables
(
`A, dA
)
has been explicitly introduced as the argument
of the indirect utility function VB. Notice that the problem is explicitly conditioned on
yA ≥ `A/γ, which is the condition of full repayment by Borrower A. This information is
useful to calculate the probability of repayment of Borrower B given that yA and yB are
assumed to be correlated. The assumed conditions on the differentiability of distribution
and instantaneous utility functions allow to write the necessary first order condition of this
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problem as follows:
Ξ
(
`A, 0; `B
)
≡ u1
1− F
(
`A
γ , yH
)
− F
(
yH, `
B
γ
)
+ F
(
`A
γ ,
`B
γ
)
1− G
(
`A
γ
)
 `B

×
1− F
(
`A
γ , yH
)
− F
(
yH, `
B
γ
)
− `Bγ F2
(
yH, `
B
γ
)
1− G
(
`A
γ
)
+
F
(
`A
γ ,
`B
γ
)
+ `
B
γ F2
(
`A
γ ,
`B
γ
)
1− G
(
`A
γ
)

−β
yHˆ
`B
γ
yHˆ
`A
γ
u1
(
yB − `B
) f (yA, yB)
1− G
(
`A
γ
)dyAdyB = µ (2.1.9)
where xy represents the derivative of the function x with respect to its y-th argument, and
µ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint `B ≤ γyH. Given conditions on concavity of
the utility function, condition (2.1.9) characterizes the solution to the optimization problem
of Borrower B. Its solution will be given by a function `B
(
`A, 0
)
that maps a fully-repaid
level of borrowing from Borrower A into borrowing of Borrower B.
2.1.4.2. Borrower B after dA = 1
In this scenario, the problem of Borrower B is very similar to the one in the previous
subsection, with the only (but fundamental) change that expectations and probabilities are
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calculated conditional on yA < `A/γ, which is the condition of default by Borrower A:
VB
(
`A, 1
)
≡ max
`B≤γyH
u
(
Pr
(
yB ≥ `
B
γ
| yA < `
A
γ
)
`B
)
+β
{
Pr
(
yB ≥ `
B
γ
| yA < `
A
γ
)
E
[
u
(
yB − `B
)
| yB ≥ `
B
γ
; yA <
`A
γ
]}
+β
{
Pr
(
yB <
`B
γ
| yA < `
A
γ
)
E
[
u
(
yB − γyB
)
| yB < `
B
γ
; yA <
`A
γ
]}
= max
`B≤γyH
u
F
(
`A
γ , yH
)
− F
(
`A
γ ,
`B
γ
)
G
(
`A
γ
)
 `B

+
β
G
(
`A
γ
)

yHˆ
`B
γ
`A
γˆ
yL
u
(
yB − `B
)
f
(
yA, yB
)
dyAdyB+
`B
γˆ
yL
`A
γˆ
yL
u
(
yB − γyB
)
f
(
yA, yB
)
dyAdyB
 (2.1.10)
And the necessary first order condition is given by:
Υ
(
`A, 1; `B
)
≡ u1
F
(
`A
γ , yH
)
− F
(
`A
γ ,
`B
γ
)
G
(
`A
γ
)
 `B

×
F
(
`A
γ , yH
)
− F
(
`A
γ ,
`B
γ
)
− `Bγ F2
(
`A
γ ,
`B
γ
)
G
(
`A
γ
)

−β
yHˆ
`B
γ
`A
γˆ
yL
u1
(
yB − `B
) f (yA, yB)
G
(
`A
γ
) dyAdyB = µ (2.1.11)
The solution of this problem is given by a function `B
(
`A, 1
)
that maps a defaulted level
of borrowing from Borrower A into borrowing of Borrower B. The functions `B
(
`A, 0
)
and `B
(
`A, 1
)
characterize the equilibrium behavior of Borrower B under each of the
two proposed scenarios. Unlike Borrower B, Borrower A has no observation on which to
condition expectations and probabilities, and must therefore rely on unconditional moments
only.
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2.1.4.3. Borrower A
The problem of Borrower A can be written as follows (see(2.1.7)):
VA ≡ max
`A
u
([
1− G
(
`A
γ
)]
`A
)
+ β×
yHˆ
`A
γ
u
(
yA − `A
)
g
(
yA
)
dyA +
`A
γˆ
yL
u
(
yA − γyA
)
g
(
yA
)
dyA
 (2.1.12)
The necessary first order condition that characterises the solution to this problem is:
Θ
(
`A
)
≡ u1
([
1− G
(
`A
γ
)]
`A
) [
1− G1
(
`A
γ
)
`A
γ
− G
(
`A
γ
)]
−β
yHˆ
`A
γ
u1
(
yA − `A
)
g
(
yA
)
dyA = µ (2.1.13)
The solution to this problem is a unique optimal value of `A.
2.1.4.4. Equilibrium
The decentralized equilibrium of the model is defined as follows:
Definition 5. A decentralized equilibrium of the model is a triple
{
`A?, `B?,d
A=0, `B?,d
A=1
}
of face values such that: 1. `A? solves problem (2.1.12), 2. `B?,dA=0 solves problem (2.1.8)
given yA ≥ `A?/γ, 3. `B?,dA=1 solves problem (2.1.10) given yA < `A?/γ.
Given the properties of differentiability, continuity and concavity of u, and differentiability
and continuity of functions F and G, the decentralized equilibrium of the model is fully
characterised by the system of equations (2.1.9), (2.1.11) and (2.1.13). A decentralized
allocation is a triple
{
`A?, `B?,d
A=0, `B?,d
A=1
}
that is a solution to this system of equations
and `B?,dA=j = `B
(
`A?, j
)
for j ∈ {0, 1}.
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The choice of Borrower A with regard to his own level of borrowing `A will have several
effects. For a start, changes in `A will change the probability of Borrower A being forced
to default, which will entail a consumption cost. Borrower A does take into account this
effect of `A on his own consumption possibilities for the second period of his life. However,
`A will also affect Borrower B in a number of ways that Borrower A does not take into
account when in his own optimization problem. First, changes in `A change the probability
of Borrower B being in either of the two situations described in sections (2.1.4.1) and
(2.1.4.2). Besides, `A will also affect, given dA, the choice set of Borrower B via the pair
of functions `B
(
`A, 0
)
and `B
(
`A, 1
)
.
2.1.5. The Problem of the Benevolent Policymaker
These externalities imply that, in general, the equilibrium allocation that would be chosen
by a benevolent policymaker concerned about the welfare of both Borrowers will be different
from the decentralized equilibrium allocation. The reason is that the former will take into
account the welfare effects of the choice of `A on the insurance possibilities of Borrower
B. The problem of the policymaker is defined as follows:
max
`A,`B
λUA + (1− λ) E
[
UB
]
(2.1.14)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) is the relative weight attached by the policymaker to Borrower A. It is
assumed that the policymaker faces the same informational constraints as the decentralized
agents. In other words, it is assumed that the policymaker cannot directly observe income
in the same way as Banks themselves cannot do it. It is in this sense that the concept
of “efficiency” attached to the solution of the problem of the policymaker corresponds
specifically to the notion of “ex-ante constrained efficiency” 14. Thanks to the sequential
nature of the problem (and to the fact that there are not subsequent markets after Market
B), it is possible to use again the backward-induction argument to reduce the two-variable
problem (2.1.14) into the following single variable program:
max
`A
λUA+ (1− λ)
{[
1− G
(
`A
γ
)]
VB
(
`A, 0
)
+ G
(
`A
γ
)
VB
(
`A, 1
)}
(2.1.15)
The solution to (2.1.15) determines the ex-ante socially optimal level of borrowing by
Borrower A. The ex-post socially optimal level of borrowing by Borrower B is determined,
by backward induction, by equations (2.1.9) and (2.1.11). Therefore, the only difference
between the set of decentralized equilibrium conditions and the solution of the policymaker
14For the same reason, this chapter makes reference to the problem of a benevolent policymaker and not
of a social planner. The social planner reference would imply the ability of policy to pick equilibrium
allocation that are state-contingent and not subject to informational constraints.
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will be given by the difference between first order condition (2.1.13) and the first order
condition of problem (2.1.15).
Definition 6. Given λ, an ex-ante efficient allocation is a triple
{
`A,P, `B,P,d
A=0, `B,P,d
A=1
}
such that15: 1. `A,P solves problem (2.1.15), 2. `B,P,dA=0 solves problem (2.1.8) after
yA ≥ `A,P/γ, 3. `B,P,dA=1 solves problem (2.1.10) after yA < `A,P/γ.
The ex-ante efficient allocation is characterised by the system of equations composed by
(2.1.9), (2.1.11) and the following first order condition of problem (2.1.15):
Φ
(
`A
)
≡ λΘ
(
`A
)
+ (1− λ)
{
G1
(
`A
γ
)
1
γ
[
VB
(
`A, 1
)
−VB
(
`A, 0
)]
+[
1− G
(
`A
γ
)]
VB1
(
`A, 0
)
+ G
(
`A
γ
)
VB1
(
`A, 1
)}
= µ (2.1.16)
The ex-ante efficient allocation is thus a triple
{
`A,P, `B,P,d
A=0, `B,P,d
A=1
}
that is a solution
to this system of equations and `B,P,dA=j = `B
(
`A,P, j
)
for j ∈ {0, 1}.
The fact that some of the actions of Borrower A have effects on other agents that are
not being taken into account in the decentralized equilibrium will imply that there is, in
general, a gap between the decentralized allocation and the efficient allocation. The nature
and economic intuition behind this gap is discussed in turn.
2.1.6. Inefficiency and Discussion
Definition 7. The decentralized allocation is efficient if there is some λ ∈ (0, 1) for which
`A,P = `A?.
Proposition 8. Suppose the parameter set rules out corner solutions (that is, µ = 0
for all the first order conditions that have been presented in the previous sections). The
decentralized allocation is efficient if and only if yAand yB are independent. Proof: See
Appendix B.1.
Thus, in the general case of non-independence between the incomes of the two borrowers,
the decentralized allocation is inefficient. However, the direction of the inefficiency (that
is, whether there is overborrowing or underborrowing ex-ante) is unclear at this point.
To be more specific, it is necessary to propose some form of correlation between yA and
15where the superindex P stands for “policymaker”.
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yB. The following paragraphs offer a discussion along this lines assuming that yA and yB
are positively correlated (if the correlation is negative, the discussion follows exactly the
opposite line of argumentation).
If yA and yB are positively correlated, dA = 0 (conversely, dA = 1) signals to agents in
Market B an increased (decreased) probability of observing higher levels of yB. Thus, for a
given level of borrowing `A, dA = 0 (dA = 1) allows Borrower B to sell a given face value
`B at a higher (lower) price. This fact implies that, for all `A:
VB
(
`A, 1
)
< VB
(
`A, 0
)
(2.1.17)
Moreover, given dA, a higher (conversely, a lower) `A signals to agents in Market B an
increased (decreased) probability of observing higher levels of yB. Thus, for a given de-
fault/repayment choice dA a higher (lower ) `A allows Borrower B to sell a given face value
`B at a higher (lower) price. This fact implies that, for all `A:
VB1
(
`A, 0
)
> 0 VB1
(
`A, 1
)
> 0 (2.1.18)
Both (2.1.17) and (2.1.18) create the ambiguity result. To see this, evaluate the optimal-
ity condition for the policymaker (2.1.16) at the decentralized `A,? assuming an interior
solution:
Φ
(
`A,?
)
= (1− λ)
{
G1
(
`A,?
γ
)
1
γ
[
VB
(
`A,?, 1
)
−VB
(
`A,?, 0
)]
+ (2.1.19)[
1− G
(
`A,?
γ
)]
VB1
(
`A,?, 0
)
+ G
(
`A,?
γ
)
VB1
(
`A,?, 1
)}
where Θ
(
`A,?
)
= 0 is used. As Φ
(
`A,P
)
= 0, it follows that the decentralized equilibrium
features inefficient overborrowing (`A,? > `A,P) only if:
G1
(
`A,?
γ
)
1
γ
[
VB
(
`A,?, 1
)
−VB
(
`A,?, 0
)]
+[
1− G
(
`A,?
γ
)]
VB1
(
`A,?, 0
)
+ G
(
`A,?
γ
)
VB1
(
`A,?, 1
)
< 0 (2.1.20)
Of course, if condition (2.1.20) is reversed, the decentralized equilibrium features inefficient
underborrowing (`A,? < `A,P). Proposition 8 implies that the LHS of expression (2.1.20)
is generally different from zero, as yA and yB are postulated to be dependent. However,
(2.1.17) and (2.1.18) imply that the sign of this term is, in principle, ambiguous.
To explain the economic intuition behind this ambiguity, it is useful to decompose the LHS
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of (2.1.20) in two terms, the relative magnitude of which will determine whether or not
overborrowing is observed in the decentralized equilibrium:
1. “Hirshleifer Term”
G1
(
`A,?
γ
)
1
γ
[
VB
(
`A,?, 1
)
−VB
(
`A,?, 0
)]
< 0 (2.1.21)
This term reflects the positive effect of `A on the probability of a loss of size
VB
(
`A, 1
)−VB (`A, 0) on Borrower B. The latter term reflects the different insur-
ance possibilities of Borrower B under dA = 1 and dA = 0 respectively16. This term
captures the mechanism that has been described before: from an ex-ante perspective,
the borrowing decision by Borrower A changes the probability of unleashing a certain
impact on the choice set of Borrower B. Notice that this effect occurs through the
information flow between financial transactions in the two markets. This mechanism
is an example of how, from an ex-ante point of view, the interim partial revelation of
information about income creates an externality through its effect on the insurance
possibilities of other agents. This term is named after Jack Hirshleifer[44, 1971], who
first explored this form of externality.
2. “Cross Reputation Term”: This term reflects the positive effect of `A on the proba-
bility of observing high levels of yB given dA:[
1− G
(
`A,?
γ
)]
VB1
(
`A,?, 0
)
+ G
(
`A,?
γ
)
VB1
(
`A,?, 1
)
> 0 (2.1.22)
This term is the expected derivative of the value function of Borrower B with respect
to `A. As explained before, given dA, an increased `A improves the insurance possi-
bilities of Borrower B, by being more informative about a high income in case dA = 0
or less informative about a low income in case dA = 1. If Borrower A and Borrower
B were the same person, this effect could be interpreted as the building of reputa-
tion by an individual Borrower, in an analogous way to people in real credit markets
sometimes wishing to borrow small quantities with the only purpose of mantaining
high credit scores. As this reputation transfers in this context from one Borrower to
the next given income correlation, this term has been called the “Cross Reputation
Term”.
If the “Hirshleifer Term” is greater (smaller) in absolute value than the “Cross Reputation
Term”, the decentralized equilibrium will feature overborrowing (underborrowing) as the
16Recall that both Borrowers are assumed to be risk-averse. This assumption implies that Borrowers wish
to smooth income across periods, and use unsecured consumer credit as the main instrument to achieve
this goal. Thus, differences in ex-post payoffs due to different values of dA(a state variable) will reflect
different choice sets in the same insurance problem.
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concern for the insurance possibilities of Borrower B outweighs (at the efficient allocation)
the need to create a reputation for him via an increase in `A.
2.1.7. Correcting the externality
Regardless of the sign of the inefficiency, it is possible to imagine several mechanisms by
which the policymaker could incentivize economic agents to optimally choose the efficient
allocation in a decentralized equilibrium. This section explores an increase in the cost of
wholesale funds and the introduction of a tax on borrowing in Market A as mecanisms of
implementation of the efficient allocation.
2.1.7.1. Increase in the cost of wholesale funds
Assume the zero-profit condition of Bank A (2.1.5) is rewritten as:
piA`A +
[
1− piA
]
0 = qA`A (1+ τ)
piA
1+ τ
= qA
where τ is an exogenously engineered percentage variation in the cost of funds. In the
baseline model, it is assumed that Banks fund loans through deposits from an exogenous
source that can be thought of as having an opportunity cost of funds of zero. Therefore,
this exercise considers a policy scenario that increases the opportunity cost for outside
depositors in some percentage τ. Rewrite the decentralized problem of Borrower A after
the introduction of this increase in the cost of funds as:
VA ≡ max
`A
u

[
1− G
(
`A
γ
)]
1+ τ
`A

+β

yHˆ
`A
γ
u
(
yA − `A
)
g
(
yA
)
dyA +
`A
γˆ
yL
u
(
yA − γyA
)
g
(
yA
)
dyA

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The necessary (and sufficient, given assumed conditions on concavity) first order condition
that characterizes the interior solution to this problem is now:
u1

[
1− G
(
`A
γ
)]
1+ τ
`A

[
1− G1
(
`A
γ
)
`A
γ − G
(
`A
γ
)]
1+ τ
−β
yHˆ
`A
γ
u1
(
yA − `A
)
g
(
yA
)
dyA = 0 (2.1.23)
In order to correct the inefficiency within the framework of the decentralized equilibrium,
the policymaker must set τ such that equation (2.1.23) is satisfied when evaluated at
`A,? = `A,P (the latter being determined by (2.1.16)). Naturally, τ > 0 (< 0) whenever
the decentralized equilibrium features overborrowing (underborrowing).
2.1.7.2. Borrowing Tax
Assume that the consumption of Borrower A is given by:
cA1 = q
A`A (1− t)
where t is an exogenous tax imposed on borrowing by Borrower A, rebated to wither
borrower in the form of a lump-sum transfer. Rewrite the problem of Borrower A with this
tax as follows:
VA ≡ max
`A
u
([
1− G
(
`A
γ
)]
`A (1− t)
)
+ β×
yHˆ
`A
γ
u
(
yA − `A
)
g
(
yA
)
dyA +
`A
γˆ
yL
u
(
yA − γyA
)
g
(
yA
)
dyA
 (2.1.24)
67
The necessary first order condition that characterizes the solution to this problem is:
u1
([
1− G
(
`A
γ
)]
`A (1− t)
) [
1− G1
(
`A
γ
)
`A
γ
− G
(
`A
γ
)]
(1− t)
−β
yHˆ
`A
γ
u1
(
yA − `A
)
g
(
yA
)
dyA = 0 (2.1.25)
In order to correct the inefficiency within the framework of the decentralized equilibrium,
the policymaker must set t such that equation (2.1.25) is satisfied when evaluated at `A,? =
`A,P (the latter being determined by (2.1.16)). Similar to the case of the increase in the
cost of funds, t > 0 (< 0) whenever the decentralized equilibrium features overborrowing
(underborrowing).
2.2. Simulations
The ambiguity result of the theoretical model suggests the necessity to explore numerically
the range of parameters under which either direction of inefficiency will show up in the
decentralized equilibrium. The model presented is simple and not designed at this stage
to provide quantitative answers to real world policymakers. This section is intended as an
exploratory exercise designed to build intuition on the effect of some parameters on the
amount of over/underborrowing.
2.2.1. Functional Forms and Parameters
In order to simulate the previous model, it is necessary to specify, together with parameter
values, functional forms for the instantaneous utility function u and the joint distribution
function F. The utility function is assumed to be:
u (c) =
c1−σ
1− σ (2.2.1)
where σ is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion. With regard to the joint distribution,
it is assumed that yA = yB = y. This form of extreme correlation between the incomes
of the two borrowers implies that the state of nature is fully realized (but not observed by
all) in the second period of Market A, and agents in Market B use available information
to learn about the realized state. In this context, the only function left to specify is the
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unconditional distribution of y. It is assumed that:
Pr (y ≥ x) =
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH−x
yH−yL
)
yL ≤ x ≤ yH
0 x > yH
(2.2.2)
That is, there exist a positive mass at y = yH, as Pr (y ≥ yH) = Pr (y = yH) = ρ,
and y is uniformly distributed in the range [yL, yH). This distribution function explicitly
encompasses both a discrete Bernoulli income distribution (ρ > 0 and zero mass after
y = yL) and a continuous distribution (ρ = 0).
Appendix B.2 presents the optimization problems of Borrower A, Borrower B and the
benevolent policymaker under (2.2.1) and (2.2.2). The model is solved computationally
with the set of base parameters presented in table 2.1.
Table 2.1.: Base Parameters
Parameter Value
ρ 0.4
γ 0.1
σ 2.5
β 0.985
yH 100
yL 30
Figure 2.2.1 at the end of the chapter presents the effect of changes in ρ (the probability
of observing y = yH), γ (the default penalty) and σ (risk aversion) from their baseline
values on the Hirshleifer Term, the Cross-Reputation Term and the LHS of (2.1.20) (which
corresponds to the sum of the previous two). Clearly, as in (2.1.21) and (2.1.22) these terms
are evaluated at `A,? (the optimal decentralized borrowing by Borrower A). To guarantee
an interior solution, as assumed throughout the paper, it is necessary to impose ρ < 0.525,
γ < 0.75 and σ > 2.5.
Panels A and B in figure 2.2.1 present respectively the Hirshleifer and Cross Reputation
Terms, and the LHS of (2.1.20) for different values of ρ (and keeping the other parameters at
their base values). As explained before, the Hirshleifer Term is generally negative, whereas
the Cross-Reputation Term is positive (Panel A). For low levels of ρ, underborrowing is
prevalent, as the sum of the two terms of interest is positive. As ρ rises, the Hirshleifer
Term becomes relatively bigger and, for ρ > 0.15, the decentralized equilibrium features
overborrowing. The intuition for this result follows closely the description of the two terms
of interest. When ρ is relatively high, Borrower A has the incentive to borrow excessively,
in the sense that his default sends a very bad signal to Market B with respect to y.
69
Under this conditions, the policymaker has a strong incentive to protect Borrower B’s
insurance possibilities. This effect of ρ can be related to the inefficiency of credit booms
in the unsecured consumer credit market. In the context of the model, the business cycle
can be captured through changes in ρ: a high ρ might characterize an economic boom,
whereas a low ρ would define a recession. Under this interpretation, the simulations suggest
that there is overborrowing during economic booms (that is, inefficient credit booms) and
inefficiently low borrowing during recessions. When ρ is extremely high (in this case, close
to ρ = 0.525, the value that triggers the corner solution `A,? = γyH), underborrowing
emerges again as the decentralized outcome. The intuition in this case is less interesting:
when the probability of the highest possible income is very high, the probability of default is
so low that the potential costs of default do not outweigh the potential benefit for Borrower
B of a likely non-default from Borrower A.
Panels C and D present the same calculations for different values of γ, the default penalty
(other parameters kept at their base values). In this case, the spectrum of possible values
of γ that imply overborrowing is very large. Underborrowing is only possible when γ is
extremely high, and the optimal decentralized borrowing of Borrower A is close to the
riskless minimum. Interestingly, as γ increases, the degree of overborrowing falls. The
intuition for this is that, as the private cost of default becomes larger, Borrower A’s incentive
to borrow diminishes, and the private cost of default makes the policymaker less willing to
“bet” on a good realization of income.
Finally, Panels D and E study the effect of different values of σ, the coefficient of risk
aversion. As is the case with γ, only extremely high levels of risk aversion would induce
underborrowing. Similarly, a higher degree of risk aversion reduces the degree of overbor-
rowing, as risk averse Borrower A has less incentives to borrow given the uncertainty of
consumption in the second period.
2.3. Conclusions
This chapter has presented a simple theoretical framework in which the effects of the default
choice of some agents spread to some other agents in the economy. The existence of this
mechanism depends crucially on the dependence between incomes of different groups of
agents. This dependence interacts with the flow of information across markets to alter
insurance possibilities across the economy. The fact that atomistic agents do not take into
account these externalities of individual default choice imply that, under some conditions,
the decentralized borrowing will be suboptimal.
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This observation suggests an important policy implication given the recent evolution of un-
secured consumer credit in several Latin American economies described in the introduction
to this chapter. The model developed here captures a number of salient features of the
unsecured consumer credit market in those economies. In particular, the lack of broadly
used legal mechanisms that allow lenders to seize individuals’ assets in the event of de-
fault and the big prominence given to aggregate variables (aggregate default) in the credit
extension decision from lenders. As the latter is an important mechanism through which
information on the aggregate state is obtained, it is plausible to conjecture that individual
decisions that alter aggregate outcomes do potentially create benefits and costs that go
beyond the private sphere. In this sense, if the rapid growth of consumer credit in Latin
America responds (to some extent) to a broad perception of a higher income in the future,
the simulations of the model suggest that policymakers may have the incentive to curb the
rapid expansion of credit, lest future defaults affect the ability of borrowers in the future to
insure and smooth consumption.
Some comments must be made about the abovementioned results that might guide future
work along these lines. Firstly, the role of the absence of secured credit should be high-
lighted. For example, if Bank B had the legal ability to seize assets from Borrower B in case
of default, the ex-ante insurance possibilities of the latter might even be the same under
dA = 0 that under dA = 1 with only a change in, say, posted collateral. The inability to
secure credit in this framework is therefore a crucial element in delivering the inefficiency
result.
Second, the inefficiency result obtained in Proposition 8 is symmetric along the business
cycle up to changes in the joint distribution function F. As suggested before, only if the
business cycle is interpreted -within the context of the model- as changes in F, then it is
possible to think of different directions of inefficiency in different stages of the business
cycle: for example, underborrowing in recessions (where high incomes are unlikely) and
overborrowing in booms (when low incomes are unlikely).
Otherwise, if F is assumed to be invariant across stages of the business cycle, then the model
does not feature endogenously inefficient credit booms, in the sense of overborrowing in
some states of nature (or stages of the cycle) at the cost of volatility and underborrowing
in some other states of nature17. Rather, the model would predict permanently inefficient
credit, regardless of the state of nature, in a similar way than information asymmetries and
other frictions do.
A possible mechanism to introduce asymmetries along the business cycle without changes to
F is proposed by Ordonez[59, 2010]. The mechanism is based on the number of transactions
17See Lorenzoni[51, 2008]
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(lending/borrowing) that take place in different stages of the business cycle, that produces
a different number of signals allowing lenders to learn at different speeds the changes in
the state of nature. This mechanism could be easily implemented in this context after
extending the model to several periods and agents.
A final reflection concerns the practical implementation of the solution to the externality.
Sections (2.1.7.1) and (2.1.7.2) discussed the theoretical calculation of instruments to
implement the efficient allocation in a decentralized equilibrium. However, the pair of
solutions discussed are implementable in practice assuming that the policymaker is able to
identify Market A from Market B, or more generally, those markets that create externalities
with default from those other markets that are affected. In the context of the model, time
is the key variable that permits this distinction, but it is clear that in practice this task
might be all but impossible at a given point in time. Again, the introduction of asymmetric
inefficiency along the business cycle regardless of F might be useful in this case: the
realization of the state of nature might serve as an indicator of socially suboptimal trends
in borrowing.
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Figure 2.2.1.: Overborrowing and Underborrowing
(2.1.20) and (2.1.21) B: LHS of (2.1.20)
A. ρ B. ρ
−
.
01
−
.
00
5
0
.
00
5
.
01
.
01
5
0 .2 .4 .6
rho
Cross−Reputation Hirshleifer
−
.
00
2
−
.
00
1
0
.
00
1
.
00
2
 
0 .2 .4 .6
rho
Cross−reputation + Hirshleifer
C. γ D. γ
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
gamma
Cross−Reputation Hirshleifer
−
.
01
5
−
.
01
−
.
00
5
0
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
gamma
Cross−reputation + Hirshleifer
E. σ F. σ
−
.
00
4
−
.
00
2
0
.
00
2
.
00
4
2 4 6 8 10
sigma
Cross−Reputation Hirshleifer
−
.
00
05
−
.
00
04
−
.
00
03
−
.
00
02
−
.
00
01
0
 
2 4 6 8 10
sigma
Cross−reputation + Hirshleifer
73
3. Information Sharing and Credit
Outcomes: Evidence from a
Natural Experiment1
In a frictionless capital market, funds will always be available for individuals to smooth their
consumption by borrowing against future expected income. In practice, however, borrowers
often complain of not being able to borrow enough at reasonable rates. Economic theory
suggests that market frictions such as information asymmetries and agency conflicts may
explain why capital does not always flow to borrowers with positive expected income flows
(see, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss [75, 1981]). From a theoretical point of view, one
mechanism lenders could use to overcome these frictions is the exchange of information
with other lenders through information brokers, generally known as Credit Bureaus (see
Pagano and Jappelli [61, 1993] and Padilla and Pagano [60, 2000])2.
Consistent with these theories, several empirical studies find that information sharing through
credit bureaus is positively correlated to ex-post credit market development, as indicated
by higher credit access and lower default rates (see, for example, Djankov et al. [32, 2007],
Jappelli and Pagano [47, 2002], Warnock and Warnock [79, 2008] and Galindo and Miller
[41, 2001]).
While still potentially increasing the discipline of borrowers, however, certain types of in-
formation sharing systems across lenders can also exacerbate “hold-up” problems where
lenders extract informational rents from borrowers (see Sharpe [73, 1990], Rajan [66, 1992]
and von Thadden [78, 2004]). For instance, if lenders share only negative information
(i.e. defaults), or if this negative information is long-lived and carries a stigma of failure,
1This chapter is joint work with Juanita Gonza´lez-Uribe.
2There are other mechanisms that banks use to overcome these frictions such as requiring potential bor-
rowers to pledge collateral in order to sort observationally equivalent loan applicants through signaling
(e.g., Bester [13, 1985] [14, 1987]; Besanko and Thakor [12, 1987a] [11, 1987b]; Chan and Thakor
[23, 1987]; Boot, Thakor, and Udell [20, 1991a]) or to induce discipline (e.g., Boot, Thakor, and Udell
[19, 1991b]; Boot and Thakor [18, 1994]; Aghion and Bolton [1, 1997]; Holmstrom and Tirole [45,
1997]). In practice, however, not all loans are easily backed by collateral. Individuals may not have
enough tangible assets to collateralize, and poor protection of creditor rights may make seizing collateral
unfeasible.
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inside banks (those with which borrowers already have a lending relationship) are more
likely to be able to hold-up customers from receiving competitive financing elsewhere. In
this regard, Frisancho [37, 2012] documents that high-quality microfinance borrowers in
Peru moved away from their banks when the sharing system was modified to include their
positive information (i.e. repayment histories).
This chapter analyzes the relationship between information sharing and credit outcomes in
the unsecured consumer credit market, focusing on the potential ex-post disciplinary effect
and the ex-ante informational hold-up of long-lived negative information about borrowers.
We exploit a natural experiment in Colombia created by Law 1266/2008, whereby detailed
information about past defaults that were exogenously “sufficiently old” was erased from
Private Credit Bureaus (in what follows, PCB). Specifically, for borrowers in good standing,
the law specified that detailed information on all defaults prior to June 2008 was erased
with immediate effect in June 2009. Information regarding defaults that occurred between
June 2008 and June 2009, as well as positive information of borrowers (e.g., repayment
histories), remained unchanged at PCB.
Our empirical strategy compares changes in the credit outcomes for those borrowers whose
negative information was erased from PCB (hereafter referred to as the “treatment” group)
with changes in credit outcomes for a counterfactual group of borrowers whose information
in PCB was not affected by the law (“control” group). In particular, the treatment group
corresponds to those borrowers in good standing by June 2009 whose last default episode
was recorded before June 2008. As a result of the law, all negative information pertaining
the history of these borrowers was destroyed in June 2009. The control group corresponds
to borrowers who had not committed a default prior to the enactment of the law, and
therefore did not have any negative information to start with. The information about these
borrowers in PCB did not change after June 2009. The main identification assumption (to
be articulated more precisely below) is that credit outcomes of treated and control borrowers
would have evolved in a similar manner in the absence of the change in information sets.
We complement our empirical strategy by comparing credit outcomes for the same borrower
across inside and outside banks (the latter being those lenders with which borrowers do not
have a pre-existing lending relationship). This comparison is essential to shed light on
the effects of the law on the informational hold-up by inside lenders. In Colombia, by
legal requirement, banks can only access a borrower’s information in PCB after obtaining
the explicit written authorization from a prospective customer, something which is done
normally as part of the application procedure for a loan. In addition, we focus on unsecured
consumer credit, where banks do not have access to reliable sources of information on
prospective borrowers for their credit evaluations other than PCB. As a consequence, the
change in information induced by the law is only relevant for outside banks, as long as
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these are unlikely to have private records on prospective borrowers. Outside lenders should
therefore be more sensitive to the information change than inside banks.
Using a Differences-in-Differences (DD) specification, we find that after old negative in-
formation is erased, there is a significant increase in the size and maturity of new loans,
no significant changes in interest rates, and an increase in subsequent default rates for the
treatment group, relative to the control group. Overall, these results are consistent with
both ex-post disciplinary effects, and ex-ante information hold-up from long-lived negative
information in PCB. Specifically, consistent with the hold-up theories, we find that most of
the increase in the value of loans comes from outside banks. In addition, consistent with
the disciplinary role of information sharing, we find evidence of a relative increase in the
frequency of default for new loans after negative information is erased.
The main advantage of the choice of treatment and control groups as described above is
that both groups committed no default after the announcement of the legislative project.
However, one disadvantage is that borrowers who did not commit any default prior to
June 2008 may be different from borrowers in the treatment group in ways that we cannot
control for even after allowing for differential trends in credit outcomes across treatment
and control groups. To deal with this concern, we perform a series of robustness checks
that include the use of alternative treatment and control groups in order to deal with
potential biases in the estimation that could arise from changes in the expected income of
borrowers concurrent to the enactment of the law. Specifically, we consider an alternative
treatment group comprised by borrowers whose last default occurred as far in the past as
the sample allows us to observe, thus resembling more closely the recent default behavior
of the control group. In addition, we consider an alternative control group corresponding
to those borrowers in good standing by June 2009 who committed a default between June
2008 and December 2008, and which (in accordance with the law) did not see their prior
default history immediately erased from the system in June 2009. The advantage of this
alternative control group is that (similar to the treatment group) these borrowers have
defaulted in their debt obligations at some point in their recent history. Reassuringly, our
main results are robust to the choice of these alternative groups.
This chapter contributes to the literature that explores the impact of information sharing on
credit markets (Pagano and Jappelli [61, 1993], Padilla and Pagano ([60, 2000]), Djankov
et al. [32, 2007], Jappelli and Pagano [47, 2002], Warnock and Warnock [79, 2008],
Galindo and Miller [41, 2001], Galindo and Micco [39, 2007] [40, 2010], Love and Milenko
[52, 2003], Brown, Jappeli and Pagano [21, 2009], Frisancho [37, 2012], Hertzberg, Liberty
and Paravisini [43, 2011]). Our chapter differs from prior research in that we focus on
one specific aspect of information sharing (long-lived negative information) and we exploit
exogenous variation in the type of information available in PCB, using detailed loan-level
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data. In contrast, prior research (with the exceptions of Frisancho[37, 2012] and Hertzberg,
Liberty and Paravisini [43, 2011]) uses cross-country differences in the development of PCB
to examine the impact of information sharing on credit outcomes. The limitations of this
type of approaches are several and well-known.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on hold-up problems (Sharpe [73, 1990],
Rajan [66, 1992], Petersen and Rajan [65, 1994], Berger and Udell [9, 1995], Boot [17,
2000], Ongena and Smith [58, 2001], Berger and Udell [10, 2002], Farinha and Santos
[35, 2000], Gopalan, Udell, and Yerramilli [42, 2011], Degrysse and Ongena [31, 2005],
Schenone [71, 2010] and Ioannidou and Ongena [46, 2010]). Our chapter differs from the
ones cited above in that our setting provides an arguably exogenous change in the capability
of hold-up by banks. Results from prior research are hard to interpret as long as they may
reflect differences between firms that self-select into relationship lending and those that do
not. Our main contribution is to propose a new form of hold-up which arises even in the
context of information sharing. The key new insight here is that in contexts where stigma
of failure is prevalent, sharing systems with long-lived negative information may exacerbate
the informational hold-up from inside banks. The results are likely to pertain to the specific
characteristics of the Colombian financial system, as there are reasons to believe that it
is particularly characterized by a slow, mistake-penalizing nature of information updating
by banks. Results may thus generalize to other similar developing economies with shallow
financial systems, but are less likely to apply to countries with more developed capital
markets where the stigma of failure is, in principle, less prevalent. In this sense, we are
limited by the cleanly identified setting to make more general claims in this regard.
This chapter unfolds as follows. Section 3.1 is devoted to a brief exploration of the insti-
tutional structure of the Colombian system of credit histories and the main features of the
natural experiment that arises from the Law 1266/2008. Section 3.2 presents the empirical
strategy employed in the chapter. Section 3.3 describes the dataset and examines the main
statistical features of the treatment and control groups created by the experiment. The
results are in turn presented in Section 3.4; some concluding comments are discussed in
Section 3.5.
3.1. Institutional Background
3.1.1. The Colombian System of Credit Histories
Regulated, formal, financial institutions in Colombia are required by law to frequently record
and report information on their loans. This information is collected on behalf of the govern-
ment by the Public Credit Registry administered by the Financial Superintendence Office
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(FSO, Financial Regulation Office). The Registry collects loan-level information covering
the formal financial system at quarterly frequency. This information is confidential and is
used by the FSO and by the Central Bank with regulatory, policy and research purposes.
Information sharing across formal lenders in the Colombian financial system is done through
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB), which started operating in Colombia in 19813. After explicit
written authorization from a prospective borrower (something usually included as part of
the application process for a loan), a bank can obtain a “credit report” on the borrower
from a PCB4. Before 2009, these credit reports included detailed information on all current
and past loans. Information on the repayment history of utilities (such as electricity bills
and telephone services) as well as an internally generated credit score was also provided in
the reports5.
For the case of financial obligations, entries in the credit report included originating bank,
loan amount, loan type, value of collateral, repayment and default history, and the value of
overdue payments6.
Before 2009, the activities of PCB in Colombia were, by and large, unregulated. The
consequent lack of oversight led to a number of legal conflicts between borrowers and
PCB. Borrowers often complained that by reporting default history on all loans, even for
those that had been already repaid in full, PCB exacerbated the consequences of default.
PCB became known as “black lists”, and the perception of the public was that once in the
black list, they would not be able to borrow at reasonable rates in the future, if at all. At
the time, these issues were at the forefront of the calls for reform of the system7.
3.1.2. The Reform of 2009: Law 1266/2008
The lack of oversight on PCB did not escape the attention of policymakers. A total of 12
attempts were made prior to 2008 to introduce a regulatory framework on the sector, but all
these legislative projects failed to reach approval by either Congress or the Constitutional
Court (CC). During the first quarter of 2008, the Colombian government submitted to
3For a brief review of the recent history of PCB in the Colombian financial system, see CEMLA [22, 2005].
As of the start of 2013, there were three operating, nation-wide, PCB in the country: Datacrédito,
CIFIN, and Procrédito.
4This legal requirement implies that it is not possible for any potential lender to get hold at once of the
entire information set of PCB unless authorized by each and every single borrower in the economy.
5Because credit reports include such detailed information, credit scores have not acquired the relative
importance that they have in more developed financial systems.
6For the case of unsecured consumer credit operations, apart from the information shared through PCB
and the information gathered through a relationship, banks have access to few other sources of infor-
mation for their credit evaluations.
7For a discussion of regulatory flaws and proposals at the time, see Miller and Guadamillas[54, 2006].
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Congress the final legislative project that eventually became Law 1266/2008. Fundamen-
tally, this law regulates the market activities of PCB in several dimensions, including -for
instance- dispositions about maximum holding time windows for negative items in credit
histories and mechanisms to deal with complaints and mistakes in the information.
Law 1266/2008 was enacted by Congress on December 31st, 2008. Importantly, the law
allowed a period of adjustment of six months after enactment (that is, from January 2009 to
June 2009) during which lenders and borrowers adapted from the old, unregulated system to
the new, regulated one. Once finished the transition period, the system became regulated
by the body of the law, and no more regulatory changes were scheduled or expected to
happen in the future.
Most likely for political reasons (the law was one of the promises of the reelection campaign
of incumbent President Alvaro Uribe in 2006), the law included a set of measures whose
purpose was to offer some borrowers a form of “fresh start” vis-a-vis PCB. This entailed
the one-off removal (or destruction) of negative items (i.e. defaults) held in the PCB credit
reports of borrowers that satisfied certain conditions. Specifically, histories of prior defaults
were erased provided that:
1. Defaults were exogenously “sufficiently old” by June 2009.
2. Borrowers were in good standing with all their debt obligations by the end of the
period of adjustment (June 2009).
The “fresh start” policy can be thought of as a natural experiment in the set of available
information about borrowers in the financial system. To be more specific, for those borrow-
ers in good standing by June 2009, detailed information on all defaults prior to June 2008
was erased. Information on defaults that occurred between June 2008 and June 2009, as
well as positive information on borrowers (e.g., repayment histories), remained in principle
unchanged. If the borrower continued to be in good standing, information on defaults
that occurred between June 2008 and June 2009 was to be erased immediately after these
defaults become one year old.
The differential (across borrowers) entitlement to a fresh start implies that the policy did
not modify the information shared in PCB homogeneously across borrowers. Instead, the
modification depended on the exact timing of prior defaults at the moment in which infor-
mation was erased. Our identification strategy relies precisely in the differential effect of
the law across borrowers.
For the purposes of studying the exact structure of the time effects of the law, Figure 3.1.1
presents the life cycle of the legislative project that culminated in Law 1266/2008. The
project was first announced to the public at the beginning of 2008, after it is approved by
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Congress and sent to the Constitutional Court (CC) for examination. The first quarter of
2008 is then referred to in what follows as Tannouncement. In April 2008, the CC rejects the
project on procedure grounds, mandating Congress to discuss it again without questioning
the constitutionality of its body. After an additional round of discussion and approval,
the CC finally gave the project the green light of constitutionality in October 2008. As
mentioned above, the law was finally enacted on New Year’s Eve 2008. In what follows, we
refer to the last quarter of 2008 as Tenactment.
Figure 3.1.1.: Timeline of Law 1266/2008
T announcement
I:2008 II:2009
T destructionT enactment
IV:2008
Adjustment Period
Interim Period Post Period
III:2008
Go-ahead by CC
I:2009II:2008
Because the implementation of the law included a transition period of six months after
Tenactment, the changes in the information of borrowers related to the fresh start policy
were not fully implemented until the end of June 2009. After this date, the information
sets of PCB were legally required to reflect the changes established by the law. In what
follows, we refer to the second semester of 2009 as Tdestruction8. In what follows, the period
between Tannouncement and Tdestruction is referred to as the interim period, and the period
after Tdestruction as the post (-reform) period. The former comprises the time window in
which anticipation effects are likely to be observed. Importantly, during the interim period
there was varying uncertainty about the probability of the law being approved and enacted
(if not about its characteristics in such a case). Only towards the end of 2008:III and the
beginning of 2008:IV, after the final approval by the CC, market agents were certain that
the law was to be enacted in the near future.
3.2. Empirical Strategy
An ideal experiment to identify the causal effect of long-lived negative information in PCB
on credit outcomes would be as follows. Consider a given borrower with some history of old,
past defaults who is in good standing in his/her current financial obligations with all inside
lenders. The experiment exogenously makes the borrower’s past defaults unobservable to
8For the purposes of this investigation, it is assumed that all negative information subject to destruction
was deleted at once at Tdestruction. To the extent that information matters at all, the destruction of
information previous to Tdestruction would have the effect of reducing the estimated impact of the reform
(for those specifications using Tdestruction as the limit between pre-reform and post-reform outcomes).
Therefore, the assumption that all destruction occurs at once after the six months of adjustment have
passed is the most conservative that could be made.
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all new, outside lenders. Given that this intervention does not affect either the probability
of default of the borrower or the quantity and quality of information at the hands of inside
banks, any observed change in his/her credit outcomes post-intervention is to be attributed
to the causal effect of the unobservability of negative information for outside lenders9.
The “fresh start” policy intervention created by Law 1266 resembles closely this ideal ex-
periment. In particular, it created a group of (treated) borrowers who were benefited by an
immediate elimination of all past negative information about defaults or arrears from the
databases of PCB. Given that the law provided for an adjustment period, this group com-
prises borrowers whose last arrears episode occurred more than one year before Tdestruction
(and were up-to-date in all their obligations at Tdestruction). Thus, borrowers at Tdestruction
whose last default was flagged at PCB before June 30th, 2008 are included in this group.
As this group emerges from the policy intervention without any stain in their credit histories,
it is used as the treatment group throughout most of the empirical specifications below10.
At the same time, the law kept unchanged the information with regard to another set of
(control) borrowers. This group corresponds to borrowers who had not committed a default
prior to the enactment of the law (within the sample), and for which information in the
credit bureaus does not change as a consequence of the law after Tdestruction11.
In light of the previous discussion regarding the timing of the approval and implementation
of the law, the main advantage of using this group of borrowers as the control group is
that (similar to the treatment group) it committed no default between Tannouncement and
Tdestruction. Its main disadvantage (which we mitigate with the robustness checks below)
is that borrowers who did not commit a default prior to 2008 may be different in ways
that we cannot control for even after allowing for differential trends in credit outcomes
across treatment and control groups. The validity of the empirical strategy relies on the
assumption that credit outcomes of treated and control borrowers would have evolved
in a similar fashion in the absence of the policy change. Thus, the main identification
assumption is that the evolution of credit outcomes responds similarly to aggregate shocks
9An alternative experiment with a similar spirit would entail handing over detailed information about past
defaults of a given borrower to a random group of potential lenders. This would create a cross-variation
across lenders with regard to the quantity of information about the particular individual. Given that
the probability of default is not affected by the random release of information, any change in the credit
outcomes of the borrower can be interpreted as a causal effect of the variation in information.
10Another group which receives (partial) treatment is comprised by those borrowers that were up-to-date
in all their liabilities at Tenactment but had at least one arrears episode occurring shortly (at most one
year) before. This group is only partially treated as long as only their old arrears episodes are deleted
from their credit histories, whereas the younger ones are kept in the credit reports. Provided they keep
up-to-date, that negative information would eventually be deleted (once it has been in the PCB set for
one year). This group will not be considered in the exercise of this chapter.
11Given the restrictions posed by using a sample over time of borrowers, it is impossible to make sure
that these borrowers had an unblemished credit history. To the extent that out-of-sample defaults are
a concern, they would have the effect of reducing the estimated effect of the policy intervention, and
therefore act against the results of this chapter, to be discussed below.
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for borrowers whose last default is older than one year, and for borrowers who have never
defaulted, at the time when negative information was erased. Evidence at this respect is
presented below. Finally, note that a violation of this identification assumption likely biases
our results against finding any positive effect in credit outcomes.
These arguments provide the foundations for a baseline Differences-in-Differences (DD)
estimation based in the following econometric specification:
Yi,g,t = αi + λt + δg × t+ θ × Treatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t (3.2.1)
where:
Treatmentg =
1 if firm ibelongs to the Treatment Group0 if firm ibelongs to the Control Group
Postt =
1 t > Tdestruction0 t ≤ Tdestruction
The dependent variable Yi,g,t is one of a number of potential credit outcomes for borrower
i, in group g (g = {Treatment, Control}) at time t. These include the natural logarithm
of the amount of loans obtained by the borrower, the average interest rate and maturity of
these loans, and the frequency of default. Given the large number of financial obligations in
the database, we analyze only new loans, thereby ensuring the timeliness of the information
or loan terms. The right hand side of specification (3.2.1) includes borrower fixed effects
(to control for all time invariant borrower heterogeneity), calendar quarter dummies (to
control for economy wide shocks) and group-specific time trends12. The interaction (DD)
coefficient θ is the coefficient of interest in specification (3.2.1). It represents the conditional
difference in credit outcomes across borrowers in the two groups before and after the policy
intervention. The specification is designed to measure the effect of the experiment on the
credit outcomes of a given borrower13.
To estimate the effects taking into account the possibility of preemptive behavior by market
participants after Tannouncement (but previous to Tdestruction), we also estimate a more
flexible specification where we allow for differences in behavior during the period after the
12The inclusion of these trends follow Angrist and Pischke [2, 2009]; it implies that specification (3.2.1) is
likely to underestimate any existing permanent effect of the intervention on growth rates of the credit
outcome in question.
13The database employed in this chapter does not include borrower information that could be used as
individual, time-varying controls in specification (3.2.1). Only individual, unobserved, fixed controls
and group-level, time-varying controls are taken into account through borrower and time fixed effects.
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legislative project was announced:
Yi,g,t = µi + ξt + ζg × t+ θI × Treatmentg × Interimt (3.2.2)
+θP × Treatmentg × Postt + ηi,g,t
where:
Interimt =
1 Tannouncement < t ≤ Tdestruction0 otherwise
The coefficient on the first interaction term in specification (3.2.2), θI , captures the effect
of announcing the characteristics of the law, holding the information set of PCB constant. It
measures the difference in credit outcomes of treated and counterfactual borrowers during
the interim period relative to any other time window in the sample. The coefficient θP
represents the difference in credit outcomes of treated and counterfactual borrowers after
the elimination of negative information from PCB.
In order to explore in more detail whether our results are consistent with the aforementioned
theories of hold-up, we complement our empirical strategy by comparing credit outcomes
for the same borrower across inside and outside banks. This comparison is useful, as
the change in information induced by the law is only relevant for outside banks, which
are unlikely to have private records on the borrower14. Unlike outside banks, which do
not observe any past negative information on treated borrowers after Tdestruction, inside
banks do have information on the default history of their borrowers previous to the policy
intervention (either because their financial operations with the borrower were directly the
subject of default or because they accessed the credit report of the borrower in the past). It
is reasonable to assume they kept this information during and after the policy intervention.
If long-lived negative information in PCB carries a persistent stigma in credit markets, it
is likely that while this information is shared in the PCB, inside banks are not disciplined
by the market to offer the better performing customers competitive rates (a la Sharpe [73,
1990]). In this setting, borrowers would have an incentive to switch banks immediately
after Tdestruction, after detailed information on their prior defaults is erased (a la Ioannidou
14Recall that, in the case of Colombia, banks can only access a borrower’s information in the credit bureau
given explicit written authorization from a prospective customer. In the Colombian unsecured consumer
credit market banks have no access to loan-level information on borrowers other than the PCB.
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and Ongena [46, 2010]). If Colombian banks are indeed using informational holding-up
with their clients, we expect new loans to be concentrated in outside banks.
The classification between inside and outside banks is based on the start period of our sam-
ple, 2007:IV. For a given borrower, this exercise follows the spirit of the baseline specification
and defines as outside banks all lenders that lent for the first time to the borrower after
Tannouncement. All other lenders are classified as inside banks. The differential effect of the
policy intervention on inside and outside banks across the treatment and control groups can
be calculated from the estimation of the following Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences
(DDD) specification:
Yi,g,Outside,t−Yi,g,Inside,t = µi+ ξt++βg× t+ ϕ× Treatmentg× Postt+ νi,g,t (3.2.3)
where Outside and Inside index the outcome for each particular group of banks. The
coefficient of interest, ϕ, reflects the effect of the policy on credit outcome Y for outside
banks relative to inside banks for treated borrowers, relative to control borrowers.
3.3. Data: Treatment and Control
3.3.1. The Data: Public Credit Registry on Consumer Credit
Our analysis uses data from the chapter on Consumer Credit of the Colombian Public
Credit Registry, administered by the FSO. The database contains detailed loan contract
information on a quarterly basis, on all outstanding loans granted by all licensed financial
institutions in Colombia. This information is submitted by financial institutions in the
form of a quarterly, standardized format (so called “Format 341”). For each loan we have
information on the date of origination, maturity date, contract terms, rating at origination,
and ex-post performance. For each borrower we have information on their total bank debt,
banking relationships, internal bank rating and past repayment history15.
The key characteristic of this database for our analysis is that, in contrast to PCB, infor-
mation in the Public Credit Registry was not modified by the law. As explained before, the
information managed by the public credit registry is confidential and used only for policy
15This rich database is similar to others used in empirical corporate finance and banking papers based on
Latin American data (e.g., Ioannidou and Ongena [46, 2010] for the case of Bolivia, and Hertzberg,
Liberti and Paravisini [43, 2011] for the case of Argentina, among others).
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and regulatory purposes. Hence, we are in a unique position to examine the effect of the
law while controlling explicitly for the changes in information.
The confidential character of the information limits the exercise of this chapter to a random
sample of borrowers for the period 2007:IV-2011:IV 16. On average for the period of study,
the sample covers 57.72% of the total stock of gross consumer credit in the consolidated
balance sheet of the Colombian financial system. This includes non-balanced information
for a total of 2,842,726 borrowers and 64 lenders over the length of the 17 quarters of
analysis.
3.3.2. The Treatment and Control Groups
3.3.2.1. Construction
Ideally, the treatment and control groups should be constructed using data about credit
histories directly extracted from PCB. Unfortunately, this information is confidential and
only available under the same conditions imposed on lenders, that is, under the authorization
of the borrowers whose information is to be collected. This chapter therefore relies on the
construction of individual credit histories from the Public Credit Registry data under the
assumption that the latter closely resemble those in PCB databases. In other words, the
confidentiality of PCB datasets forces the analysis to make several assumptions with regard
to the behavior of PCB using data only from the Public Credit Registry.
It is assumed that, at the borrower (consumer) level, the key variable that PCB use to
produce and summarize a credit history is the number of days in arrears for each single
outstanding loan. Let dijt denote this number for borrower i, loan j at a given point in
time, t. The key assumption is that a negative information item (“stain”) in an individual
firm’s credit history is triggered (or flagged) whenever dijt > d¯, for some threshold d¯ and
some loan j. That is, when the number of days in arrears for any loan exceeds some d¯. In
what follows, the period of time where dijt > d¯ for some j will be interchangeably known
as an “arrears episode” or a “default episode” of individual i. The stain is assumed to be a
permanent feature of the credit history of borrower i except when altered by the fresh start
policy intervention.
Let t¯i = max
{
t : dijt > d¯ for some j and t < Tdestruction
}
denote the date of the last de-
fault episode for a given borrower i before Tdestruction. Borrower i belongs to the treatment
group (Treatmentg = 1) whenever he/she satisfies both the following conditions:
16In addition, the ID codes for borrowers and lenders are anonymized, in the sense that the database
accessed by this investigation identifies borrowers and lenders with a code different to their legal ID.
Therefore, it is not possible to identify individual borrowers or lenders by name using this database.
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1. ti ∈
[
2007 : IV, Tenactment
)
. That is, i has at least one default episode in the sample,
but i is not flagged in all his/her outstanding obligations at the time of enactment
of the law or at the time of destruction of negative information.
2. t¯i < Tdestruction − 1 year. That is, the last negative flag in the credit history was
triggered more than one year previous to the destruction of negative information.
Borrower i belongs to the control group (Treatmentg = 0) whenever dijt ≤ d¯ for all j and
for all t ∈ [2007 : IV, Tdestruction]. Alternatively, borrower i belongs to the control group
whenever t¯i is not defined. In other words, individuals in this control group do not register
any stain during the sample of study.
3.3.2.2. Characterization
The selection of the groups depends naturally on the choice of d¯. All the exercises to follow
employ two alternative values for d¯, 30 days and 0 days. When d¯ is set to 30 (0), a negative
flag is assumed to appear at the PCB information set whenever there are more than 30 (0)
days in arrears for a given borrower in any of his/her obligations. Although setting d¯ = 30
is closer to the legal and practitioner’s definition of a default, d¯ = 0 is used as a robustness
check given that is the most conservative threshold that could be employed (as it is unlikely
that lenders and PCB give a lot of informational value to arrears that are settled in a small
number of days).
Selecting d¯ = 30 produces a panel dataset of 29,062,134 observations that includes
2,056,214 borrowers. Of these, 1,900,746 (92.4%) belong to the control group and the
remaining 155,648 (7,6%) to the treatment group. Table 3.1 presents a summary of de-
scriptive statistics at the end of the first quarter of 2008 (Tannouncement) for a number
of variables that reflect credit outcomes and average contractual characteristics for both
groups. The main variables of interest are: 1. Loans, which corresponds to the overall
value of all loans obtained by a given borrower in a given quarter (loans are defined as fi-
nancial obligations whose origination date is recorded to be within the previous 90 days), 2.
Average interest rate, which corresponds to the weighted average of contractual (ex-ante)
interest rate of loans originated within the previous 90 days, and 3. Average loan matu-
rity, defined as the weighted average of contractual (ex-ante) maturity of loans originated
within the previous 90 days. The information in the table reinforces the conjecture that
both control and treatment groups are similar in a number of observed dimensions that
may help determine future credit outcomes, at the moment in which the policy intervention
is announced. Table 3.2 presents the same set of summary statistics when the threshold is
set to d¯ = 0; similar conclusions arise in this case17.
17The maximum interest rates presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are practically the same. This is due to the
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Evidence in favour of the “common-trends” identification assumption discussed before is
presented in Figure 3.3.1. The figure presents the behavior over time of the average size
of (ln) new loans. Panel A is constructed with a threshold of d¯ = 30 and Panel B with
a threshold of d¯ = 0. The vertical bars in the panels, from left to right, correspond to
Tannouncement, Tenactment and Tdestruction. Anticipation effects, if at all, are likely to be
observed in the window between the first two dates.
The evolution of average (ln) new loans supports the hypothesis of common trends across
the two groups before the policy intervention and serves as visual evidence of the effect of
the destruction of negative information on the loans obtained after Tdestruction by treated
borrowers. The permanent, positive impact of treatment on the access to credit of bor-
rowers in the treatment group is confirmed below with the estimation of the econometric
specifications. Importantly, notice that the average (ln) fresh loans received by the treat-
ment and the control groups starts to diverge right before the actual destruction of negative
information, which suggests the absence of strong anticipatory effects. Finally, notice that
(controlling for the pre-intervention time trend of loans) the policy intervention did not
seem to affect the access to credit of borrowers in the control group.
Figure 3.3.1.: Average (ln) Loans
The figure presents the evolution of the average natural logarithm of new loans across groups. New loans
are defined as financial obligations whose origination date is recorded to be within the 90 days previous
to report. The vertical bars in the panels, from left to right, correspond to Tannouncement, Tenactment and
Tdestruction.
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Figure 3.3.2 at the end of the chapter presents the evolution of a number of alternative
measures of credit outcomes. These include the interest rate and maturity on loans, and
the rating at issuance (an ex-ante measure of risk). Interest rates for both the treatment
and the control groups share a downward trend that follows the expansionary stance of
monetary policy carried by the Central Bank of Colombia after the first half of 2008. Only
fact that consumer credit lenders in Colombia are subject to a system of ceiling rates. At the other side
of the spectrum, zero interest rates are prevalent in consumer loans whose maturity is smaller than 30
days.
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in the case of d¯ = 0 (Panel B) the interest rate charged on loans to the treatment group
seemed to have fallen relatively more than that of the control group. The maturity of
loans experienced an upward trend for both groups during the sample period. Especially
in the case of d¯ = 30, the maturity on loans taken by the treated borrowers seemed to
increase proportionally more (alternatively, the gap between the maturities of the control
group loans and the treatment group loans shrank after intervention).
As discussed before, the evolution of the rating at issuance in Figure 3.3.2 deserves some
attention18. As explained above, by the definition of treatment and control groups, there
are quarters in which (some of the) obligations of treated borrowers are in arrears (dijt > d¯).
This is true for arrears episodes older than Tdestruction − 1 year, as the exercise imposes no
arrears for the treatment group between Tdestruction − 1 year and Tdestruction . Therefore,
the rating at issuance of the treatment group falls over time as these borrowers continue
to be in good standing over time. As expected, the rating of control borrowers is low
throughout the sample window as these borrowers do not have any arrears the period of
study. At Tdestruction, the level of the ratings is very similar across groups, and treated
borrowers are only different in their negative credit history. Thus, although by construction
the rating at issuance of treated and non-treated borrowers does not share a common trend
before Tenactment, its rapid convergence before Tdestruction yields support to the hypothesis
that the behavior of credit outcomes would have evolved in a similar fashion for both groups
in the absence of the policy intervention (at least they do not exhibit large differences in
terms of their expected future probabilities of default).
3.4. Results
This section presents the results of the estimation of the aforementioned specifications
together with additional robustness checks. All estimations below are performed on a
17-quarter panel that includes 2 quarters pre-announcement, 5 interim quarters (that is,
7 pre-intervention quarters) and 10 post-intervention quarters. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the two-way bank-time level1920. Results are shown separately with and without
the inclusion of group-specific time trends (coefficients δg in the specifications above) and
for two different values of the threshold d¯ (30 and 0). Only results that are statistically
18 In the original reporting structure of Format 341, the variable “Rating” is coded in the scale A-E, where
“A” correspond to the highest rating. The rating has been recodified here in the scale 1-5, where the
equivalence is given by: “A”=1, ..., “E”=5.
19In order to construct the panel this exercise selects the “main” bank for each borrower at each quarter.
The “main” bank is defined as the counterparty with which the borrower holds his/her largest financial
obligation at a given moment in time.
20Standard errors were also clustered at the one-way borrower level. These errors were without exception
smaller than those under the two-way clustering level, and therefore are not reported.
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significant regardless of the choice of d¯ and of the inclusion/exclusion of group-specific time
trends are considered robust.
3.4.1. Baseline Results
Tables 3.3-3.5 present the results of the estimation of specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2).
The main result of this chapter is presented in Table 3.3: the increase in loans received by
the treated borrowers after the destruction of negative information is statistically significant
and robust to the choice of d¯, to the inclusion of group-specific time trends and to the
choice of control group. When choosing d¯ = 30 as the threshold for a negative flag (Panel
A), the estimates in column 3 of table 3.3 indicate that treated borrowers experience an
increase of 54.7% in loans after their negative information is deleted compared to borrowers
in the control group. This point estimate falls to 29.7% when a threshold of d¯ = 0 is chosen
instead (Panel B), and is in both cases relatively unaffected by the inclusion of group-specific
time trends.
As expected, the point estimates fall with the lower threshold, as a relatively small number
of days in arrears is less informative than a large one. Thus, the choice of d¯ = 0 is the
most conservative scenario that could be considered and the results in this case indicate a
lower bound for the effects of the policy intervention. The estimates of the interim effects,
although statistically significant when a large threshold is chosen, are not robust to picking
d¯ = 0. The absence of interim effects on the amount of loans can in principle be interpreted
as the result of uncertainty regarding the characteristics of the law. However, the interim
effects will be manifest in alternative credit outcomes, as will be seen below.
There is no robust, statistically significant effect of the policy intervention or its announce-
ment on the interest rate on loans across groups (Table 3.4). Although almost always the
point estimate suggest a reduction in the interest rate for treated borrowers, this results
is not statistically significant when including group-specific time trends or reducing the
threshold for d¯. The absence of strong effects on the interest rate is expected in a credit
market characterized by the prevalent use of ceiling rates on consumer credit.
Interim effects are observed when considering the effect of the policy intervention on the
maturity of loans (Table 3.5). Choosing d¯ = 30, the maturity of loans received by treated
borrowers increased on average 30.5% during the interim period and 51.1% after the in-
tervention (Column 3), compared to the control group. That is, even though during the
interim period treated borrowers do not receive a larger amount of loans compared to the
control group, they are able to obtain larger maturities on average. The direction of these
results is robust to picking d¯ = 0 as threshold. Point estimates are not significantly affected
by the inclusion of group-specific time trends.
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The results presented thus far indicate that the destruction of negative information caused
by Law 1266 allowed affected borrowers to obtain larger loans at longer maturities. In the
case of loans, the effect of the policy intervention is only manifest after the destruction
of information; although the policy was announced in advance, anticipation effects are not
found to be robust or statistically significant.
3.4.2. Robustness Checks
In addition to the inclusion of group-specific time trends and different choices of d¯ (as per-
formed above), this section implements two additional robustness checks on the estimated
effect of the policy intervention on loans and average maturity.
3.4.2.1. Alternative Treatment and Control Groups
A concern with respect to the identification strategy is related to the fact that, by construc-
tion, borrowers in either treatment and control group may be different in their repayment
ability as of time Tdestruction simply because the treatment group does have default episodes
during the period of study. To mitigate this concern, we employ alternative treatment and
control groups as follows.
First, we pick an alternative treatment group according to t¯i, that is, according to the last
date in which the borrowers register a default episode. An alternative sub-treatment group
comprised only by borrowers that have the minimum possible t¯i (oldest default in-sample
before Tdestruction) is the least likely to be affected by the concern, as long as the predictive
power of old defaults on repayment ability at Tdestruction is expected to decay with the age
of the default episode.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the results of the estimation of specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2),
following the structure of the previous subsection, when the treatment group is comprised
only by borrowers whose last default is t¯i = 2007 : IV (the first period of the sample).
The control group in each case is the same employed in the baseline specifications. The
choice of this groups provides the most conservative configuration of treatment and control
groups that is feasible to construct with the sample.
At a significance level of 10%, the result that treated borrowers obtain more loans af-
ter the policy intervention relative to controlled borrowers is robust to picking the new
(sub)treatment group. In this case, loans to borrowers in the treatment group increase
51.4% (Column 3) after the destruction of information relative to the control group. This
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result is robust to the inclusion of group-specific time trends and to the choice of thresh-
old21.
From the results presented in table 3.7, it is clear that borrowers in the treatment group
are also able to obtain longer maturities after the destruction of information. Similar to the
baseline scenario, these borrowers get an average of 50.7% (Column 3) higher maturities
after intervention compared to the control group. This result is robust to the choice of
d¯ and the inclusion of group-specific trends. However, the result that maturities increase
during the interim period found above (see table 3.5) is not robust to the change in the
treatment group: although the estimate of θI is significant when d¯ = 30 and time trends are
excluded, it is not when the threshold is changed and/or group-specific trends are included.
From this exercise it is possible to conclude that, as is the case for loans, the positive effect
of the policy intervention on maturities of treated borrowers is restricted to the period after
the destruction of negative information, whereas anticipation effects are relatively weak (or
non-existent).
Finally, we also submit our main result to the choice of an alternative control group,
corresponding to borrowers who committed a default between June 2008 and December
2008, and which therefore did not see their prior default history immediately erased from
the system at Tdestruction.The main advantage of this alternative control group is that
(similar to the treatment group) these borrowers have also defaulted at some point in the
past on some of their financial obligations. The main disadvantage of this group, however,
is that these borrowers necessarily defaulted after the legislative project was announced.
This behavior suggests that these control borrowers may be unsophisticated vis-a-vis the
treatment group, something which can potentially bias our estimates. Thus, the main
identification assumption in using this alternative control group is that borrowers who
defaulted after the announcement of the legislative project are not fundamentally different
to the treatment group, such that aggregate shocks concurrent to the policy change have
a similar direct effect on their expected income (we refer to this assumption as common
trends assumption in what follows). To be consistent with previous notation, borrower j
belongs to the alternative control group whenever ti ∈
[
Tdestruction − 1 year, Tenactment).
Table 3.8 presents the results of the estimation of specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2), follow-
ing the structure of the previous subsection when the alternative control group is employed.
Reassuringly, the main result of this chapter, the increase in the average loan size to bor-
rowers whose negative information is deleted from PCB after the policy intervention, is
robust to this choice.
21The only exception in this regard is the lack of significance after including group-specific time trends
under d¯ = 0. Together with the choice of the subtreatment group, this is the most conservative scenario
that could be studied from the sample. The robustness of the main result to all other specifications
and to additional checks below is, however, reassuring with regard to its statistical and economic
significance.
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3.4.2.2. Placebo Test
An additional concern is that the sample selection procedure somehow produces the results
presented above in a mechanical way. To verify that this is not the case, this subsection
performs a “placebo” policy intervention using the sub-sample of the data that starts at
Tenactment. The exercise assumes that the policy intervention is announced 2 quarters after
(and is implemented 7 quarters after) the start of this “placebo sample”. The placebo
announcement occurs therefore at Tenactment + 2 and the implementation of the placebo
intervention occurs at Tenactment + 7. Importantly, treatment and control groups are re-
constructed with the new placebo sample. In this sense, the time structure imposed on the
placebo sample resembles the one of the original dataset. Naturally, if the results presented
above are not driven by the sample selection procedure, it is expected that the estimates of
the coefficients of interest are either not significant or not robust to small changes in the
specification.
Reassuringly, this concern on sample selection procedure is rejected by the results in table
3.9, which presents estimates of the baseline specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) with the
new “placebo” sample22. The estimate of coefficient θP is significant when d¯ = 30 is
chosen and linear time trends are excluded. However, this result is not robust to either
the inclusion of trends or the choice of d¯ (in all other configurations the estimate is not
statistically different from zero).
This check confirms that the baseline results discussed above are a consequence of the
economic and financial effects of the policy intervention, and not of any sample/group
procedure selection.
3.4.3. On the Ex-post Cost of Information Destruction
The baseline results indicate that the policy intervention potentially increases the utility
of borrowers in the treatment groupby allowing them to increase the size and maturity of
their loans. However, this does not necessarily imply that policies towards the elimination
of public negative information are welfare-improving. As discussed above, there is a well
established literature on the social benefits of information sharing created by the reduction
of adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets. As a consequence, one of
the potential social costs of destroying public negative information is precisely the ex-post
quality of outstanding loans and the severity of asymmetric information problems.
22For the sake of brevity, only results using the natural logarithm of loans as the dependent variable are
reported.
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Evidence on the potential social costs of the policy intervention is provided in Figure 3.4.1
at the end of this chapter. The figure presents the evolution of the average default status
(borrower i is in a state of default if dijt > d¯ for some j) across groups. The figure focuses
only on the post-intervention period, as no borrower in the treatment or control group is
in arrears during the interim period by contruction. The figure suggest that after negative
information is deleted both groups experienced an increase in the incidence of defaults, but
this increase was proportionately larger for the treatment group. This indicates that the
additional borrowing treated borrowers are able to obtain after the policy intervention is on
average more risky ex-post.
Following Hertzberg, Liberty and Paravisini [43, 2011], the effect of the destruction of
public negative information on the hazard rate of default episodes across the treatment
and control groups is estimated using two specifications analogous to (3.2.1), where the
dependent variable is a measure of the frequency of arrears episodes:
1
{
dijt > d¯|dijt−1 > d¯ for some j
}
i,g,t = αi + λt + δg × t+ (3.4.1)
θ × Treatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
The dependent variable is an indicator that switches to the value of 1 whenever borrower i
registers a new episode of default after being in good standing in the previous period. The
dependent variable takes the value of zero everywhere else. This indicator is a measure of
the frequency with which borrower i in group g falls into arrears (or default). The variables
at the right-hand side of (3.4.1) follow the same structure of baseline specification (3.2.1).
The results presented below also include the estimation of the following specification
1
{
dijt > d¯ for some j
}
i,g,t = αi + λt + δg × t+ (3.4.2)
θ × Treatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 whenever borrower i registers a (not nec-
essarily new) default epiode. Unlike the indicator variable in the main text, this dependent
variable measures the frequency with which borrower i in group g is in a state of arrears (or
default). As will be seen, the estimated direction of the effects is robust to the use of this
alternative specification. Given that the treatment and the control group are constructed
assuming they do not have arrears episodes during the interim period, specification (3.2.2)
cannot be employed in this context.
Table 3.10 reports the estimation results. Consistent with the evidence presented in figure
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3.4.1, there is a statistically significant and robust increase in the frequency of defaults
of treated borrowers post-intervention, compared to the control group. Taking d¯ = 30
as threshold, Column 1 (3) of table 3.10 indicates that the hazard rate of new (existing)
defaults on any debt increases on average 3.4% (6.3%). Similar to previous results, the
introduction of group-specific time trends do not change the direction of these effects.
Overall, the evidence thus far indicates that borrowers whose negative information was
destroyed, while increasing their loan sizes at better conditions as a consequence of the law,
turn out to experience a higher frequency of episodes of arrears after the policy intervention.
This result is consistent with the “discipline effect” discussed before of information sharing.
The identification assumption posed in this chapter implies that, although the quality of
the pool of borrowers composed by the treatment and the control group is not affected by
the policy intervention, the latter has the joint effect of increasing proportionately more the
borrowing of one group in a way that has a proportionately larger effect on the ex-post risk
of their loans. The effect of the policy intervention on ex-post defaults is therefore a clear
downside of policy interventions of the type studied in this chapter.
In future versions of the chapter, we plan to quantify the overall ex-post disciplinary effect
of sharing information on old defaults and the associated costs of this practice due to
informational hold-up, to make more general statements about the welfare effects of the
fresh-start policy.
3.4.4. On the Evidence of Ex-ante Informational Hold-up
The results of the estimation of specification (3.2.3) for loans size and the maturity of loans
are presented respectively in tables 3.11 and 3.12. The estimations follow the baseline ex-
ercise in including separately different thresholds and group-specific linear time trends. The
first column of Table 3.11 indicates that, on average after the destruction of information,
borrowers in the treatment group (under d¯ = 30) obtain 20.9% more loans from outside
banks than from inside banks, compared to the control group. Although the point estimates
vary mildly, the direction of this result is robust to the inclusion of time trends and a change
in the threshold d¯.
These results indicate that the increase in loans obtained by treated borrowers was attained
proportionately more by establishing new relationships than by increasing their borrowing
from existing lenders at the time of the announcement of the law. This result is consistent
with the idea that borrowers whose negative information is destroyed have a strong incen-
tive to substitute away from lenders who can access information about their past default
behavior. This evidence is consistent with inside banks using informational holding-up with
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their clients prior to the fresh start policy intervention. The hold-up is partially broken
by the destruction of negative information, allowing treated borrowers to engage in fresh
relationships with outside lenders.
The results in table 3.12 suggest that despite obtaining more loans from outside banks,
treated borrowers do not experience a statistically significant difference between inside and
outside banks in terms of the maturity of loans after the policy intervention, compared to the
control group. The increase in maturities post-intervention presented in tables 3.5 and 3.7
seems therefore to have been shared proportionately by both types of banks. Admittedly,
this result is less consistent with theories of hold-up. In future versions of the chapter
where certain data restrictions have been overcome, we plan to explore in more depth the
differences in contract conditions for new loans across old and new banks in order to shed
light on the existence of information hold-up on the contractual conditions of new loans.
3.5. Conclusions
We analyze the relationship between information sharing and credit outcomes in the un-
secured consumer credit market, focusing on the potential ex-post disciplinary effect, and
ex-ante informational hold-up, of long-lived negative information about borrowers. We ex-
ploit a natural experiment in Colombia where detailed information about past defaults that
were exogenously “sufficiently old” by June 2009 was erased from the private credit bureaus
by law.
We find a significant relative increase in the size and maturity of new loans, no significant
changes in interest rates, and an increase in subsequent default rates, for treated borrowers
whose old negative information is erased, relative to control borrowers whose information
does not change. Overall, results are consistent with both ex-post disciplinary effects,
and ex-ante information hold-up from long-lived negative information in credit bureaus.
Specifically, consistent with the hold-up theories, we find that most of the increase in the
value of loans comes from outside banks. For a given borrower, we find an increase in the
value and maturity of new loans by outside relative to inside banks. Finally, consistent with
the disciplinary role of information sharing we find an increase in the probability of default
for loans obtained after the destruction of information.
In future versions of the chapter we plan to examine more carefully the variation of a given
borrower across inside and outside banks with respect to loan size, maturity and price of
new loans, as well as quantify the aggregate consequences of this policy, using information
about the universe of borrowers in Colombia. Access to the universe of borrowers would
also allow us to perform calculations with regard to the welfare implications of changes
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in publicly available negative information, as it would allow us to compare the aggregate
benefit of breaking informational hold-ups against the aggregate cost of a less efficient
discipline device.
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Table 3.1.: March 2008 Cross-Section of Borrowers. Descriptive Statistics (d¯ = 30)
This table presents a summary of descriptive statistics for a number of credit outcomes using a snapshot of
the treatment and control groups at the end of the first quarter of 2008 (Tannouncement). The threshold d¯
is set to 30 days. Loans are defined as financial obligations whose origination date is recorded to be within
the 90 days previous to the end of the quarter. The variable “Rating” is coded in Format 341 in the scale
A-E, where “A” correspond to the highest rating. For the purposes of constructing the table, the rating has
been recodified in the scale 1-5, where the equivalence is given by: “A”=1, “B”=2, “C”=3, “D”=4, “E”=5.
Sample
Mean S.D. Median Max. Min.
Loans (mill. COP) 8.12 16.3 3.50 1860 0.00
Total Debt (mill. COP) 8.16 20.0 2.84 8590 0.00
Nr. of Lenders 1.79 1.21 1 17 1
Average Interest Rate (%) 22.59 10.34 26.82 33.08 0.00
Average Maturity (years) 2.89 2.38 3.00 24.26 0.00
Average Rating 1.04 0.29 1.00 5.00 1.00
g
Treatment (125,522 individuals)
Mean S.D. Median Max. Min.
Loans (mill. COP) 7.42 18.9 2.16 841 0.00
Total Debt (mill. COP) 8.18 19.7 2.32 1500 0.00
Nr. of Lenders 1.99 1.36 1 16 1
Average Interest Rate (%) 23.35 10.26 27.27 32.75 0.00
Average Maturity (years) 2.24 2.54 1.33 23.54 0.003
Average Rating 1.54 0.96 1.00 5.00 1.00
g
Control (1,754,571 individuals)
Mean S.D. Median Max. Min.
Loans (mill. COP) 8.15 16.2 3.55 1860 0.00
Total Debt (mill. COP) 8.16 20.0 2.87 8590 0.00
Nr. of Lenders 1.77 1.20 1 17 1
Average Interest Rate (%) 22.55 10.34 26.81 33.08 0.00
Average Maturity (years) 2.92 2.36 3.01 24.26 0.003
Average Rating 1.01 0.15 1.00 5.00 1.00
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Table 3.2.: March 2008 Cross-Section of Borrowers . Descriptive Statistics (d¯ = 0)
This table presents a summary of descriptive statistics for a number of credit outcomes using a snapshot
of the treatment and control groups at the end of the first quarter of 2008 (Tannouncement). The threshold
d¯ is set to 0 days. Loans are defined as financial obligations whose origination date is recorded to be within
the 90 days previous to the end of the quarter. The variable “Rating” is coded in Format 341 in the scale
A-E, where “A” correspond to the highest rating. For the purposes of constructing the table, the rating has
been recodified in the scale 1-5, where the equivalence is given by: “A”=1, “B”=2, “C”=3, “D”=4, “E”=5.
Sample
Mean S.D. Median Max. Min.
Loans (mill. COP) 7.41 11.7 3.80 700 0.00
Total Debt (mill. COP) 5.89 14.4 2.28 8590 0.00
Nr. of Lenders 1.47 0.86 1 13 1
Average Interest Rate (%) 22.30 10.35 26.81 33.08 0.00
Average Maturity (years) 3.15 2.26 3.04 23.54 0.003
Average Rating 1.03 0.27 1.00 5.00 1.00
g
Treatment (184,766 individuals)
Mean S.D. Median Max. Min.
Loans (mill. COP) 6.62 14.2 2.15 700 0.00
Total Debt (mill. COP) 6.31 14.1 1.93 852 0.00
Nr. of Lenders 1.72 1.07 1 13 1
Average Interest Rate (%) 23.21 10.49 27.27 33.08 0.00
Average Maturity (years) 2.51 2.46 3.00 23.54 0.003
Average Rating 1.16 0.61 1.00 5.00 1.00
g
Control (967,856 individuals)
Mean S.D. Median Max. Min.
Loans (mill. COP) 7.56 11.2 4.00 600 0.00
Total Debt (mill. COP) 5.81 14.4 2.35 8590 0.00
Nr. of Lenders 1.43 0.80 1 13.00 1
Average Interest Rate (%) 22.14 10.32 26.81 33.08 0.00
Average Maturity (years) 3.26 2.21 3.05 22.90 0.003
Average Rating 1.01 0.13 1.00 5.00 1.00
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Figure 3.3.2.: Alternative Credit Outcomes
The figure presents the evolution of alternative measures of credit outcomes during the sample period. The
variable “Rating” is coded in Format 341 in the scale A-E, where “A” correspond to the highest rating.
The rating has been recodified here in the scale 1-5, where the equivalence is given by: “A”=1, “B”=2,
“C”=3, “D”=4, “E”=5. The vertical bars in the panels, from left to right, correspond to Tannouncement,
Tenactment and Tdestruction.
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Figure 3.4.1.: Average Default Status
The figure presents the evolution of the average default status (borrower i is in a state of default if dijt > d¯
for some j) across groups. Average default in the interim period is zero by contruction for both the
treatment and the control groups, thus the figure focuses only on the post-intervention period.
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Table 3.3.: Effects of the Policy Intervention. Loans
This table presents the estimations of specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) using as the dependent variable
the natural logarithm of Loans:
(3.2.1) ln
(
Loansi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θ × Treatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
(3.2.2) ln
(
Loansi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θI × Treatmentg × Interimt
+θP × Treatmentg × Postt + ηi,g,t
Robust standard errors clustered at the two-way main bank-time level are presented in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. ** indicates estimates are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Panel
A (B) uses a threshold for negative flag of d¯ = 30 (d¯ = 0) days.
Panel A: d¯ = 30
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.386** 0.276**
(0.077) (0.138)
θI 0.236** 0.232**
(0.087) (0.092)
θP 0.547** 0.536**
(0.080) (0.147)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 29,062,134
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 61×17 61×17 61×17 61×17
s
Panel B: d¯ = 0
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.187** 0.112
(0.070) (0.129)
θI 0.161 0.158
(0.086) (0.088)
θP 0.297** 0.288**
(0.066) (0.129)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 17,416,323
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 61×17 61×17 61×17 61×17
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Table 3.4.: Effects of the Policy Intervention. Interest Rate on Loans
This table presents the estimations of specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) using as the dependent variable
the interest rate on Loans:
(3.2.1) Interesti,g,t = αi + λt + δg × t+ θ × Treatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
(3.2.2) Interesti,g,t = αi + λt + δg × t+ θI × Treatmentg × Interimt
+θP × Treatmentg × Postt + ηi,g,t
Robust standard errors clustered at the two-way main bank-time level are presented in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. ** indicates estimates are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Panel
A (B) uses a threshold for negative flag of d¯ = 30 (d¯ = 0) days.
Panel A: d¯ = 30
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.033 -0.582**
(0.201) (0.236)
θI -0.515** -0.941**
(0.168) (0.182)
θP -0.338 -1.611
(0.263) (1.630)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 3,311,359
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 56×17 56×17 56×17 56×17
s
Panel B: d¯ = 0
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ -0.212 -1.175**
(0.286) (0.403)
θI -0.638 -1.256**
(0.323) (0.377)
θP -0.658 -2.520**
(0.474) (0.719)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 1,677,661
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 55×17 55×17 55×17 55×17
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Table 3.5.: Effects of the Policy Intervention. Maturity of Loans
This table presents the estimations of specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) using as the dependent variable
the natural logarithm of the maturity of Loans:
(3.2.1) ln
(
Maturityi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θ × Treatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
(3.2.2) ln
(
Maturityi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θI × Treatmentg × Interimt
+θP × Treatmentg × Postt + ηi,g,t
Robust standard errors clustered at the two-way main bank-time level are presented in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. ** indicates estimates are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Panel
A (B) uses a threshold for negative flag of d¯ = 30 (d¯ = 0) days.
Panel A: d¯ = 30
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.289** 0.088
(0.076) (0.068)
θI 0.305** 0.257**
(0.043) (0.028)
θP 0.511** 0.367**
(0.076) (0.056)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 3,572,443
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 56×17 56×17 56×17 56×17
s
Panel B: d¯ = 0
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.262** 0.149
(0.095) (0.135)
θI 0.516** 0.554**
(0.209) (0.193)
θP 0.628** 0.742**
(0.156) (0.162)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 1,818,966
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 55×17 55×17 55×17 55×17
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Table 3.6.: Robustness Check: Subtreatment Group with Oldest Default. Loans
This table presents the estimations of specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) using as the dependent variable
the natural logarithm of Loans:
(3.2.1) ln
(
Loansi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θ × Subtreatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
(3.2.2) ln
(
Loansi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θI × Subtreatmentg × Interimt
+θP × Treatmentg × Postt + ηi,g,t
where Subtreatmentg is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if borrower i’s only default episode in-sample
(before Tdestruction) occurred in 2007:IV, and zero if the borrower does not experience any default episode
in-sample (before Tdestruction). Robust standard errors clustered at the two-way main bank-time level are
presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. **(*) indicates estimates are statistically differ-
ent from zero at the 5% (10%) level. Panel A (B) uses a threshold for negative flag of d¯ = 30 (d¯ = 0) days.
Panel A: d¯ = 30
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.374** 0.273*
(0.115) (0.158)
θI 0.204 0.197
(0.224) (0.224)
θP 0.514** 0.493*
(0.233) (0.269)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 28,163,670
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 61×17 61×17 61×17 61×17
s
Panel B: d¯ = 0
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.137* 0.063
(0.083) (0.139)
θI 0.159 0.156
(0.114) (0.111)
θP 0.246** 0.237
(0.112) (0.151)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 16,099,313
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 61×17 61×17 61×17 61×17
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Table 3.7.: Robustness Check: Subtreatment Group with Oldest Default. Maturity of
Loans
This table presents the estimations of specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) using as the dependent variable
the natural logarithm of Loans:
(3.2.1) ln
(
Maturityi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θ × Subtreatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
(3.2.2) ln
(
Maturityi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θI × Subtreatmentg × Interimt
+θP × Treatmentg × Postt + ηi,g,t
where Subtreatmentg is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if borrower i’s only default episode in-sample
(before Tdestruction) occurred in 2007:IV, and zero if the borrower does not experience any default episode
in-sample (before Tdestruction). Robust standard errors clustered at the two-way main bank-time level are
presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. **(*) indicates estimates are statistically differ-
ent from zero at the 5% (10%) level. Panel A (B) uses a threshold for negative flag of d¯ = 30 (d¯ = 0) days.
Panel A: d¯ = 30
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.259** 0.026
(0.095) (0.099)
θI 0.342* 0.282
(0.189) (0.183)
θP 0.507** 0.330*
(0.201) (0.191)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 3,454,204
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 56×17 56×17 56×17 56×17
s
Panel B: d¯ = 0
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.263** 0.180
(0.126) (0.165)
θI 0.355 0.379
(0.332) (0.322)
θP 0.514* 0.586*
(0.308) (0.318)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 1,665,413
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 55×17 55×17 55×17 55×17
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Table 3.8.: Robustness Check: Alternative Control Group. Loans
This table presents the estimations of specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) using as the dependent variable
the natural logarithm of Loans:
(3.2.1) ln
(
Loansi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θ × Treatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
(3.2.2) ln
(
Loansi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θI × Treatmentg × Interimt
+θP × Treatmentg × Postt + ηi,g,t
where Treatmentg takes a value of 0 if borrower i’s last default episode in-sample (before Tdestruction)
occurred in ti ∈
[
Tdestruction − 1 year, Tenactment), and 1 as in the baseline specification of table 3.3.
Robust standard errors clustered at the two-way main bank-time level are presented in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. **(*) indicates estimates are statistically different from zero at the 5% (10%)
level. Panel A (B) uses a threshold for negative flag of d¯ = 30 (d¯ = 0) days.
Panel A: d¯ = 30
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.209 -0.204
(0.116) (0.101)
θI 0.462** 0.421**
(0.104) (0.171)
θP 0.532** 0.445*
(0.095) (0.253)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 61×17 61×17 61×17 61×17
s
Panel B: d¯ = 0
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.083 -0.226**
(0.081) (0.066)
θI 0.274** 0.123
(0.080) (0.154)
θP 0.275** -0.037
(0.060) (0.226)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 61×17 61×17 61×17 61×17
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Table 3.9.: Placebo Test. Loans
This table presents the estimations of specifications (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) using as the dependent variable
the natural logarithm of Loans:
(3.2.1) ln
(
Loansi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θ × Treatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
(3.2.2) ln
(
Loansi,g,t
)
= αi + λt + δg × t+ θI × Treatmentg × Interimt
+θP × Treatmentg × Postt + ηi,g,t
for a placebo sample that starts at Tdestruction. The placebo policy intervention takes place 7 quarters
after the start of the placebo sample and is announced 2 quarters after the start of the placebo sample.
Robust standard errors clustered at the two-way main bank-time level are presented in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. ** indicates estimates are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Panel
A (B) uses a threshold for negative flag of d¯ = 30 (d¯ = 0) days.
Panel A: d¯ = 30
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.307** 0.120
(0.057) (0.078)
θI 0.121 0.008
(0.068) (0.124)
θP 0.392** 0.133
(0.028) (0.169)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 29,062,134
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 61×17 61×17 61×17 61×17
s
Panel B: d¯ = 0
(3.2.1) (3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.2)
θ 0.159** 0.131**
(0.030) (0.056)
θI 0.000 -0.036
(0.052) (0.085)
θP 0.159** 0.074
(0.043) (0.120)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 17,416,323
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 61×17 61×17 61×17 61×17
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Table 3.10.: Effects of the Policy Intervention: Default/Arrears
This table presents the estimations of specifications (3.4.1) and (3.4.2):
(3.4.1) 1
{
dijt > d¯|dijt−1 > d¯ for some j
}
i,g,t = αi + λt + δg × t
+θ × Treatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
(3.4.2) 1
{
dijt > d¯ for some j
}
i,g,t = αi + λt + δg × t
+θ × Treatmentg × Postt + εi,g,t
Robust standard errors clustered at the two-way main bank-time level are presented in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. ** indicates estimates are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Panel
A (B) uses a threshold for negative flag of d¯ = 30 (d¯ = 0) days.
Panel A: d¯ = 30
(3.4.1) (3.4.1) (3.4.2) (3.4.2)
θ 0.034** 0.043**
(0.003) (0.006)
θ 0.063** 0.052**
(0.002) (0.005)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 25,252,962
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 62×15 62×15 62×15 62×15
s
Panel B: d¯ = 0
(3.4.1) (3.4.1) (3.4.2) (3.4.2)
θ 0.043** 0.056**
(0.003) (0.008)
θ 0.086** 0.062**
(0.004) (0.005)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes No Yes
Nr. of Observations 15,058,194
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 61×15 61×15 61×15 61×15
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Table 3.11.: Inside Banks vs. Outside Banks. Loans
This table presents the estimation of specification (3.2.3) using as the dependent variable the natural
logarithm of Loans:
(3.2.3) ln
(
Loansi,g,Outside,t
)
− ln
(
Loansi,g,Inside,t
)
= µi + ξt ++βg × t
+ϕ× Treatmentg × Postt + νi,g,t
where Outside and Inside index the credit outcome for outside and inside banks starting at Tannouncement.
Robust standard errors clustered at the two-way main bank-time level are presented in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. ** indicates estimates are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Panel
A (B) uses a threshold for negative flag of d¯ = 30 (d¯ = 0) days.
Panel A: d¯ = 30
(3.2.3) (3.2.3)
ϕ 0.209** 0.401**
(0.074) (0.058)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes
Nr. of Observations 1,752,894
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 53×14 53×14
s
Panel B: d¯ = 0
(3.2.3) (3.2.3)
ϕ 0.352** 0.332**
(0.137) (0.081)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes
Nr. of Observations 983,966
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 53×15 53×15
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Table 3.12.: Inside Banks vs. Outside Banks. Maturity
This table presents the estimation of specification (3.2.3) using as the dependent variable the natural
logarithm of Maturity on Loans:
(3.2.3) ln
(
Maturityi,g,Outside,t
)
− ln
(
Maturityi,g,Inside,t
)
= µi + ξt ++βg × t
+ϕ× Treatmentg × Postt + νi,g,t
where Outside and Inside index the credit outcome for outside and inside banks starting at Tannouncement.
Robust standard errors clustered at the two-way main bank-time level are presented in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. ** indicates estimates are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Panel
A (B) uses a threshold for negative flag of d¯ = 30 (d¯ = 0) days.
Panel A: d¯ = 30
(3.2.3) (3.2.3)
ϕ -0.166 0.057
(0.090) (0.063)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes
Nr. of Observations 1,752,894
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 53×14 53×14
s
Panel B: d¯ = 0
(3.2.3) (3.2.3)
ϕ -0.026 -0.087
(0.127) (0.186)
Borrower FE and Quarter FE Yes Yes
Group Time Trends No Yes
Nr. of Observations 983,966
Level of Clustering Bank × Time Bank × Time
Nr. of Clusters 53×15 53×15
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A. Appendices to Chapter 1
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The system of equations of the equilibrium is given by:
βEt
[
Rt+1
Gt+1
(
cy,t
cm,t+1
)]
= 1 (A.1.1)
βEt
[
Rt+1
Gt+1
(
cm,t
co,t+1
)]
= 1 (A.1.2)
βEt
[
It
Πt+1Gt+1
(
cy,t
cm,t+1
)]
= 1 (A.1.3)
cy,t + lt = 1− βγ (A.1.4)
cm,t − lt = 1+ (1+ β) γ+ dt (A.1.5)
co,t = 1− γ− dt (A.1.6)[
aHS
φ−1
t + (1− aH)
] φ
φ−1 ∆t = S
1−φ
t (A.1.7)
Et−1
{(
pˇHt
)−e
YHt
(
pˇHt −
[
1
1− κ −
κ
1− κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e] 11−e)}
= 0 (A.1.8)
F−ηt (At)
−η−1 Y(1+η)t c
αy
3
y,tc
αm
3
m,tc
αo
3
o,t × (A.1.9)[
aH + (1− aH) S1−φt
] 1+η
1−φ
=
[
1
1− κ −
κ
1− κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e] 11−e
117
{
(1− κ)
[
1
1− κ −
κ
1− κ
(
pˇHt
)1−e] −e1−e
+ κ
(
pˇHt
)−e}−1
= Ft (A.1.10)
Rt =
I¯∗ξt
Πt
(A.1.11)
The non-stochastic steady state of the Home economy is characterized by a situation where
At = At−1 = A¯ = 1 . Given that utility is logarithmic, Sheedy[74, 2013] has proved that
there exists a unique steady state to the subsystem of equations composed by (A.1.1),
(A.1.2) and (A.1.4)-(A.1.6) in which G¯t = Y¯tY¯t−1 = 1 and c¯y = 1, c¯m = 1, c¯o = 1,
l¯ = −βγ, d¯ = −γ and βR¯ = 1. Given this, the remaining of the proof amounts to check
that the remaining set of equations imply a steady state in the values described in the
proposition that is consistent with G¯t = 1. Given that there is no uncertainty, all firms
pick the same price in the steady state and thus ¯ˇpH = F¯ = 1 . From the steady state of
the Foreign economy, β I¯∗ = 1. From (A.1.11), 1 = ξ¯tΠ¯t . By definition,
St
St−1 =
ξt
Πt
. Thus,
in steady state, St and Yt are constant and the system of equations reduces to (A.1.7) and
(A.1.9) with S¯ and Y¯ unknowns. A solution of this system is S¯ = 1 and Y¯ = 1.
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A.2. Parameters
The combinations of structural parameters that have been mentioned throughout the chap-
ter are:
θ ≡
2 (1+ β) + βγ+
√
(1+ 2β)2 + 3
[
1− (βγ)2
]
2 (1+ γ)
λ ≡ 2 (βγ− 1)
2 (1+ β)− βγ+
√
(1+ 2β)2 + 3
[
1− (βγ)2
]
χ ≡ 1
3
[
(γβ)2 + γ (θ − β)2 + (−γθ)2
]
+
1
1− η
1
3
[
αy (γβ− ζ)2 + αm (γ (θ − β)− ζ)2 + αo (−γθ − ζ)2
]
ΘA ≡ $(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
− (1+ aHψ) ζ$
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) [θ (1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) + (1+ aHψ) ζ] (1− λβΓ)
Θd ≡ δζ
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2
−
(1+ aHψ)
{
χ [(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2 + δζ2
}
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2 [θ (1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) + (1+ aHψ) ζ] (1− λ2β)
Θpi ≡ e+ δα
(1− α) (1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
[
θ
θ (1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) + (1+ aHψ) ζ
]
where:
δ ≡ (1+ η)− 2 (1+ η) (1− aH)ψ+ (1− aH) [(φ+ η) (1− aH) + 1− φ]ψ2
$ ≡ (1− aH) aH (1− φ)ψ
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A.3. The Loss Function
The social planner of the home economy maximizes the following social welfare function:
Wo = E0
[
1
3
∞
∑
t=−2
βtUt
]
= E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
1
3
(
lnCy,t + lnCm,t + lnCo,t
)
− 1
1+ η
1
3
(
α
−η
y H
1+η
y,t + α
−η
m H
1+η
m,t + α
−η
o H
1+η
o,t
)]}
+tip
where tip stands for “terms independent of monetary policy”. We will proceed step by step.
A.3.1. The term
(
α
−η
y H
1+η
y,t + α
−η
m H
1+η
m,t + α
−η
o H
1+η
o,t
)
From the intratemporal first order condition of the consumers in the Home economy:
α
−η
i =
H−ηi,t wi,t
Ci,t
Plugging this into our term of interest:
(
α
−η
y H
1+η
y,t + α
−η
m H
1+η
m,t + α
−η
o H
1+η
o,t
)
=
Hy,twy,t
Cy,t
+
Hm,twm,t
Cm,t
+
Ho,two,t
Co,t
=
1
Yt
(
Hy,twy,t
cy,t
+
Hm,twm,t
cm,t
+
Ho,two,t
co,t
)
From the allocation of labour demands by firms, the equilibrium in the labour market at
Home and taking into account xtAt = wt:(
α
−η
y H
1+η
y,t + α
−η
m H
1+η
m,t + α
−η
o H
1+η
o,t
)
=
xtAtNt
Yt
(
αy
cy,t
+
αm
cm,t
+
αo
co,t
)
From the aggregate production function, YtFt
(
Pt
PHt
)
= AtNt, thus:
(
α
−η
y H
1+η
y,t + α
−η
m H
1+η
m,t + α
−η
o H
1+η
o,t
)
=
xt
Ft
(
Pt
PHt
)(
αy
cy,t
+
αm
cm,t
+
αo
co,t
)
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From the expression for xt - recall Yˆt ≡ Yt
(At)
1
1−(1−aH)ψ
:
(
α
−η
y H
1+η
y,t + α
−η
m H
1+η
m,t + α
−η
o H
1+η
o,t
)
= c
αy
3
y,tc
αm
3
m,tc
αo
3
o,tYˆ
1+η
t × (A.3.1)(
Pt
PHt
)1+η
F−η−1t ×
(At)
(1+η)(1−aH)ψ
1−(1−aH)ψ
(
αy
cy,t
+
αm
cm,t
+
αo
co,t
)
Employing the definition of the natural terms of trade Snt = A
− ψ
1−(1−aH)ψ
t , we can rewrite
this as:
(
α
−η
y H
1+η
y,t + α
−η
m H
1+η
m,t + α
−η
o H
1+η
o,t
)
= c
αy
3
y,tc
αm
3
m,tc
αo
3
o,tYˆ
1+η
t × (A.3.2)(
Pt
PHt
)1+η
F−η−1t ×
(Snt )
−(1+η)(1−aH)
(
αy
cy,t
+
αm
cm,t
+
αo
co,t
)
A.3.2. The term 13
(
lnCy,t + lnCm,t + lnCo,t
)
1
3
(
lnCy,t + lnCm,t + lnCo,t
)
=
1
3
(
ln cy,t + ln cm,t + ln co,t + 3 lnYt
)
=
1
3
(
ln cy,t + ln cm,t + ln co,t
)
+ lnYt
=
1
3
(
ln cy,t + ln cm,t + ln co,t
)
+ ln Yˆt +
1
1− (1− aH)ψ ln At
=
1
3
(
ln cy,t + ln cm,t + ln co,t
)
+ ln Yˆt + tip
=
1
3
(
c˜y,t + c˜m,t + c˜o,t
)
+ Yˆt + tip (A.3.3)
where the last equality uses the fact that the steady state values for those variables are
equal to one.
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A.3.3. Second-order approximations
The approximation of the loss function will employ the following second-order approxima-
tions
1.
(Ft)−η−1 = eF˜t(−η−1)
= 1+ (−η − 1) F˜t + (−η − 1)
2
2
(
F˜t
)2
+O (3)
2.
(
Yˆt
)1+η
= eYˆt(1+η)
= 1+ (1+ η) Yˆt +
(1+ η)2
2
(
Yˆt
)2
+O (3)
3.
1
3
(
c˜y,t + c˜m,t + c˜o,t
)
= −1
2
1
3
(
c˜2y,t + c˜
2
m,t + c˜
2
o,t
)
+O (3)
4.
c
αy
3
y,tc
αm
3
m,tc
αo
3
o,t = e
c˜y,t
αy
3 +c˜m,t
αm
3 +c˜o,t
αo
3
= 1+
(
c˜y,t
αy
3
+ c˜m,t
αm
3
+ c˜o,t
αo
3
)
+
1
2
(
c˜y,t
αy
3
+ c˜m,t
αm
3
+ c˜o,t
αo
3
)2
+O (3)
5.
αy
cy,t
+
αm
cm,t
+
αo
co,t
= αye−c˜y,t + αme−c˜m,t + αoe−c˜o,t
= 3− (αy c˜y,t + αm c˜m,t + αo c˜o,t)+
1
2
[
αy c˜2y,t + αm c˜
2
m,t + αo c˜
2
o,t
]
+O (3)
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6.
Ft =
{
(1− κ)
[
1
1− κ −
κ
1− κ e
˜ˇpHt (1−e)
] −e
1−e
+ κe−e ˜ˇp
H
t
}−1
F˜t = − κe2 (1− κ)
(
˜ˇpHt
)2
+O (3)
= − κe
2 (1− κ)
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)2
+O (3)
where the last equality uses the fact that Et−1 ˜ˇpHt = 0+O (2).
7.
(
Pt
PHt
)1+η
=
[
aH + (1− aH) S1−φt
] 1+η
1−φ
=
[
aH + (1− aH) eS˜t(1−φ)
] 1+η
1−φ
= 1+ (1+ η) (1− aH) S˜t +
1
2
(1+ η) (1− aH) [(φ+ η) (1− aH) + (1− φ)] S˜2t
8.
(At)
(1+η)(1−aH)ψ
1−(1−aH)ψ = e
A˜t
[
(1+η)(1−aH)ψ
1−(1−aH)ψ
]
= 1+ A˜t
[
(1+ η) (1− aH)ψ
1− (1− aH)ψ
]
+
1
2
(
A˜t
)2 [ (1+ η) (1− aH)ψ
1− (1− aH)ψ
]2
+O (3)
9.
(Snt )
−(1+η)(1−aH) = e−S˜
n
t (1+η)(1−aH)
= 1− S˜nt (1+ η) (1− aH)
+
1
2
(1+ η)2 (1− aH)2
(
S˜nt
)2
+O (3)
A.3.4. The Second-Order Approximation to the Welfare Function
Approx II: Terms of Trade Gap
The objective of the social planner is thus to maximize:
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Wo = E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
1
3
(
c˜y,t + c˜m,t + c˜o,t
)
+ Yˆt − 11+ η c
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3
y,tc
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3
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1
3
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1
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1
3
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+ tip
Now we plug all our results from before, and eliminating all elements of order greater than
2:
Wo = E0
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∑
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+ (1− aH) S˜nt + (1+ η) (1− aH) S˜nt Yˆt + (1+ η) (1− aH)2 S˜tS˜nt
}
+O (3) + tip
= E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
−1
2
1
3
(
c˜2y,t + c˜
2
m,t + c˜
2
o,t
)
− (1+ η)
2
(
Yˆt
)2
+ F˜t
− 1
1+ η
1
2
[(αy
3
c˜2y,t +
αm
3
c˜2m,t +
αo
3
c˜2o,t
)
−
(
c˜y,t
αy
3
+ c˜m,t
αm
3
+ c˜o,t
αo
3
)2]
− (1− aH) Sˆt − (1+ η) (1− aH) YˆtSˆt − 12 (1− aH) [(φ+ η) (1− aH) + (1− φ)] Sˆ
2
t
− (1− aH) aH (1− φ) SˆtS˜nt
}
+O (3) + tip
where the last equalities use the definition of the terms of trade gap, Sˆt + S˜nt = S˜t. From
the equilibrium conditions:
(αy
3
c˜2y,t +
αm
3
c˜2m,t +
αo
3
c˜2o,t
)
=
d˜2t
θ2
[αy
3
(γβ− ζ)2
−
(
c˜y,t
αy
3
+ c˜m,t
αm
3
+ c˜o,t
αo
3
)2
+
αm
3
(γ (θ − β)− ζ)2 + αo
3
(−γθ − ζ)2
]
and:
1
3
(
c˜2y,t + c˜
2
m,t + c˜
2
o,t
)
=
1
3
[
(γβ)2 + γ (θ − β)2 + (−γθ)2
] d˜2t
θ2
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to rewrite the welfare function as:
Wo = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
−1
2
1
3
[
(γβ)2 + γ (θ − β)2 + (−γθ)2
] d˜2t
θ2
− (1+ η)
2
Yˆ2t
− κe
2 (1− κ)
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)2
− 1
1+ η
1
2
[αy
3
(γβ− ζ)2 + αm
3
(γ (θ − β)− ζ)2 + αo
3
(−γθ − ζ)2
] d˜2t
θ2
− (1− aH) Sˆt − (1+ η) (1− aH) YˆtSˆt −
1
2
(1− aH) [(φ+ η) (1− aH) + (1− φ)] Sˆ2t
− (1− aH) aH (1− φ) SˆtS˜nt
}
+O (3) + tip
or:
Wo = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
−1
2
χ
θ2
d˜2t −
(1− η)
2
Yˆ2t −
κe
2 (1− κ)
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)2
− (1− aH) Sˆt − (1+ η) (1− aH) YˆtSˆt − 12 (1− aH) [(φ+ η) (1− aH) + (1− φ)] Sˆ
2
t
− (1− aH) aH (1− φ) SˆtS˜nt
}
+O (3) + tip
with:
χ ≡ 1
3
[
(γβ)2 + γ (θ − β)2 + (−γθ)2
]
+
1
1+ η
1
3
[
αy (γβ− ζ)2 + αm (γ (θ − β)− ζ)2 + αo (−γθ − ζ)2
]
The loss function L0 is defined as −W0 excluding terms of order higher than 2 and terms
independent of monetary policy::
L0 = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
1
2
χ
θ2
d˜2t +
(1+ η)
2
Yˆ2t +
e
2
(
κ
1− κ
)(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)2
+ (1− aH) Sˆt + (1+ η) (1− aH) YˆtSˆt + 12 (1− aH) [(φ+ η) (1− aH) + (1− φ)] Sˆ
2
t
+ (1− aH) aH (1− φ) SˆtS˜nt
}
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The loss function in the main text just replaces the definition of S˜nt .
A.4. The First Order Condition of the Central Planner
In the decentralized equilibrium of the model, the following holds (see Sheedy[74, 2013]):
l˜t = − d˜t
θ
The loss function can then be rewritten as:
L0 = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
χ
2
l˜2t +
(1− η)
2
Yˆ2t +
e
2
(
κ
1− κ
)(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)2
+ (1− aH) Sˆt + (1+ η) (1− aH) YˆtSˆt + 12 (1− aH) [(φ+ η) (1− aH) + (1− φ)] Sˆ
2
t
+ (1− aH) aH (1− φ) SˆtS˜nt
}
(A.4.1)
The constraints of this minimization problem are given by the equilibrium conditions as
follows:
Et l˜t+1 = λl˜t (A.4.2)
(1+ aHψ)
(
Yˆt − Yˆt−1
)
= θ l˜t + l˜t−1 + (1+ aH) (1− φ)
(
S˜nt − S˜nt−1
)
(A.4.3)
− κ
1− κ
(
Et−1Π˜Ht − Π˜Ht
)
= (1+ η) Yˆt + ζ l˜t + (1+ η) (1− aH) Sˆt (A.4.4)
Sˆt = −ψYˆt (A.4.5)
The endogenous variables are l˜t, Yˆt, Sˆt, and Π˜Ht . After plugging the definition of the terms
of trade, the Lagrangian is given by:
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L = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
{
χ
2
l˜2t +
e
2
(
κ
1− κ
)(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)2
+
δ
2
Yˆ2t −
[
ψ (1− aH) + $S˜nt
]
Yˆt
}
(A.4.6)
+
∞
∑
t=0
βtE0
{
גt
[
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) Yˆt + ζ l˜t − κ1− κ
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)]}
+
∞
∑
t=0
βtE0
{
kt
[
λl˜t − l˜t+1
]}
+
∞
∑
t=0
βtE0
{
it
[
θ l˜t + l˜t−1 + (1+ aH) (1− φ)
(
S˜nt − S˜nt−1
)− (1+ aHψ) (Yˆt − Yˆt−1)]}
with
δ = (1+ η)− 2 (1+ η) (1− aH)ψ+ (1− aH) [(φ+ η) (1− aH) + 1− φ]ψ2
$ = (1− aH) aH (1− φ)ψ
The FOC with respect to Π˜Ht , l˜t and Yˆt:
e
[
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
]
= גt − Et−1גt (A.4.7)
χl˜t + גtζ +ktλ− β−1kt−1 +itθ + βEtit+1 = 0 (A.4.8)
δYˆt −
[
ψ (1− aH) + $S˜nt
]
(A.4.9)
+גt (1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
−it (1+ aHψ) + β (1+ aHψ) Etit+1 = 0
Conjecture Etit+1 = 0 (to be verified later). Then, the system is:
e
[
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
]
= גt − Et−1גt (A.4.10)
χl˜t + גtζ +ktλ− β−1kt−1 +itθ = 0 (A.4.11)
δYˆt −
[
ψ (1− aH) + $S˜nt
]
(A.4.12)
+גt (1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)−it (1+ aHψ) = 0
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It’s evident that the key to solving the system is to find גt − Et−1גt. To find this term, we
start from (A.4.12):
גt = it
(1+ aHψ)
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) +
ψ (1− aH) + $S˜nt
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) −
δ
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) Yˆt
From the Phillips Curve:
Yˆt =
κ
1− κ
1
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)
− ζ
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) l˜t
Plugging in the previous equation:
גt = it
(1+ aHψ)
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) −
κ
1− κ
δ
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)
+
δζ
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2
l˜t +
ψ (1− aH)
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
+
$
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) S˜
n
t
Taking conditional expectations and employing the guess:
Etגt+1 =
δζ
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2
Et l˜t+1 +
ψ (1− aH)
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
+
$
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)EtS˜
n
t+1
Combining the last two:
גt − Et−1גt = it (1+ aHψ)(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) (A.4.13)
− κ
1− κ
δ
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)
+
δζ
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2
[
l˜t − Et−1 l˜t
]
+
$
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
(
S˜nt − Et−1S˜nt
)
(A.4.14)
Now it is necessary to solve for it (which will confirm the guess). It turns out it is first
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necessary to solve for kt. Taking conditional expectation of (A.4.11) at t+ 1:
kt = χβEt l˜t+1 + ζβEtגt+1 + λβEtkt+1
From previous equations, we can replace Etגt+1 in the last expression:
kt =
[
χβ+
ζ2βδ
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2
]
Et l˜t+1 +
ζβψ (1− aH)
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
+
ζβ$
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)EtS˜
n
t+1 + λβEtkt+1
We can employ forward operators to solve for kt (FlXt = EtXt+l):
kt (1− λβF) =
[
χβ+
ζ2βδ
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2
]
Fl˜t +
ζβψ (1− aH)
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
+
ζβ$
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)FS˜
n
t
kt =
[
χβ+
ζ2βδ
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2
]
F
1− λβF l˜t
+
ζβψ (1− aH)
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
1
1− λβF
+
ζβ$
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
F
1− λβF S˜
n
t
Recall Fl˜t = Et l˜t+1 = λl˜t and assume FS˜nt = EtS˜nt+1 = ΓS˜nt . Then:
kt =
[
χ+
ζ2δ
[(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]2
]
βλ
1− λ2β l˜t +
ζψ (1− aH)
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
β
1− λβ
+
ζ$
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)
βΓ
1− λβΓ S˜
n
t
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Now we plug this result back in (A.4.11) together with our solution for גt above:
it =
κ
1− κ
δζ
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) [ζ (1+ aHψ) + θ (1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]
− ζ$
(
S˜nt − Et−1S˜nt
)
[ζ (1+ aHψ) + θ (1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]
1
1− λβΓ
− χ [(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]
2 + ζ2δ
(1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH) [ζ (1+ aHψ) + θ (1+ η) (1− ψ+ ψaH)]
(
l˜t − Et−1 l˜t
)
1− λ2β
which confirms the guess and where the definitions λl˜t−1 = Et−1 l˜t and ΓS˜nt−1 = Et−1S˜nt
were employed. Finally, we plug the solution for it and (A.4.13) in (A.4.10):
(
e+ α1−α
δθ
(1+η)(1−ψ+ψaH)[ζ(1+aHψ)+θ(1+η)(1−ψ+ψaH)]
) (
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)
=(
δζ
[(1+η)(1−ψ+ψaH)]2
− χ(1+aHψ)[(1+η)(1−ψ+ψaH)]2+ζ2δ(1+aHψ)
[(1+η)(1−ψ+ψaH)]2[ζ(1+aHψ)+θ(1+η)(1−ψ+ψaH)](1−λ2β)
) (
l˜t − Et−1 l˜t
)
+
(
$
(1+η)(1−ψ+ψaH) −
(1+aHψ)
(1+η)(1−ψ+ψaH)
ζ$
[ζ(1+aHψ)+θ(1+η)(1−ψ+ψaH)](1−λβΓ)
) (
S˜nt − Et−1S˜nt
)
Defining ΘA, Θd and Θpi as in Appendix A.2, the first order condition is rewritten as:
Θpi
(
Π˜Ht − Et−1Π˜Ht
)
= Θd
(
l˜t − Et−1 l˜t
)
+ΘA
(
S˜nt − Et−1S˜nt
)
(A.4.15)
The first order condition of the main text replaces the equilibrium condition for l˜t and the
definition of S˜nt . Writing the Phillips curve and the definition of the real return in the form
of unanticipated responses, the system of equations of the main text is complete.
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B. Appendices to Chapter 2
B.1. Proof of Proposition 8
1. (⇐): If yAand yB are independent, it is possible to write f (yA, yB) = g (yA) h (yB)and
F
(
yA, yB
)
= G
(
yA
)
H
(
yB
)
. Imposing this in (2.1.9) and (2.1.11), and using
µ = 0, it is straightforward to show that both of them collapse to:
u1
([
1− H
(
`B
γ
)]
`B
) [
1− H1
(
`B
γ
)
`B
γ
− H
(
`B
γ
)]
−β
yHˆ
`B
γ
u1
(
yB − `B
)
h
(
yB
)
dyB = 0
which does not depend on `A. Thus, VB
(
`A, 1
)
= VB
(
`A, 0
)
and VB1
(
`A, 0
)
=
VB1
(
`A, 1
)
= 0. Imposing these on (2.1.16), this condition is reduced to Θ
(
`A,P
)
=
0 as λ > 0, which is the same optimality condition of the decentralized equilibrium
assuming interior solutions.
2. (⇒): Suppose that the decentralized allocation is ex-ante efficient. Then, there
exists some λ for which Θ
(
`A,P
)
= 0. For the same value of λ, from (2.1.16), it
follows that, for interior solutions:
G′
(
`A,SP
γ
)
1
γ
[
VB
(
`A,SP, 1
)
−VB
(
`A,SP, 0
)]
+[
1− G
(
`A,SP
γ
)]
VB1
(
`A,SP, 0
)
+ G
(
`A,SP
γ
)
VB1
(
`A,SP, 1
)
= 0
This condition is not true in general as long as it involves both preferences and
the distribution of income, which can be chosen arbitrarily and separately from one
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another. As for interior solutions G (·) > 0 and increasing, efficiency requires:
VB
(
`A, 1
)
−VB
(
`A, 0
)
= 0
VB1
(
`A,SP, 0
)
= 0
VB1
(
`A,SP, 1
)
= 0
which are jointly true only if Ξ
(
`A, 0; `B
)
and Υ
(
`A, 0; `B
)
do not depend on `A.
As u1 > 0 (Inada condition) and `B < γyH, this holds only if f
(
yA, yB
)
=
g
(
yA
)
h
(
yB
)
and F
(
yA, yB
)
= G
(
yA
)
H
(
yB
)
.
B.2. Solution of the simulated model
B.2.1. Basics
The probability density function for y is:
f (y) =

1−ρ
yH−yL yL ≤ y < yH
ρ y = yH
0 o.w.
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Using this, we can calculate the following moments for the problem of Borrower A:
Pr (y ≥ t) =
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
)
yL ≤ t ≤ yH
0 t > yH
Pr (y < t) =
(1− ρ)
(
t−yL
yH−yL
)
yL ≤ t ≤ yH
1 t > yH
E [u (y) | y ≥ t] =
yHˆ
t
u (y)
g (y)
Pr (y ≥ t)dy+
ρ
Pr (y ≥ t)u (yH)
=
yHˆ
t
u (y)
1−ρ
yH−yL
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
)dy+ ρ
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
)u (yH)
=
1−ρ
yH−yL
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
) yHˆ
t
u (y) dy+
ρ
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
)u (yH)
E [u (y) | y < t] =
tˆ
yL
u (y)
g (y)
Pr (y < t)
dy
=
tˆ
yL
u (y)
1−ρ
(yH−yL)
(1− ρ)
(
t−yL
yH−yL
)dy
=
1
(t− yL)
tˆ
yL
u (y) dy
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Assuming that Borrower A chose to repay on `A = x < γyH, his action reveals y ≥ xγ
and we can calculate the following moments for the problem of Borrower B:
Pr
(
y ≥ t | y ≥ x
γ
)
=
ρ
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) + yHˆ
t
1−ρ
yH−yL
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
)dy
=
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
)
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
)
Pr
(
y < t | y ≥ x
γ
)
= 1−
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
)
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
)
=
(1− ρ)
(
t− xγ
yH−yL
)
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
)
E
[
u (y) | y ≥ t, y ≥ x
γ
]
=
yHˆ
t
u (y)
1−ρ
yH−yL
ρ+(1−ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
)
ρ+(1−ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
)
ρ+(1−ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) dy
+
ρ
ρ+(1−ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
)
ρ+(1−ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
)
ρ+(1−ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) u (yH)
=
1−ρ
yH−yL
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
) yHˆ
t
u (y) dy
+
ρ
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH−t
yH−yL
)u (yH)
E
[
u (y) | y < t, y ≥ x
γ
]
=
1−ρ
yH−yL
(1− ρ)
(
t− xγ
yH−yL
) tˆ
x
γ
u (y) dy
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Finally, assuming that Borrower A chose to default on `A = x < γyH, his action reveals
y < xγ and we can calculate the following moments for the problem of Borrower B:
Pr
(
y ≥ t | y < x
γ
)
=
x
γˆ
t
1
x
γ − yL
dy
=
x
γ − t
x
γ − yL
Pr
(
y < t | y < x
γ
)
= 1−
x
γ − t
x
γ − yL
=
t− yL
x
γ − yL
E
[
u (y) | y ≥ t, y < x
γ
]
=
x
γˆ
t
u (y)
1
x
γ−yL
Pr (y ≥ t)dy
=
1
x
γ − t
x
γˆ
t
u (y) dy
E
[
u (y) | y < t, y < x
γ
]
=
1
t− yL
tˆ
yL
u (y) dy
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B.2.2. Decentralized Equilibrium
B.2.2.1. Problem of Borrower A
Using the results above, the problem of Borrower A can be expressed as:
max`A∈[γyL,γyH ] u
(
Pr
(
y ≥ `
A
γ
)
`A
)
+ β
{
Pr
(
y ≥ `
A
γ
)
E
[
u
(
y− `A
)
| y ≥ `
A
γ
]
+
[
Pr
(
y <
`A
γ
)]
E
[
u (y− γy) | y < `
A
γ
]}
= max`A∈[γyL,γyH ] u
ρ+ (1− ρ)
yH − `Aγ
yH − yL
 `A

+β
ρ+ (1− ρ)
yH − `Aγ
yH − yL
×

1−ρ
yH−yL
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Aγ
yH−yL
) yHˆ
`A
γ
u
(
y− `A
)
dy
+
ρ
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Aγ
yH−yL
)u (yH − `A)

+β
(1− ρ)
 `Aγ − yL
yH − yL

 1( `A
γ − yL
)
`A
γˆ
yL
u (y (1− γ)) dy

136
Using (2.2.1):
max`A∈[γyL,γyH ]
([
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Aγ
yH−yL
)]
`A
)1−σ
1− σ
+β
ρ+ (1− ρ)
yH − `Aγ
yH − yL
×

1−ρ
yH−yL
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Aγ
yH−yL
) yHˆ
`A
γ
(
y− `A)1−σ
1− σ dy
+
ρ
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Aγ
yH−yL
) (yH − `A)1−σ
1− σ

+β
(1− ρ)
 `Aγ − yL
yH − yL

 1( `A
γ − yL
)
`A
γˆ
yL
[y (1− γ)]1−σ
1− σ dy

= max`A∈[γyL,γyH ]
[
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Aγ
yH−yL
)]1−σ (
`A
)1−σ
1− σ
+β
ρ+ (1− ρ)
yH − `Aγ
yH − yL
×

1−ρ
yH−yL
[(
yH − `A
)2−σ − (`A (1−γγ ))2−σ][
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Aγ
yH−yL
)]
(1− σ) (2− σ)
+
ρ
[(
yH − `A
)1−σ][
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Aγ
yH−yL
)]
(1− σ)

+β
(1− ρ)
 `Aγ − yL
yH − yL
 (1− γ)1−σ
[(
`A
γ
)2−σ − (yL)2−σ](
`A
γ − yL
)
(1− σ) (2− σ)
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= max
`A∈[γyL,γyH ]
[
ρ+
(
1−ρ
yH−yL
) (
yH − `Aγ
)]1−σ (
`A
)1−σ
1− σ
+
β
(1− σ) (2− σ)
[
1− ρ
yH − yL
(
yH − `A
)2−σ
− 1− ρ
yH − yL
(
`A
)2−σ (1− γ
γ
)2−σ
+ ρ (2− σ)
(
yH − `A
)1−σ]
+
β
(1− σ) (2− σ)
[(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)]
(1− γ)1−σ
[(
`A
γ
)2−σ
− (yL)2−σ
]
B.2.2.2. Optimization by Borrower A: conditions on interior solution
The aforementioned maximization problem has two constraints: `A ≥ γyLand `A ≤ γyH.
This constraints can be rewritten as:
γyL − `A ≤ 0
`A − γyH ≤ 0
Let µ and θ be the respective Lagrange multipliers on this two constraints. The first order
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condition of the problem of Borrower A is:
∇
(
`A
)
=
[
ρ`A + yH
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
`A − 1
γ
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)(
`A
)2]−σ ×{
ρ+ yH
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
− 2
γ
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
`A
}
+
β
(1− σ) (2− σ)
[
− (2− σ) 1− ρ
yH − yL
(
yH − `A
)1−σ
− (2− σ) 1− ρ
yH − yL
(
`A
)1−σ (1− γ
γ
)2−σ
− ρ (2− σ) (1− σ)
(
yH − `A
)−σ]
+
β
(1− σ) (2− σ)
[(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)]
(1− γ)1−σ
[
(2− σ)
(
`A
γ
)1−σ ( 1
γ
)]
= −µ+ θ
=
[
ρ`A +
yH (1− ρ)
yH − yL `
A − 1− ρ
γ (yH − yL)
(
`A
)2]−σ ×[
ρ+
yH (1− ρ)
yH − yL −
2 (1− ρ)
γ (yH − yL)`
A
]
+
β
(1− σ)
1− ρ
yH − yL
[(
1− γ
γ
)1−σ (
`A
)1−σ − (yH − `A)1−σ
]
−βρ
(
yH − `A
)−σ
= −µ+ θ
In the following expression I explore the conditions under which the first constraint is slack
but the second binds with equality: `A = γyH. That is, conditions under which µ = 0
and θ > 0 at `A = γyH. Imposing these, the condition collapses to:
ρ−σ
[
1−
(
1− ρ
ρ
)
yH
yH − yL
]
> β
(
1
γ
− 1
)−σ
(B.2.1)
B.2.2.3. Problem of Borrower B
Assume `A = x < γyH. As in the main text, the optimization problem of Borrower B
depends on the default choice of Borrower A given x.
1. If Borrower A repays, then this action will reveal xγ ≤ y, and nothing more than that.
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The problem of Borrower B is:
max`B∈[x,γyH ] u
(
Pr
(
y ≥ `
B
γ
)
`B
)
+β
{
Pr
(
y ≥ `
B
γ
)
E
[
u
(
y− `B
)
| y ≥ `
B
γ
,=B
]
+[
Pr
(
y <
`B
γ
)]
E
[
u (y− γy) | y < `
B
γ
,=B
]}
= max`B∈[x,γyH ] u

ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Bγ
yH−yL
)
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) `B
+ β
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Bγ
yH−yL
)
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) ×

1−ρ
yH−yL
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Bγ
yH−yL
) yHˆ
`B
γ
u
(
y− `B
)
dy
+
ρ
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Bγ
yH−yL
)u (yH − `B)

+β

(1− ρ)
(
`B
γ − xγ
yH−yL
)
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
)
 1`Bγ − xγ
`B
γˆ
x
γ
u (y (1− γ)) dy
= max`B∈[x,γyH ] u

ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− `Bγ
yH−yL
)
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) `B
+ βρ+ (1− ρ)( yH− xγyH−yL
) ×
 1− ρyH − yL
yHˆ
`B
γ
u
(
y− `B
)
dy+ ρu
(
yH − `B
)
+
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
) `Bγˆ
x
γ
u (y (1− γ)) dy

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using (2.2.1):
max`B∈[x,γyH ]
 ρ+(1−ρ)
(
yH− `
B
γ
yH−yL
)
ρ+(1−ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) `B

1−σ
1− σ +
β
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) ×
 1− ρyH − yL
yHˆ
`B
γ
(
y− `B)1−σ
1− σ dy+ ρ
(
yH − `B
)1−σ
1− σ
+
1− ρ
yH − yL
`B
γˆ
x
γ
(y (1− γ))1−σ
1− σ dy

= max`B∈[x,γyH ]
1[
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
)]1−σ ×
[
ρ+
(
1−ρ
yH−yL
) (
yH − `Bγ
)]1−σ (
`B
)1−σ
1− σ
+
1
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) × β
(1− σ) (2− σ)
[(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)((
yH − `B
)2−σ −(1− γ
γ
)2−σ (
`B
)2−σ)
+
ρ (2− σ)
(
yH − `B
)1−σ
+
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
(1− γ)1−σ
(
`B
γ
2−σ
− x
γ
2−σ
)]
The aforementioned maximization problem has two constraints: `B ≥ x and `B ≤
γyH. This constraints can be rewritten as:
x− `B ≤ 0
`B − γyH ≤ 0
Let ϕ and υ be the respective Lagrange multipliers on this two constraints. The first
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order condition of the problem of Borrower B is:
∇
(
`B,R,d
A=0
)
=
1[
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
)]1−σ ×
[
ρ`B + `B
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
yH −
(
`B
)2( 1− ρ
yH − yL
)
1
γ
]−σ
×[
ρ+
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
yH − `B
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
2
γ
]
+
1
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) ×
{
β
(1− σ) (2− σ)×[
− (2− σ) 1− ρ
yH − yL
(
yH − `B
)1−σ−(
1− γ
γ
)2−σ
(2− σ) 1− ρ
yH − yL
(
`B
)1−σ]
−ρβ
(
yH − `B
)−σ
+
β
(1− σ) (2− σ)
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
(1− γ)1−σ ×
(2− σ)
(
`B
γ
)1−σ ( 1
γ
)}
= −ϕ+ ν
=
1[
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
)]1−σ ×
[
ρ`B + `B
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
yH −
(
`B
)2( 1− ρ
yH − yL
)
1
γ
]−σ
×[
ρ+
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
yH − `B
(
1− ρ
yH − yL
)
2
γ
]
+
1
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH− xγ
yH−yL
) ×
{
β
(1− σ)
1− ρ
yH − yL
[(
1− γ
γ
)1−σ (
`B
)1−σ − (yH − `B)1−σ
]
−βρ
(
yH − `B
)−σ}
= −ϕ+ ν
In the following expression I explore the conditions under which the first constraint
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is slack but the second binds with equality: `B = γyH. That is, conditions under
which ϕ = 0 and ν > 0 at `B = γyH. Imposing these, the condition collapses to[
ρ+ (1− ρ)
(
yH − xγ
yH − yL
)]σ
× (B.2.2)
ρ−σ
[
1−
(
1− ρ
ρ
)(
yH
yH − yL
)]
> β
(
1
γ
− 1
)−σ
2. Conversely, if Borrower A defaults, then his action will reveal y < xγ . The problem
of Borrower B is:
max`B∈[γyL,x) u
(
Pr
(
y ≥ `
B
γ
)
`B
)
+β
{
Pr
(
y ≥ `
B
γ
)
E
[
u
(
y− `B
)
| y ≥ `
B
γ
,=B
]
+[
Pr
(
y <
`B
γ
)]
E
[
u (y− γy) | y < `
B
γ
,=B
]}
= max`B∈[γyL,x) u
 xγ − `Bγ
x
γ − yL
`B
+
β
x
γ − yL

x
γˆ
`B
γ
u
(
y− `B
)
dy+
`B
γˆ
yL
u (y (1− γ)) dy

Using (2.2.1):
= max`B∈[γyL,x)
1
1− σ
`B xγ − 1γ (`B)2
x
γ − yL
1−σ
+
β(
x
γ − yL
)
(1− σ) (2− σ)
(
x
γ
− `B
)2−σ
− β(
x
γ − yL
)
(1− σ) (2− σ)
(
1− γ
γ
)2−σ (
`B
)2−σ
+
β (1− γ)1−σ(
x
γ − yL
)
(1− σ) (2− σ)
(
`B
γ
)2−σ
− β (1− γ)
1−σ(
x
γ − yL
)
(1− σ) (2− σ)
y2−σL
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and the first order condition is:
∇
(
`B,R,d
A=1
)
=
`B xγ − 1γ (`B)2
x
γ − yL
−σ ( x
γ
− 2
γ
`B
)
− β
(1− σ)
(
x
γ
− `B
)1−σ
+
β
(1− σ)
(
1− γ
γ
)1−σ (
`B
)1−σ
= 0.
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